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Foreword 
 
Today, drug counterfeiting is a rapidly growing phenomenon in both developed and developing countries. The 
number of victims is rising, as is the income derived - almost with impunity - from transnational organized crime.  
The International Institute of Research against counterfeit Medicines (IRACM) intends to devise measures to 
better understand the phenomenon, educate and motivate leaders, rally public opinion, warn potential victims 
and to facilitate the implementation of strategies related to these issues, both from governments and the 
international community. This is the IRACM’s very reason for existing. 
Drug counterfeiting is primarily a ‘dark figure’, and most likely a considerable one. The effectiveness and 
credibility of the solutions are subject to a systematic and comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon, all 
its aspects, its mechanisms and the strategy of organized crime, which, in many parts of world, has become a 
leading activity. 
This is why the IRACM decided to support the creation of an in-depth study and instructed a particularly 
competent researcher in the field, Eric Przyswa, to conduct it. 
The work he has achieved is substantial and we now know more thanks to him. He has written a very full report, 
which, once published, will no doubt be a milestone in the understanding of the role of organized crime in drug 
counterfeiting and the implications and effects of these truly transnational crimes. Transnational because they 
thrive in the wake of globalization by exploiting the destitution in poor countries and the credulity of the people in 
rich countries. 
Through this report, the IRACM wishes to inform as many citizens of the world as possible of the dangers and 
threats it has revealed, and to ensure that policymakers take them into account to implement the necessary 
action, contain organized crime, protect society and safeguard the rule of law in our countries against the power 
these criminals have gained. 
 
 
Bernard Leroy, Director of IRACM 
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Introduction 
 
The combat against counterfeiting started during the 1980s and, at that time, was limited to sectors where it was 
frequently the consumer who asked for the product, and was even party to the purchase. Above all, it is only 
since the start of the 2000s that the situation expanded substantially particularly with the liberalisation of the 
WTO1, technological developments, containerisation and the significance of China as the world's factory. On the 
other hand, it was only later that counterfeiting seemed to affect the pharmaceutical sector, at least from the 
industrial point of view. Studies and reports have covered the involvement of organised crime in ‘traditional’ 
counterfeiting, particularly in creative industries (luxury goods, audiovisual). 
Nevertheless, even if there are more and more discussions on the topics of ‘counterfeit medicines’ and 
‘organised crime’, very few researchers have analysed the relationship between the two phenomena. 
Consequently, it appeared that such a report should be written and a dual objective was decided: 
- To take as objective and as rigorous a view as possible on the reality of the "counterfeiting – criminal 
organisations" combination in the area of medicines. 
- From a criminology and strategic standpoint, to give some consideration to what could be done to guide current 
actions. 
What about the reality of this phenomenon? How can criminal organisations be characterised in our area of 
study? Are these organisations transnational? Is the Internet a genuine Eldorado for criminal organisations 
dealing in medicines? 
The questions relating to our problems proved to be varied and complex. One of the interests in this research is 
to offer new food for thought on a potentially real, but still opaque threat for which an interpretation can only be 
made through a documented, pragmatic and also imaginative approach. 
In the first part, the framework of our new conceptual study will be explained. It is important to define the 
counterfeiting and falsification of medicines in a clear field of analysis, presenting the specific features of the 
Internet in particular. 
In the second part, we will analyse the reality of the relationship between counterfeit medicines and criminal 
organisations both in the physical world and on the Internet. Theoretical considerations will also supplement our 
own thoughts. 
Thirdly, we will go into detail on the criminological issues raised by our problems. Finally, we will analyse to what 
extent knowledge of the phenomenon can be improved and therefore eliminated with new forms of expertise. 
  
                                                        
 
 
1 World Trade Organization. 
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I. Medicine counterfeiting, criminal organisations and 
cybercrime 
 
I.1. Counterfeiting, falsification and medicines 
It is essential to better determine the concepts relating to our problems so that the current challenges may be 
painstakingly identified. 
The issue in counterfeit medicines is an old one since Dioscoride (born towards 40 A.D.), a Greek doctor and 
botanist, already gave advice on how to detect fake medicines2. More recently3, in post-war Vienna, counterfeit 
penicillin was detected in 1948, an event used in the famous film noir The Third Man, directed by Carol Reed. 
Etymologically, the origin of the term counterfeiting4 comes from the 18th century Latin word contrafacere which 
means ‘imitate’ and, generally speaking, counterfeiting is therefore a fraudulent reproduction intended to mislead 
the consumer on the product's real identity or origin. From a legal point of view “counterfeiting consists in the 
violation of an intellectual property right protected by law, particularly by reproducing by copying or imitating a 
design, an invention, a trademark or a model protected by an intellectual property right”5 without its owner's 
consent. In the case of consumer goods, “a counterfeit is an identical reproduction or a fraudulent imitation 
including deception: the counterfeiter's aim is to create confusion between the original product (counterfeited) 
and the imitation he proposes (counterfeit). (…). Let us be clear that, in some cases, consumers are themselves 
fooled but they may also become a counterfeiter's accomplice by knowingly buying fakes”.6 On the other hand, it 
should be noted that in the case of counterfeit medicines, the patient is rather the victim and rarely the 
accomplice in the purchase, at best they are foolhardy enough or misled by third parties to order medicines on 
websites which do not have all the necessary guarantees. 
Where the definition is concerned, a medicine may be defined as “any substance or compounds presented as 
having curative or preventive properties with regard to human diseases. Any substance or compound which may 
be administered to humans with a view to establishing a medical diagnosis or to restore, correct or modify 
physiological functions in humans is also considered as a medicine”.7 It should also be noted that a medicine is 
not a product like any other. To date, it is certainly the product most subject to control from its creation and its 
development, but also during its marketing phase (pharmacovigilance). 
 
Similarly to other cases of counterfeiting concerning everyday consumer products, the definition of the 
counterfeit medicine has for many years been linked to infringement of intellectual property rights. On reflection, 
this analysis is all the more relevant since a counterfeit medicine involves reproducing or imitating an authentic 
brand and also, sometimes, copying the product patented by the pharmaceutical company. Nevertheless, 
however justified this may be, this view to a large degree overshadows an essential consequence of fake 
medicine: health. 
                                                        
 
 
2 Barbara Pick, Accès aux médicaments et contrefaçon pharmaceutique en Russie post-soviétique, L’Harmattan, 2006, 
L’Harmattan, p. 10. 
3 Albert I. Wertheimer, Perry G. Wang, Counterfeit Medicines Volume I: Policy, economics and Countermeasures, ILM 
Publications, 2012, p. 1. 
4 Eric Przyswa, Cybercriminalité et contrefaçon, FYP, 2010. 
5 Ibidem. 
6 IRACM, Fiche Propriété Intellectuelle, January 30, 2012. 
7 WHO definition (WHO Drug Dictionary Enhanced) and the one in European Directive 65/65, source: IRACM, Fiche Propriété 
Intellectuelle, January 30, 2012.  
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Even though some laws have included health as a circumstance aggravating a violation of intellectual property, 
this parameter was only a component and not the determining element. Under these conditions, medicine 
counterfeiting is still closely linked to reproducing, imitating, importing and selling an intellectual property right 
without it's holder's authorisation. As an extension to this infringement of intellectual property rights, the terms 
fake, illicit, counterfeiting and counterfeit have emerged. That said, limiting the concept of medicine 
counterfeiting to this simple legal aspect comes down to considering this phenomenon as ordinary counterfeiting 
while denying its singular and dangerous nature. 
The challenge in finding an exact definition of ‘counterfeit medicine’ is confirmed by Jean-Christophe Marten 
Pérolin, a senior official at the OCLAEPS8: “The products proposed are not always counterfeits; there are also 
other forms of crime. It may mean stolen or diverted medicines, quackery or medicines which have no marketing 
authorisation. The process for protecting public health (and consequently consumers) is an added value in the 
protection of trademarks and patents. The danger to health is real and must be taken into account by all”. 
Gradually, the concept of falsification above all emerged and even if this concept is still relatively inaccurate in its 
application, falsification may be defined as the “voluntarily altering (a substance or any other elements) with a 
view to misleading”. Paradoxically, even if the intrinsic elements have been defined within the scope of 
falsification (fraudulent portrayal of its identity, of its source), counterfeiting is still the term used in numerous 
cases. On this subject, the most significant example is the definition deriving from the Médicrime convention, 
which defined falsified medicines but still kept the term counterfeiting for convenience. This semantic inaccuracy 
is also to be found in the definition of the IMPACT9 group's work in Hammamet (Tunisia) in December 2008. 
According to the IMPACT group, whose Secretariat is provided by WHO: “A medical product is counterfeited 
when its identity and/or its source is falsely portrayed. This applies to the product, its packaging or to any other 
information concerning the packaging or labelling. Counterfeit may apply to patented products or generic 
products. Counterfeit products may be products containing the right ingredients/components or bad 
ingredients/components, no active ingredient or an insufficient quantity of the active ingredient or products 
whose packaging was falsified”.10 But in actual fact, in this case this is indeed the definition of a ‘falsified’ 
medicine. 
 
The term falsification, compared with the term counterfeiting, by emphasising the risks of an impact on public 
health, makes it possible to go beyond a simple infringement of an intellectual property right. Furthermore, this 
concept avoids the difficult equation between the territoriality of intellectual property rights, access to medicines 
and the tricky issue of generics. 
Preference is therefore given to the term ‘falsification’ rather than the more legal ‘counterfeiting’ to emphasise 
the risks of impact on public health. 
 
In this context, the best definition would be the one in the European Directive of May 16, 201111 which defines a 
falsified medicine as: 
“Any medicine which falsely presents at least one of the following characteristics: ‐ its identity, including its packaging and labelling, its name or the composition, regarding any of its ingredients, 
including the excipients, and the dosage of these ingredients; ‐ its source, including its manufacturer, its country of manufacture, its country of origin or that of its marketing 
authorisation holder; 
                                                        
 
 
8 Philippe Collier, “L’OCLAESP cible toutes les problématiques liées à la santé publique”, Contrefaçon Riposte, December 18, 
2009. 
9 IMPACT: International Medicines Products Anti-counterfeiting Task force. The IMPACT Secretariat is provided by WHO. Group 
without any activity at present. 
10 IRACM, Fiche Propriété Intellectuelle, January 30, 2012.  
11 Amending directive 2001/83/EC establishing a community code on medicines for human use with regard to preventing falsified 
medicines being introduced into the legal supply chain. 
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‐ its history, including registrations and documents concerning the distribution circuits used. 
This definition does not include unintentional quality defects and is understood as being without prejudice to 
violations of intellectual property rights”. 
This directive must be incorporated into the national legal systems of the European Union Member States by 
January 2013 at the latest. 
 
Moreover, a distinction should be made between the concepts of counterfeiting and falsification in other cases: 
- The “sub-standard medicine” or the “non-compliant medicine”: 
Even though there is no legal definition for them, sub-standard medicines (called 'OOS' -out of specification) are 
authentic medicines produced by manufacturers authorised by the national regulatory authority but which do not 
meet the quality specifications set for them by national standards for such products. The term ‘non-compliant’ 
means that a medicine partially deviates from the specifications set by the registration dossier approved by the 
registration authority and/or good manufacturing practices in force in the country of registration. It is also 
important to make a distinction between defective products and counterfeit medicines as, according to Médecins 
sans Frontières, problems with defective products are more widespread.12 The definition of a defective product is 
close, even identical, to that of a ‘sub-standard medicine’. There are many causes for the defect, which may 
include the holder of the right and its potential sub-contractors. Not conforming to the standards of quality and 
traceability does not constitute counterfeiting but is rather a potential consequence of this.  
- “Fake medicines”: 
There is no proper definition of a ‘fake medicine’. The term is occasionally employed, and is used in the Cotonou 
Appeal of the Jacques Chirac Foundation. A fake medicine is one that is not what it claims to be and is intended 
to mislead the consumer. 
- “Generic medicines”: 
Generic medicines are authorised copies of an original drug (brand-name drug). These copies are permitted by 
law once the patent protecting the active ingredient of the reference drug has expired, i.e. 20 years after the 
patent is filed and not 20 years after the product’s launch (sometimes there are several years between the two 
dates), and unless an extension is granted by an SPC (supplementary protection certificate for a maximum 
duration of 5 years after the initial expiry date). Even though they are not totally identical to the originals, generic 
drugs have the same qualitative and quantitative composition in active ingredients, the same pharmaceutical 
form and the same bioavailability in the body as the brand-name drug. 
Generic medicines are regulated, controlled and require a marketing authorisation (MA). Accordingly, they are 
not a problem for public health and we should note that generic medicines can also fall victim to counterfeiting. 
 
In short, “the problem with counterfeit medicines lies in the wider context of sub-standard pharmaceuticals. (…) 
Counterfeiting can apply to both brand-name and generic products and counterfeit medicines may include 
products with the correct active ingredients but fake packaging, or other active ingredients, no active ingredient 
or insufficient active ingredients”.13 
In such a complex environment, the concept of counterfeit medicines must be harmonised14 as the most widely 
accepted definition is the previously mentioned WHO definition but this dates back to 1990. It should be updated 
                                                        
 
 
12 Jean-Michel Caudron et coll, “Substandard medicines in resource-poor settings: a problem that can no longer be ignored”, 
Tropical Medecine and International Health, vol. 12, No. 8, August 2008, p. 1062-1072. 
13 Allafrica.com, “Médicaments de qualité inférieure ou contrefaits - 25% des produits consommés dans les pays pauvres sont des 
contrefaçons”, All Africa, August 25, 2006. 
14 Amir Attaran, Roger Bate and Megan Kendall, “Why and How to Make an International Crime of Medicine Counterfeiting”, 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 9, No. 4, 2011. 
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as, according to this definition, counterfeit medicines involve brand-name products and generic products as well 
as products containing appropriate or dangerous ingredients. In this case, counterfeit products may therefore be 
‘professional’ or ‘semi-professional’, even ‘amateur’. 
The Council of Europe's definition is different from that of WHO in that it takes into account the counterfeiter's 
intentional nature in the definition and the portrayal of the counterfeit product. In this definition, it is not 
necessary to establish proof that the author's behaviour was actually detrimental to public and individual health. 
The importance of the intentional nature is to be found in the field where a distinction is rarely made between 
counterfeit medicines and unintentional defective medicines, and according to a report made in South-East 
Asia15, quality defects are more frequent (10% of medicines analysed) than counterfeits according to the WHO 
definition (from 0.3 to 0.5% of medicines analysed). 
As we have noted, the problem of defining counterfeiting is particularly evident in the case of medicines, 
particularly on an international scale. As Graham Jackson, editor of The International Journal of Clinical Practice 
16 recently summarised, “among the obstacles to adopting effective measures, the lack of any clear worldwide 
consensus on what constitutes a counterfeit medicine, as well as the fact that activities that are illegal in one 
country may be legal in another”. More generally, a distinction should also be made in the analyses between the 
parameter on the health and public health impact and that of intellectual property17. 
Consequently, particular caution is necessary in the field of statistics on counterfeit medicines and we will 
sparingly use the statistics given in a large number of reports, as quantifying this phenomenon on a world-wide, 
even regional scale, is delicate to say the least. 
 
I.2. State of play 
Counterfeiting medicines is a world-wide phenomenon, for example fake medicines for malaria and tuberculosis 
are present in 90 countries and kill 700,000 people each year.18 The areas most affected are Africa, Asia and 
Latin America. The Center for Medicines in the Public Interest19 estimates that the sale of counterfeit medicines 
reached USD 75 billion in 2010, i.e. an increase of 90% since 2005 while the overall turnover in the 
pharmaceutical sector increased from USD 605 to more than USD 856 billion in 201020. A more recent figure 
from the World Economic Forum21 even evaluates counterfeit medicine sales at approximately USD 200 billion, 
i.e. the leading sector for illicit trafficking ahead of prostitution and marijuana. Even if it proves impossible to 
provide reliable world-wide statistics on this situation22, it can nevertheless be estimated that the sales of 
counterfeit medicines over this period increased by 20% more than the legal market world-wide. In fact, it must 
be considered that the only sound statistical data concerns seizures made by customs. 
                                                        
 
 
15 Marcus M. Reidenberg, Bradley A. Conner, “Counterfeit and substandard drugs”, Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics, vol. 69, 
No. 4, April 2001, p. 189-193 cited in Waito Foundation, Le crime-contrefaçon : Un enjeu majeur, 2011, p. 285. 
16 Bulletin of the World Health Organisation, The growing threat from counterfeit medicines, vol. 88, No. 4, April 2010, p. 241-320. 
17 Amir Attaran, Roger Bate and Megan Kendall, “Why and How to Make an International Crime of Medicine Counterfeiting”, 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 9, No. 4, 2011, p. 947-951. 
18 Julian Harris, Philip Stevens, Julian Morris, “Keeping It Real - Protecting the world's poor from fake drugs”, International Policy 
Network, May 2009, p. 4. 
19 Ibidem. 
20 Sources: IMS, Health Market Prognosis, March 2010 and Health Market Prognosis, March 2011. 
21 World Economic Forum, Global Risks, Sixth edition, An Initiative of the Risk Response Network, 2011, p. 23. 
22 Randall W. Lutter, Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning, Food and Drug Administration, “Pharmaceutical Supply 
Chain Security”, Statement before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, House Committee 
on Oversight Government Reform, July 11, 2006. 
- All rights reserved -  
 
15 
 
There are three focuses on which the world-wide dimension of counterfeit medicines may be observed: the 
physical flows, the organisation of illicit trafficking and the Internet. 
 
- Geography of the physical flows 
According to researcher Roger Bate less than 1% of medicines are counterfeit in developed countries (United 
States, United Kingdom, and Europe)23 are counterfeit and approximately 10% in a large number of developing 
countries (Russia, China, Cambodia). 
However the ‘dark figure’ is considerable and sources are limited. According to the WHO IMPACT programme:24 
- one in 3 medicines is counterfeit in some African, Asian or Latin American countries, 
- one in 5 medicines is counterfeit in the former Soviet Union. 
- China, India and, to a lesser extent, Russia remain the main producers of counterfeit medicines but Nigeria and 
the Philippines also have a significant number of illegal factories. 25 
By geographic area26, Asia is significantly dominant by number of incidents: 
 
Figure 1: Incidents by region. 
Source: Pharmaceutical Security Institute, Situation Report, 2010. 
 
The Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI) uses specific terminology where cases of counterfeit medicines are 
referred to as “incidents” (according to the WHO definition) but also include stolen items and illegal diversions. 
These statistics are submitted by pharmaceutical companies who are members of the PSI. 
                                                        
 
 
23 Roger Bate, Making a Killing. The Deadly Implications of Substandard and Counterfeit Drugs, Wellcome Trust presentation, 
October 26, 2009. 
24 IMPACT, Counterfeit medicines, Fact sheet, Estimates, November 14, 2006. It should be noted that the overall figures are 
debatable. 
25 See Commonwealth Business Council Working Group on Healthcare, The Problem of Counterfeit Medicines in the 
Commonwealth, May 2007, p. 2. 
26 Pharmaceutical Security Institute, Situation Report, 2010.  
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According to its methodology, the PSI only takes into account seizures of more than one thousand medicine 
doses. The statistics concerning Africa are quite poor (45 incidents referenced), stemming from the inadequate 
means of detection and investigation in this part of the world.    
In 2009, according to the PSI, Asia and Europa were the two main regions involved in manufacturing counterfeit 
medicines. According to the OECD, 75% of counterfeit medicines in the world come from China and India and 
half of these products transit through Dubai to conceal their origin. 
 
- Organisation of illicit trafficking 
This trafficking is characterised by a variety of strategies depending on the regions, the increasingly dangerous 
nature of the counterfeit medicines as well as an ever-greater number of seizures. 
Strategies varying depending on the regions 
More specifically, there are three stages in the medicine counterfeiting process: 
- Production: 
The counterfeit medicines can be produced in an emerging country such as China but, in certain cases, in more 
developed countries which are happy to import for example the starting material at a lesser cost. 
- Transit: 
This may be by sea but air, road and rail transport may also be used or medicines even carried by travellers. 
The storage areas may have no relation to the country of origin, which tend to cover their tracks. Furthermore, 
similarly to world transport, particularly by container, goods may transit through countries, be stored in free trade 
zones, be transhipped to other means of transport, and in this way enable the real origin of the goods to 
disappear so that only their declared origin remains. 
At all stages, the counterfeiters try to maximise fragmentation so as to avoid being detected (see the ‘broken 
load technique’ page 34). 
- Distribution: 
The products are often distributed through various shell companies which take advantage of local relay networks 
but may also be distributed directly within legal economic networks through well-known companies. In this way, 
they can be directly incorporated into the mainstream medicines distribution chain as far as the delivery outlet, or 
quite simply, in certain countries, made available on street markets or the Internet. 
In industrialised countries the packaging of counterfeit medicines is identical to that of authentic medicines. The 
easy access to high-quality low-cost mass production printing systems is also behind an increase in internet 
counterfeiting. “Counterfeiters know that the key to success is making the packaging as realistic as possible, 
then distributing the products as quickly as they can”. 27  The marketing channels are international and 
counterfeiters take advantage of deregulation to penetrate a given market after passing through several 
countries. According to the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Associations (IFPMA) 
counterfeiting a ‘blockbuster’ (medicine generating sales of more than one billion dollars for the pharmaceutical 
company) can generate a profit in the region of USD 500,000 for an initial investment of USD 1,00028 while the 
same initial sum invested in the trafficking of counterfeit money or heroin would bring in USD 20,000 and 
USD 43,000 for counterfeit cigarettes. Drug counterfeiting is 10 to 25 times more profitable than drug 
trafficking.29 
                                                        
 
 
27 Andrew Baxter, “The war on drugs copycats”, Financial Times, December 19, 2006. 
28 Report written under the direction of Eric Schmidt, Evaluation de l’ampleur de la vente des produits contrefaisants sur internet, 
CEIS, March 2009, p. 56. 
29 IRACM, Fiche Criminalité organisée, January 30, 2012. 
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In poor and developing countries, counterfeit medicines are of poor quality and dangerous to human health. It is 
very often in these countries that dangerous ingredients are found, such as the cough syrup containing anti-
freeze for motor vehicles which killed 84 Nigerian children (2009). 30 
In these countries, counterfeit medicines are found locally, for instance at markets or in hospitals. The counterfeit 
products are often also intended to treat potentially lethal illnesses, such as malaria or HIV/AIDS. These 
products are also copycat antibiotics, analgesics or antiparasitics.31  
In Nigeria, six out of 10 medicines sold have not been approved and in Guinea, 60% of the medicines sold in 
pharmacies are counterfeit.32 
 
 
Figure 2: Example of the manufacturing and distribution flow of counterfeit products 
Source: OECD, The economic impact of counterfeit and piracy, 200833 
 
Counterfeiting is a world-wide problem. According to the WCO (World Customs Organization), 140 countries are 
targeted. 34 Counterfeiting has become globalised.  
It should be noted that information on the Chinese factories involved and their sometimes dubious methods are 
still not well documented. A few years ago it was estimated “that China has 80,000 firms in the chemical sector 
but the U.S. Food and Drug Administration does not know how many of them sell ingredients used in the 
medicines taken by Americans. The Times, which examined thousands of firms selling products on the major 
B2B sites, succeeded in identifying 1,300 Chinese firms in the chemical sector offering medical ingredients for 
sale”. 35 
                                                        
 
 
30 Blandine Fauran, “Les enjeux de la lutte contre les faux médicaments”, Cahiers de la sécurité. Les dangers de la contrefaçon, 
No. 15, January-March 2011. 
31 Ibidem. 
32 Pierre Delval, Le marché mondial du faux. Crimes et contrefaçons, CNRS éditions, 2010, p. 153. 
33 OECD, The economic impact of counterfeiting and piracy, 2008, p. 361. 
34 World Customs Organization, Customs and IPR Report, 2008. 
35 Walt Bogdanich, “Chinese drugs flow to market unchecked”, International Herald Tribune, November 1, 2007. 
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The genuinely dangerous nature of counterfeit medicines 
These medicines are truly dangerous and we should remember that, even if they do not actually kill, counterfeit 
products, whether over-dosed, under-dosed or without any active ingredient, do not cure. Therefore, at best, a 
counterfeit medicine fails to cure the patient and, at worst, it is deadly. Somewhere in between, it can lead to 
drug resistance, which may result in treatment failure. From a more concrete standpoint, the WHO referenced a 
series of major accidents and particularly the case of injections of counterfeit products to treat anaemia that 
killed a young Argentinian woman in 2004.36 
There are other examples that may be cited: 
 In 2006, more than 100 children in Panama were victims of a counterfeit medicine containing diethylene 
glycol, a powerful solvent, added to a fake cough syrup. The solvent was falsely identified and exported 
as glycerine, an ingredient used in a large number of medicines37.  Singapore: the health authorities recorded 11 deaths and 24 coma cases after taking counterfeit 
medicines for sexual dysfunction in 2008-2009.38  China: 192,000 deaths from counterfeit medicines in 2001 (400,000 deaths since 2001 according to 
Pharmaciens sans Frontières in Luxembourg).39 
The risk to public health from counterfeit medicines is expanding: counterfeit seizures in 2009 during the ‘Storm 
2’ operation, co-ordinated by IMPACT in Asia, ranged from antibiotics to contraceptives, tetanus vaccines, anti-
malaria medicines and treatments for erectile problems. In Egypt, investigators have found products of all types: 
from medicines used in organ transplants to those prescribed for disorders such as heart disease, schizophrenia 
and diabetes, as well as thousands of packs of cancer medicines. 40 The PSI estimates that about 523 medicines 
were counterfeited in 2012.41 
 
A growing number of seizures 
According to the WCO, the trafficking of counterfeit medicines increased by 300% between 2007 and 200942. In 
2009, 117 million medicines were seized by customs in Europe 43, 18 million of which were dangerous. Seizures 
of counterfeit medicines are becoming more and more varied.). 44 (anti-inflammatory drugs, pain killers, 
antiseptics, medical equipment (stethoscopes, etc). 
                                                        
 
 
36 IMPACT, Counterfeit medicines, Fact sheet, November 14, 2006. 
37 IRACM, Fiche Enjeux : Stopper une pandémie planétaire, January 30, 2012. 
38 Sylvia Tan, “Counterfeit sex drugs: 11 deaths and 24 coma cases”, Friday, September 18,2009. 
39 Pharmaciens-sans-frontieres.lu, “Les médicaments contrefaits”, Pharmaciens Sans Frontières Luxembourg, May 22, 2011. We 
will come back to the validity of these statistics later on. 
40 Comments by Aline Plançon, Interpol in the Bulletin of the World Health Organisation, vol. 38, April 2010, p. 241-320. 
41 Kathy Chu, “Growing problem of fake drugs hurting patients, companies”, USA Today, September 13, 2010. 
42 IRACM, Fiche Criminalité organisée, January 30, 2012. 
43 Christophe Zimmerman, co-ordinator of the combat against counterfeiting and piracy at the WCO, Conférence sur la 
contrefaçon à la Mutualité française : Le trafic de faux médicaments comment le combattre, October 15, 2010. 
44 Interview with Jean-Christophe Marten Pérolin, senior official at OCLAESP, by Philippe Collier, “Douanes : 7 million d’articles 
contrefaisants saisis en 2009”, Contrefaçon Riposte, April 23, 2009. 
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Between 2009 and 201045, the number of shipments intercepted by customs almost doubled: it went from 43,500 
in 2009 to almost 80,000 in 2010, with health products representing respectively 18% and 14.5% of the total. 
These substantial figures can be explained by the huge increase in the number of illicit postal parcels 
intercepted, almost 50,000, which were purchases on the Internet. Germany (22,125) and Great Britain (22,146) 
each made almost 30% of these interceptions. In France, customs seizures mainly concern fake tablets for 
erectile dysfunction. That said, these figures should be put into perspective as, at the same time, it should be 
remembered that smaller quantities of this type of product are despatched. 
In the United States, the customs authorities also seize increasing quantities of counterfeit medicines. Hence, 
their market value was assessed at USD 16.8 million in 2011 compared with USD 5.7 million the previous year, 
i.e. an increase of 200%.46 In financial terms, these medicines represent 10% of total seizures compared with 
3% in 2010.47 
The number of investigations conducted by the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) concerning cases of 
counterfeit medicines went from 6 in 2000 to 58 in 200848. Products potentially dangerous to the health and 
safety of consumers represented 10% of seizures made in 2008 at a value of USD 28 million. 49 
There are several reasons for the increase in the number of seizures of counterfeit medicines50: 
- High profitability and low penal risk. 
- Technological progress (particularly in printing). 
- Globalisation mechanisms. 
 
Internet: a major distribution vehicle 
International trans-organised crime has very quickly understood the substantial advantages that the internet has 
to offer. The net is decentralised and anonymous and the malleability and permanent interconnection of 
networks seems to offer genuine opportunities for illicit trafficking. 
On the whole, e-commerce is increasing considerably world-wide and counterfeit medicines can therefore find a 
real growth potential in cyberspace. Even if there are still very few studies concerning the internet, a certain 
number of results portray the reality of the phenomenon: 
- according to the WHO, 50% of the medicines are bought on web sites which conceal their physical address51, 
- according to a study52 carried out by the European Alliance for Access to Safe Medicines, 62% of medicines 
bought on the internet are counterfeits (50% according to the WHO). 
                                                        
 
 
45 European Commission - Taxation and customs union, Report on EU customs, enforcement of intellectual property rights Results 
at the EU border, 2010. Source: Philippe Collier, “Europe : En 2010, les douanes ont saisi pour plus d’un milliard d’euros de 
contrefaçons aux frontières de l’UE”, Contrefaçon Riposte, July 15, 2011. 
46 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Intellectual Property Rights, Fiscal Year 
2011 Seizure Statistics, 2011. 
47 Ibidem. 
48 Leem.org, “La contrefaçon dans les pays industrialisés”, LEEM, May 19, 2010. 
http://www.leem.org/article/contrefacon-dans-les-pays-industrialises 
49 Ibidem. 
50 Mickaël R. Roudaut, Marchés criminels. Un acteur global, Presses Universitaires de France, 2010, p. 133. 
51 Bulletin of the World Health Organisation, “Growing threat from counterfeit medicines”, vol. 88, No. 4, April 2010, p. 241-320.  
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/88/4/10-020410/fr/index.html 
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- 90% of counterfeit medicines now sold on the Internet53 are fakes54 and according to a Japanese study55, 60% 
of medicines treating erectile dysfunction on the Internet are counterfeits. 
 
Some elements per geographic area 
- United States 
In the United States, 36 million Americans56 bought medicines without a prescription on illegal sales sites and 
the Internet has become the leading distribution channel for counterfeit medicines in this country.57 A more 
worrying statistic cited by the American firm OpSec Security58: 66% of Internet users are prepared to knowingly 
buy counterfeit products and 90% of people interviewed gave the price as the main criterion for buying such 
products. Such information challenges the claim that the patient is always the victim and not the accomplice 
when buying a fake medicine or, at least, is very foolhardy. Sites offering medicines for sale in America often 
emphasise their Canadian nationality even though there are only 300 legal Canadian on-line pharmacies. 
Furthermore, according to the International Chamber of Commerce, more than 11,000 fake sites using a 
‘Canadian cover’ are in actual fact based in other countries (often in Russia and India).59 
- Europe 
The regulations adopted by the various governments to implement the new European directive vary greatly 60 
from one country to another. Based on the Doc Morris61 order from the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) of December 11, 2003, online marketing of products without a prescription is now authorised. 
One unique study serves as a reference: the ‘Cracking Counterfeit Europe”62 study conducted in 14 European 
countries concludes that the European market for counterfeit medicines is worth around EUR 10.5 billion 
annually. In France, the market is worth almost EUR 1 billion.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
52 Agence France Presse, “Les médicaments vendus sur Internet inquiètent”, EAASM, July 2, 2008. 
The study concerns the analysis of 100 on-line pharmacies and the purchase of 30 medicines. 
53 Indo-Asian News Service, “Beware, 44 percent Viagra sold on net is spurious”, IANS, January 26, 2010. 
54 Ibidem. 
55 Pharma-japan.com, “60% of ED Treatments Sold Online Are Counterfeits”, Pharma Japan, December 21, 2010. 
56 Prnewswire.com, “36 Million Americans have Bought Medications Online Without a Doctor’s Prescription”, PR Newswire, 
December 14, 2010. 
57 National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center, Intellectual Property Rights Violations: A Report on Threats to United 
States Interests at Home and Abroad, November 2011, p. 31. 
58 OpSec Security, Press release, OpSec Identifies High Quality and Product Functionality as Key New Drivers Motivating Online 
Counterfeit Electronic Sales, July 8, 2009. 
59 International Chamber of Commerce, Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau, The International Anti-Counterfeiting Directory, 2009, 
p. 25. 
60 Philippe Collier, “L’OCLAESP cible toutes les problématiques liées à la santé publique”, Contrefaçon Riposte, December 18, 
2009. 
61 The company Doc Morris offered German consumers, in German, medicine for human use, part of which were authorised in 
Germany and the majority of which were authorised in other member states of the European Union. The Court held that the 
prohibition to sell medicines online without authorisation is justified and for those which need a prescription. On the other hand, 
mail-order sales of medicines that do not need a prescription and their advertising cannot be prohibited. 
62 Mypharma-editions.com, “Les faux médicaments représenteraient 10,5 milliards d’euros en Europe”, MyPharma Editions, 
February 16, 2010. 
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This study, carried out by Nunwood on behalf of Pfizer Inc. shows that, in Europe, one out of five persons 
surveyed, i.e. 77 million individuals, acknowledges buying prescription medicines outside the authorised 
channels. In France, it was 14% of those interviewed, i.e. 6.9 million people.  
- France 
France is still safeguarded in Europe, thanks to the quality of the healthcare system, the strong regulations 
governing pharmaceutical activities and thanks to the system of reimbursement for prescription drugs. However, 
risks are now emerging in connection with “purchases of counterfeit so-called 'comfort' products on the internet, 
slimming pills, food supplements, performance-enhancing drugs or anabolic agents sought by bodybuilding 
enthusiasts”.63 
Between 2001 and 2008, some 40 pharmacovigilance cases relating to the use of internet medicine purchases 
were reported to the Afssaps64. Out of 38 cases identified, 11 concerned purchases of slimming products, 3 
anabolic steroids, and 8 stimulants or revitalizing products, particularly hormone-based. 
- Switzerland 
Switzerland is sometimes used as a strategic area for trafficking counterfeit medicines at European level. In 
2011 the director of Swissmedic65  pointed out “a strong rise in the illegal imports of medicines potentially 
dangerous for patients”. According to customs authorities, seizures of illicit products rose to 61% compared to 
2009. More than a third of the counterfeits were stimulants treating erectile problems. 
The counterfeit medicines most frequently purchased online66 are mainly medicines against erectile dysfunction, 
but also slimming products, anabolic agents, growth hormones, melatonin, products to quit smoking and also 
narcotics and psychotropic substances. 
With regard to the slimming products sold on the internet, a Swissmedic study67 showed that almost 90% contain 
active ingredients that are a dangerous health threat.  
 
In light of this assessment of counterfeit medicines, how can a more specific analysis be made of the criminal 
organisations involved in this ever-growing illicit trafficking? 
I.3. Criminal organisations and counterfeiting 
The concept of criminal organisations should be determined and the logic of ‘structural holes’ used by such 
organisations when counterfeiting medicines. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
This survey was carried out between October 27, and November 8, 2009. 14,000 men and women in 14 European countries took 
part in it. Countries concerned: United Kingdom, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Germany, 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Finland and Ireland.   
63 Philippe Collier, “L’OCLAESP cible toutes les problématiques liées à la santé publique”, Contrefaçon Riposte, December 18, 
2009. 
64 Philippe Collier, “L’Afssaps démontre les dangers des médicaments vendus sur Internet” Contrefaçon Riposte, January 13, 
2009. 
65 Elisabeth Eckert, “Berne lance l'alerte contre les faux Viagra”, Le Matin, 20 F2011. 
66 Blandine Fauran, “Les enjeux de la lutte contre les faux médicaments”, Cahiers de la sécurité. Les dangers de la contrefaçon, 
No. 15, January-March 2011. 
67 Swissmedic, Press release, Résultats d’analyse alarmants: Nouveaux chiffres sur des produits amincissants dangereux vendus 
sur Internet, June 6, 2011. 
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I.3.a. Definition of criminal organisations 
The expression ‘organised crime’68 first appeared in 1897 in the United States and developed during prohibition. 
The concept is generally associated with “rackets, extortion, predatory activities and the supply of illegal 
goods. Interest in it revived during the 1960s with the spread of the drug dealing which grew at an 
unprecedented rate in the United States”.69 This view of organised crime influenced the European approach, 
particularly from the 1970s, with “a view of organised crime which is moving towards a more violent model, more 
professional and multinational”.70 
There are two main definitions71 of organised crime: 
- The Council of Europe (1998) describes criminal organisations as “a structured group of more than two 
persons, established over a period of time, acting in concert with a view to committing offences which are 
punishable by deprivation of freedom or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious 
penalty, whether the offences are an end in themselves or a means of obtaining material benefits and, where 
appropriate, of improperly influencing the work of the public authorities”. 
- The definition of criminal organisations with the greatest consensus is that of the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo, December 2000)72 , which defined an “organised criminal 
group” as a “structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with 
the aim of committing one or more serious crimes in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other 
material benefit”.  
 
From a more theoretical standpoint, we note moreover that “this transition from multiple to single definition raises 
many questions, particularly concerning the appropriateness of the legal standard in relation to the phenomena 
that we wish to comprehend (…) but also (…) its purposes and its functions”.73 Consequently, a definition of 
‘organised crime’ as flexible as the one decided at Palermo still raises the question of adapting the ‘legal 
standard’ on how organisations are perceived and treated. Another issue with the definition: the ‘transnational’ 
dimension. This aspect of the definition is not quite as simple as it appears and the question of relations between 
criminal organisations and the international economy was a subject for debate among researchers in the 1960s. 
It was in 1975, at the fifth United Nations congress on ‘Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice’ that the 
expression ‘transnational crime’74 took on its full magnitude, particularly by going into the details of the complex 
links which may exist between conventional organised crime, major economic actors and corrupt institutional 
representatives. That said, little effect seems to have resulted from this pertinent review of the situation, 
particularly on the type of relations in question between these actors, which has nevertheless not dampened 
academic debates often out of touch with the real issues. 
This transnational dimension is obvious to an initial category of researchers. According to the economist Loretta 
Napoleoni75 “a new economy of terror has emerged” and for the journalist Claire Sterling there is a “Pax Mafiosa” 
with criminal organisations which peacefully share territories on a world-wide scale.76 A more ‘networked’ view of 
                                                        
 
 
68 We will not make a distinction between the expressions ‘criminal organisation’ and ‘organised crime’ in this report. 
69 Bleuzenn Monot, La guerre de la contrefaçon. Le grand pillage des marques, Ellipses, 2008, p. 77. 
70 Maria-Luisa Cesoni, Criminalité organisée : des représentations sociales aux définitions juridiques, LGDJ, 2004, p. 622. 
71 IRACM, Fiche Criminalité organisée, January 30, 2012. 
72 Source of the definition: United Nations Convention of November 15, 2000. 
73 Maria-Luisa Cesoni, Criminalité organisée : des représentations sociales aux définitions juridiques, LGDJ, 2004, p. 5. 
74 Vincenzo Ruggiero, “Fuzzy criminal actors: Introduction”, Crime, Law & Social Change, vol. 37, No. 2, p. 177-190, 2002. 
75 Franck G. Madsen, Transnational Organized Crime, Routledge, 2009, p. 80. 
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international mafia groups 77  is favoured by the sociologist Manuel Castells 78 , a specialist in information 
technologies, who sees in these mafia organisations “a global network”. Within a more geopolitical approach, the 
academic Susan Strange, who considers that there “is a form of transnational mafia diplomacy which has given 
rise to a proliferation of informal agreements denoting the existence of an international mafia society just as a 
State one”.79 
Another category of researchers has a more critical view and considers this transnational dimension of 
organised crime as ‘hypothetical’ and “to obtain additional resources or to extend their prerogatives, it is naturally 
of interest to the enforcement authorities to present the criminal organisations as powerful, threatening and 
hungry to extend their activities and influence”.80 
In the context of today's globalised economy, these two views however appear to be somewhat exaggerated as 
we will see that, at the very least, this transnational dimension of crime is obvious. According to the most 
credible researchers,81 it is important to challenge the ‘conspiracy views’ as the alliances in question between 
so-called transnational criminal groups are above all “temporary opportunistic alliances”82 and their structures 
are still not particularly ‘formalised’. Criminal organisations (and ‘mafias groups’ even more so) in fact must see 
themselves as not particularly structured as, according to the expression of the academic, Jean-Louis Briquet 83, 
they are “an object with indeterminate outlines, a reality constantly avoiding the definitions suggested for them 
(…) a constantly changing moving phenomenon, forcing a corresponding change in the models which try to 
comprehend it”. 
As for the ‘critical approach’, even if it raises pertinent questions on the direction in which certain enforcement 
agencies may or may not be going, in its analyses it neglects access to the crime sources which, even if they are 
difficult to access, may to a certain degree be available particularly on problems as specific as ‘counterfeit 
medicines’. 
Generally speaking, one should avoid falling victim to sensationalism or being taken in by the frequent incorrect 
information on criminal organisations not only in the media but sometimes also in the academic environment.84 
The whole difficulty therefore lies in having comparative research work on a study subject as complex as 
criminal organisations, as “although the attempt to unequivocally identify an 'organised crime' subject, enabling 
international comparative research to be developed, was made by various researchers85, it resulted in “an 
impossibility being recognised, based on the over-diversity of the phenomena generally grouped together under 
these names”.86 The organised nature of the phenomenon is particularly difficult to determine. 
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 There are many definitions and academic debates about the mafia. In the original sense, the term means the Sicilian mafia but 
in the wide sense it means any form of organised crime in other geographic areas (Russian, Japanese mafia, etc.). The mafia may 
be defined as a criminal organisation whose activities are subject to concealed collegial management and which is based on a 
strategy of infiltrating civil society and institutions. Source Wikipedia: September 15, 2012. 
78 Manuel Castells, End of Millennium, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000, p. 172. 
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Strange”, Culture & Conflits, No. 42, summer 2001. 
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86 Ibidem. 
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A complexity probably mainly due to globalisation, as it must not be perceived as “a technological extension”,87 
particularly with the impact of the Internet, but rather as a “social process which configures and reconfigures 
“relations between multiple entities (…) which are widely spread over the area”.88 An interpretation which tends 
to prove the wide variety of social organisations present and therefore the multiplicity of potential criminal 
organisation models. 
 
For all that, should it be considered that we are faced with a form of analytical stalemate? 
A Council of Europe report on crime89 qualifies this stalemate and considers that “the concept of organisations 
with a clearly defined hierarchy seems increasingly to give way to one with criminal networks made up of 
individuals or small units, as well as legal structures (most often commercial) and experts of all types (lawyers, 
accountants, etc.) more or less closely affiliated to these structures. (…) In short, the criminal networks can 
function by adapting to market conditions and by exploiting the possibilities offered to them”. However, beyond 
this flexible organisational structure, it remains true that criminal organisations, particularly in counterfeiting, may 
be described as “economic extremists, who are looking for profit any way they can”.90 
Although globalisation has transformed the traditional models of criminal organisations, even made them more 
complex, from this point of view, medicine counterfeiting is a stimulating study area which will enable us to 
question and shed light on ‘organised crime’ – and therefore the concepts of ‘crime’ and ‘organisation’ – under a 
new and pragmatic angle. 
 
I.3.b. Criminal organisations and counterfeit medicines: a ‘structural hole’ logic 
Whatever definitions of criminal organisations are accepted (Council of Europe or Palermo), the trafficking of 
counterfeit medicines most often meets each of the criteria common to both91: 
-  several persons involved, 
-  the existence of a real structure within the group, 
-  the violations committed or intended are serious, 
-  the criminal activity is stable over time. 
 
But this view of the criminal organisation appears to be too ‘static’ as many criminal organisations, particularly 
where medicines are concerned, seem to be formed on ‘organisational flaws’. A point of view more particularly 
conceptualised by the American sociologist Ronald S. Burt92, who theorised on the concept of “structural holes”93 
which appear “when there is a gap between two persons with a complementary need in terms of resources and 
information”.94 A third party is then necessary and acts as a sort of entrepreneur, bringing together the two 
separate individuals and closing the existing gap. This ‘social bridge’ then enables the entrepreneur to make a 
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profit. In the field of counterfeit medicines the counterfeiters may be extremely skilful at locating the ‘social holes’ 
within the supply chain. 
The following diagram (based on food fraud) may also be applied to crime in counterfeit medicines. 
 
Figure 3: Criminal opportunities based on the Felson triangle. 
 
This diagram is based on the Felson criminal triangle95 which identifies three elements offering opportunities for 
crime: the criminals, the victims and the “guardians and protectors of gaps”. ‘Guardians’ should be understood 
as the police, customs, NGOs, etc. and by ‘protectors’ as systems intended to monitor product traceability, watch 
techniques, etc. Above all, the importance of the gaps and ‘structural holes’ for fraudsters is seen here. No 
matter how skilled the ‘guardians’ or ‘protectors’ may be in reducing the risks of counterfeit, the opportunities for 
crime cannot be entirely controlled and they have probably increased with globalisation and the liberalisation of 
international trade over the past 20 years. However, similarly to food fraud96, detecting counterfeit medicines is 
complicated as the counterfeiting criminals can multiply the ‘entry points’ thanks to the numerous ‘gaps’ that the 
logistics flows offer them. 
From the more operational standpoint, it can be seen that the medicine counterfeiters use the “broken load” 
technique 97 which makes it difficult to seize the goods. This technique consists in “routing a counterfeit product 
to its final destination and passing it through one or more third party countries which, as far as possible, are not 
considered to be countries producing counterfeits in that particular field. In this way, the counterfeiters hope that 
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the customs will focus on where the product has come from and not its origin”.98 Furthermore, the counterfeiters 
use every means of transport possible and divide up the manufacturing and packaging stages. Such operations 
make it difficult to trace the goods as “counterfeit medicines may be manufactured in one country, processed in 
another, packaged in a third before they are shipped in transit via various countries to arrive at last at the 
destination where they are intended for sale”.99 These criminal organisations also tend to perfect their medicines' 
packaging rather the content, giving priority to deceiving the customs services on the products' origin.100 On a 
large scale, these networks of counterfeiters also have the capacity to produce fake quality conformity 
certificates for the medicines or other fake official documents enabling them to infiltrate the legal wholesaler or 
distribution networks. Control of the distribution network is generally the key factor for the most powerful criminal 
organisations. 101  Moreover, it can be noted that these problems of intermediation and traceability of 
pharmaceutical products are hardly new and that, in the 19th century, control over the products sold already gave 
rise to fears of counterfeiting at that time.102 
This question of flows more generally poses the problem of the manufacturing and distribution network. The 
American system, with its complex network of distributors and wholesalers, offers a great many opportunities for 
a criminal organisation specialised in counterfeiting to enter into this maze of flows by identifying the weak 
points. As the diagram below103 shows, the three main American wholesalers which distribute 90% of medicines 
in the United States (AmeriSourceBergen, Cardinal Health Inc., and McKesson Corp.) are in contact with 
pharmacies then consumers and can also potentially be the target for the flow of counterfeit products. The risk 
particularly comes from 6,500 small secondary wholesalers which can be targeted by counterfeiters.104 
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Figure 4: Example of manufacturing and distribution flows of counterfeit products. 
Infiltration of U.S. Drug Supply. 
As figure 4 shows, the counterfeiters seek to integrate the supply chain legally. To do this, they can mix the real 
and fake products and repackage counterfeit products.  
The aim is to avoid arousing the suspicion of the three main American wholesalers by mixing legal and illegal 
products and by fragmenting the chain as much as possible thanks to secondary wholesalers who are less 
particular about the products' origin, making it even more difficult to trace back to the source. 
Generally speaking, the United States is a priority target for counterfeiters as, according to estimates, 40% of 
medicines are imported there, thereby increasing the potential risk of importing counterfeit medicines. 105 
These problems are also to be found in Europe, in particular in Switzerland106, which may sometimes be an 
intermediate zone at risk, especially due to its permeable borders with the European Union. 
In fact, even if imports of medicines directly intended for the Swiss population are tightly monitored, this is less 
the case for exports to European countries.107 According to Hans-Beat Jenny, deputy director of Swissmedic, the 
Swiss Institute for therapeutic products, favourable economic and tax conditions make Switzerland an attractive 
country for traders in somewhat dubious medicines, and despite rather strict local practices with regard to 
authorisations. “That’s just the way it is”, admits the deputy director of Swissmedic. “It is often noticed that the 
real origin of fake medicines has been concealed”.108 
                                                        
 
 
105 Nabp.net, “National, International Stakeholders Develop New Strategies for Fighting Counterfeit Drugs”, NABP, May 3, 2011. 
106 Julie Zaugg, “La Suisse leader des faux médicaments”, L’Hebdo, May 29, 2008. 
107 Ibidem. 
108 Ibidem. 
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Trying to trace these commercial routes proves to be difficult109. That said, there is no doubt that ‘commercial’ 
flows of counterfeit medicines exist between Asian countries such as China and India and Europe and North 
America. It is obvious that there are unscrupulous European and North American importers who exploit the 
opportunities offered by the parallel market as we have seen with the cases of Peter Gillespie in Great Britain or 
Andrew Strempler in Canada. These importers set up dangerous entry points within legal supply chains. It is all 
the more complicated to backtrack along these commercial routes since the supply chain may be particularly 
sophisticated and the counterfeiters may have various ways of integrating them.  
 
The criminological environment also has a special significance in the case of counterfeit medicines as we saw 
that the criminal organisations are difficult to identify. White-collar crime, sometimes linked to an industrial 
environment or immersed in a legal environment, can offer opportunities to set up illicit networks in medicines. 
Sometimes a major analytical challenge arises which is of course linked to the fact that such organisations are 
more or less secret as well as access to sources of information both confirmed and relevant. This work does not 
claim to be an exhaustive view but to open up strong lines for analysis with the most credible sources (media, 
academics, interviews). Fieldwork and subsequent work could of course extend this initial analysis to where 
crime and the pharmaceutical sector meet since it should be kept in mind that criminal-counterfeiting methods 
and organisations are permanently evolving110. In addition, this research work should be considered not as a 
definitive study on a complex and opaque phenomenon but rather a ‘snapshot’ which also tries to clarify a field 
of thought, to a large degree as yet untouched. The case of cybercrime reveals analytical challenges on the 
combination of ‘criminal organisations and counterfeit medicines’. 
 
 
I.4. Cybercrime and counterfeiting 
I.4.a Definition  
Similarly to the many debates on the definition of crime, cybercrime does not evade definition problems, which 
particularly stem from the difficulty in identifying this form of Internet crime. Among the many proposals is the 
one put forward by the United Nations111: “cybercrime means any illegal behaviour using electronic operations 
which target the security of computer systems and data they process”. Olivier Iteanu112, a lawyer specialised in 
new technologies, proposes a definition widely shared by the majority of actors: “cybercrime can be defined as 
any illegal action in which a computer is the instrument or the subject of the offence”. 
However, as Olivier Iteanu makes clear, this definition has the disadvantage of not taking what is ‘offline’ into 
account113. That said, the customs and a certain number of actors tend to widen the concept of cybercrime to 
include actions which involve criminal flows both in reality and on the Internet by means of a computer. This 
wider view of cybercrime is accepted as it has the advantage of enabling this form of crime to be observed both 
in a real and a virtual field. Indeed, it is evident that if an order is placed on the Internet, inevitably it is physically 
delivered. 
                                                        
 
 
109 UNICRI, Counterfeiting, A Global Spread, A Global Threat, 2007, p. 39. 
110 Nayanah Siva, “Tackling the booming trade in counterfeit drugs”, The Lancet, vol. 376, November 20, 2010. 
111 Myriam Quéméner, Joël Ferry, Cybercriminalité, défi mondial et réponses, Economica, 2007, p. 4. 
112 Olivier Iteanu, Tous cybercriminels, Jacques-Marie Laffont éditeur, 2004. 
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The question remains114 as to whether cybercrime as such is actually a new form of avant-gardist criminality or if 
it is only a medium for more conventional forms of crime.115 According to this point of view, the concept of 
cybercrime ‘swings’ between the new and the conventional which “raises a difficulty from the definition's 
theoretical standpoint”. The Canadian researcher, Stéphane Leman-Langlois, makes a distinction between 
simple computer crime and cybercrime which involves a more dynamic use of the Internet network and within 
which the concept of cybercrime covers conduits whose existence is entirely linked to that of the networks. This 
dynamic view of the networks is particularly relevant for the continuation of our reflections on the issues of 
counterfeit medicines on line. 
 
I.4.a Types of cybercrime  
Since the 1990s, cybercrime has been characterised by its “automatic and dispersed” nature116  thanks to 
broadband technology. In the 2000s, there was a substantial increase in cybercrimes with growing specialisation 
in technology: 
Spam: this may be defined as “unsolicited bulk email. Unsolicited means that the recipient has not granted 
verifiable permission for the message to be sent. Bulk means that the message is sent as part of a larger 
collection of messages, all having substantively identical content”. 117 
The despatch of these emails is often “an instrument starting the execution of a main violation enabling 
substantial profits to be made illegally”.118 
This technique can be used in certain cases of online counterfeiting, in particular for medicines. 
Phishing is a “method for fraudulent gathering of individual and personal data from Internet users with a view to 
using it to the detriment of the customers of banks and commercial websites”. This technique consists in taking 
advantage of Internet users' gullibility to obtain, for instance, their credit card number by means of fake emails 
using official logos (FBI or a famous bank).119 
As for pharming, it is an offshoot of phishing and involves rerouting access to a website towards a pirate site. 
Even if the site's address seems to be correct, the Internet user is in fact rerouted to a bogus site where the 
hacker can then capture confidential information. 
Cybersquatting
120 is a practice which consists in registering an Internet domain name (most often taking the 
name of a known brand), then selling it back with profit to the legitimate owner of this name. Depending on the 
way the domain name is used, this technique can have certain similarities with counterfeiting, unfair or parasitic 
competition. 
                                                        
 
 
114 Stéphane Leman-Langlois, “Questions au sujet de la cybercriminalité, le crime comme moyen de contrôle du cyberespace 
commercial”, Centre International de Criminalité Comparée, Université de Montréal, Criminologie, vol. 39, No. 1, spring 2006, p. 
63-81. 
115 It should be noted that according to the British reference academic David S. Wall, the majority of cybercrimes which come to 
court in fact are classic criminal activities rather than a presumed new type of cybercrime in David S. Wall, “The internet as a 
conduit for criminal activity” in April Pattavina (ed.), Information Technology and the Criminal Justice System, Sage, 2004. 
116 Franck Guarnieri, Eric Przyswa, “Cybercriminalité - contrefaçon : les interactions entre ‘réel et virtuel’”, Cahiers de la sécurité. 
Les dangers de la contrefaçon, No. 5, January-March 2011. 
117 Source: The site of the international organisation The Spamhaus Project, http://www.spamhaus.org/consumer/definition/ 
118 Joël Ferry, Myriam Quéméner, Cybercriminalité, défi mondial et réponses, Economica, 2007. 
119 According to the sources quoted by researcher Eric Filiol, about 5% of targeted Internet users fall into the traps set by phishers. 
Eric Filiol, Philippe Richard, Cybercriminalité, enquête sur les mafias qui envahissent le web, Dunod, 2006, p. 41. 
120 CEIS definition, Source: Eric Schmidt (dir.), Evaluation de l’ampleur de la vente des produits contrefaisants sur internet, CEIS, 
March 2009. 
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Typosquatting (or typowriting) consists in registering a domain name whose spelling is very similar to that of 
another name which has the advantage of substantial traffic. If Internet users accidently enter an incorrect 
website name, they may be rerouted to the site owned by the cybersquatter.  
 
As for cyberspace, two features may describe it121: 
- A permanent interaction between real and virtual (an essential point which is also extremely relevant to the 
analysis of a cybercrime relating to counterfeiting). 
- A spatiality specific to it since it is a moving landscape, a relational territory constantly being reconfigured which 
gives priority to gateways and ‘connectivity’. 
 
To summarise, cybercrime is evolving in an emerging territory where computer threats are carried out 
specifically in relation to the real world but where the interaction between virtual and real is still essential for 
analysis particularly in the case of a product with high added value such as a medicine. 
The moving dimension of cyberspace makes the observation of cybercrime all the more strategic since there are 
2.2 billion Internet users in the world.122  
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II. Realities of the « counterfeit medicines and criminal 
organisations » combination 
 
Before moving onto the specific case of counterfeiting, it should be made clear that criminal organisations are 
also involved in the theft or diversion of medicines to the black market. A recent case in Canada123 is significant 
of this situation: almost 3 million painkillers were stolen or mysteriously disappeared from Canadian pharmacies 
over three years, of which more than 200,000 were doses of opiates in Quebec. The others were above all ‘lost 
in transit’ or were ‘inexplicably lost’. Two products are particularly prized by thieves: “oxycodone (…) and 
hydromorphone”.124 These two products enable the production of medicines belonging to the opiates class, 
which include all those deriving from the poppy, including heroin, opium and morphine and can therefore in part 
be of interest to drug addicts. The origin of this trafficking may be varied: thefts from pharmacies, fake 
prescriptions, thefts from a wholesaler or from an importer's premises, even from customs. 
With regard to counterfeiting, the links between counterfeit medicines and organised crime today seem to be 
widely acknowledged particularly by UNICRI125 as well as by Interpol126. As far as trafficking is concerned, it is 
confirmed that this involvement in counterfeit medicines is managed to varying degrees by organised crime. 
“The criminal organisations have seized the opportunities inherent to global changes. They have developed a 
competitive advantage and governments are today incapable of setting up effective strategies to combat a crime 
which is both delocalised and globalised”.127 Hence, organised crime has a new face that increasingly resembles 
a transnational firm's trade which combines a rigid hierarchy and a territorial presence with flexible structures 
that can be adapted depending on the circumstances. 
These organisations which meet the criteria laid down by the United Nations Palermo Convention 
(2000)128 above all want to profit financially from these serious offences. A financial profit that we will see is 
increasingly substantial in medicine counterfeiting. As for the structure of the groups in question, the diversity of 
cases can be observed, with prominence given to networked organisations over those with a more highly 
structured hierarchy. The size parameter appears to be the most significant indicator of the criminal nature of 
such organisations: cybercrime will confirm such a network approach sometimes on a large scale but with more 
marked organisational fragmentation and with one individual's capacity to commit crimes potentially on a world-
wide scale. 
Generally speaking, these criminal organisations will also tend to sustain their activities over time to generate 
even more profits with an ever-growing risk to health. 
Several types of criminal organisations may be distinguished in medicine counterfeiting: 
- small-sized organisations, 
- medium-sized transnational organisations, 
- large-scale and particularly transnational organisations which can last for several years and change depending 
on constraints/opportunities, 
- cybercriminal organisations. 
                                                        
 
 
123 Daphné Cameron, “Opiacé des million de pilules disparues”, LaPresse.ca, June 6, 2012. 
124 Ibidem. 
125 UNICRI, Counterfeiting, A Global Spread, A Global Threat, 2007, p. 103. 
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As we will see, a strategic category is linked to this typology: the case of Chinese crime which combines crime 
linked to a grey economy with the triads whose involvement, despite everything is still difficult to demonstrate 
accurately in our field of research. We will also discuss the question of mafia groups and links with terrorism. 
 
 
II.1. Small-sized criminal organisations (two to five persons) 
This type of organisation is generally to be found in a western country where an individual imports counterfeit 
medicines from China or India either alone (or with two or three accomplices). These organisations are often 
people who sense the opportunity to make money by proposing specific products for a section of the population 
at attractive prices. Among the many examples that can be cited is the case of Englishman Victor Cheke129, 42 
years old, who was questioned by agents of the UK Border Agency at Coventry airport when he arrived with 
packets containing tens of thousands of counterfeit pills to treat erectile dysfunction. Cheke had initially 
contemplated simply importing these ‘medicines’ then planned on distributing them afterwards on the Internet 
and selling the tablets at 25 pence per unit. The Englishman was in financial difficulties and, in this illegal trade, 
saw a fast way of earning money. He had a previous history as he illegally imported 29,000 tablets from India in 
2009 and was given a one-year prison sentence. 
There is also the case of Mimi Trieu130 , the owner of a beauty salon in Philadelphia, who imported and sold 
slimming pills from October 2008 to May 2009 and continued to import them up to March 2010, even though she 
was well aware that these pills contained sibutramine and other dangerous substances. Almost four million pills 
were imported from China by post in this way: the parcels stated that the contents were gifts with a non-
commercial value. 
According to the American authorities, Mimi Trieu sold 1,750,000 capsules of illegal medicines at a value of 
USD 245,000. Furthermore, she promoted these fake pills stating that they were manufactured in Japan and 
contained natural ingredients… All incriminating evidence.131 
In the case of China, there is the example of Lu Chong132, a 27-year old Chinese man from Tianmen City, in the 
province of Hubei, who was sentenced to 11 years in prison for having sold almost a hundred types of 
counterfeit medicines on the Internet (especially to treat diabetes, gout and depression) in 2007 and 2008. When 
his apartment was inspected, more than 5,000 bottles of medicines were confiscated as he did not have a 
licence to manufacture medicines. His sales were estimated at CNY 1.4 million (USD 220,000) in two years. The 
investigators had to travel to 20 Chinese towns over three years to collect proof from 400 victims in order to 
prove his guilt. 
Even if France is still protected, and no counterfeit medicines have been seized in legal pharmacies, 
nevertheless trafficking can be organised particularly with Chinese channels. In an investigation, the SNDJ133 
established the involvement of a couple134 who, from 2006 to 2008, ran a family network to procure medicines 
for their Paris shop and several illegal pharmacies in Paris. “They also used frontmen to conceal the illegal 
import of medicines and the financial transfers between France and China. The couple and their accomplices 
were questioned in May 2008. 7,600 boxes, representing more than 400 medicines, were seized in their Paris 
                                                        
 
 
129 Matthew Cooper, “Man jailed for faked Viagra imports”, TheIndependent.co.uk, September 9, 2011. 
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shop. Only pharmacists have the right to sell these medicines. Some of them, particularly those treating sexual 
dysfunctions, were counterfeits or were forbidden due to their toxicity (risks of hypertension or renal failure)”.135        
 
These types of case confirm that ordinary people increasingly have access to criminal activities thanks to widely 
accessible technological tools and international commercial flows. 
 
 
II.2. Medium-sized transnational criminal organisations (about 10 
persons) 
Three big cases can be distinguished in this category: the Wuppertal and Arnaud B. cases (both of them still on-
going) and the Peter Gillespie case, which is a major health risk. These examples prove that medium-sized 
organisations can stem both from international organised crime (Wuppertal) and actors more directly involved in 
the pharmaceutical industry (Gillespie) or an opportunistic wheeler-dealer (Arnaud B.). 
 
II.2.a. Wuppertal case136 
This case started in February 2007. At that time, a German received a parcel containing medicines addressed 
as ‘return to sender’ that he had never posted. This German informed the authorities and in May 2007 the 
regional police set up a surveillance system around the Wuppertal central post office which seemed to be where 
counterfeit products were sent from to potential patients. In July 2007, almost 18,000 parcels containing 
medicines, i.e. 1,300 kilos of various brands, were intercepted in Wuppertal warehouses after only four months 
of surveillance. The parcels seized contained tablets in bulk packed in sachets with a photocopy of the leaflet 
sent to American patients who had ordered their medicines on two supposedly American Web sites 
(www.usamedz.com and www.pillenpharm.com) but which in fact are domiciled in the Netherlands and Israel. 
Furthermore, the online payments routed the patient to a third site called rxsecured.com, shared by the former 
sites, hosted in Israel. Finally, the money was paid into a bank in Panama. 
In August 2007, the authorities made test purchases on the site www.usamedz.com which confirmed that the 
medicines were counterfeit. The investigation proved that the goods were manufactured in China then imported 
to a warehouse in Italy. Four suspects were then arrested, the ringleader of which was an Israeli. The value of 
the goods seized was estimated at EUR 450,000 in cash or equipment. The value of the post sent was valued at 
about USD 4 million. Two other Bulgarian suspects, responsible for the logistics and post, were located in 
Salzburg in Austria. Finally, a last suspect was from Georgia and Israel. A number of countries were used for the 
logistics: Italy for storage and the transfer of counterfeit medicines and Germany for packaging the orders 
intended for American patients. 
The goods were then sent by post from France to the United States. 
The payment system turned out to be complex and transited through various countries: Germany, Cyprus, 
Austria then Switzerland. A Georgian bank was also involved in money transfers. Two central points in the 
organisation were in Israel and the British Virgin Islands. 
This case is similar to organised crime which is characterised by “the temporary nature of the groups which 
spontaneously break up after a few operations or spontaneously disperse after some of their members have 
been arrested”.137 With the sole difference that the network was only dismantled temporarily as it was formed 
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again particularly in Spain. On the other hand, the three-fold skill in logistics, e-commerce and finance brings this 
organisation very obviously close to a managerial system. 
 
II.2.b. Arnaud B. case 
A second recent large-scale case with a central actor: the Arnaud B. case138. 
Since 2007, Arnaud B. is suspected of having disposed of more than 4 tonnes of counterfeit medicines 
manufactured in China through official pharmacies in the United Kingdom, and also in Germany, Belgium, 
Switzerland, the United States the United Arab Emirates. 
“He had medicines manufactured that were either under-dosed or had no active ingredient at all, according to a 
source close to the case. These products were intended to combat cardiovascular diseases and treat people 
who suffered from bipolar disorder”139. The damage to pharmaceutical companies, including Sanofi, came to 
several million euros. The suspect, the owner of a villa in Spain, bought EUR 14 billion in cash, was served a 
European arrest warrant before being presented to the Spanish judicial authorities. He is expected to be handed 
over to an examining magistrate in the specialised inter-regional court in Marseilles, in charge of this case. 
“This operation, called Casamayor, the name of the company managed by Arnaud B. in Spain, was made 
possible thanks to the collaboration between the investigators of the Guardia Civil and the gendarmes in the 
OCLAESP (French central office for combatting dangers to the environment and public health), the same source 
went on to say. This international dealer in medicines had become the number one priority”.140 The French 
investigators traced back to him after the American health authorities, during clinical trials, found anomalies in 
the composition of several medicines treating cardiovascular diseases and schizophrenia delivered by Arnaud B. 
“Without this, he would have continued his little businesses for a long time” revealed someone close to the case. 
One of his accomplices was questioned in the United States and was given a six-year prison term. One of his 
intermediaries in France was also identified before being questioned”.141 Catherine K., director of a company 
based in Nice, responsible for reshipping part of the counterfeit goods, was formally accused with dealing in 
‘counterfeit medicines’, ‘laundering’ and ‘illegal practising the profession of pharmacist’, before being put under 
judicial supervision. These pills were resold in packaging very similar to the originals and with the same name as 
the genuine medicines. The investigations are being continued to establish the destination of the money 
amassed by this dealer. 
 
II.2.c. Peter Gillespie case 
Peter Gillespie is 65-year old Englishman, originally from Windsor, Berkshire who managed a Luxembourg-
based company. Between December 2006 and May 2007, this chartered accountant and pharmaceutical 
distributor imported 72,000 packets of counterfeit medicines, i.e. more than two million doses142. Approximately 
one-third of these shipments concerned medicines presumed to treat serious conditions such as prostate 
cancer, heart problems and schizophrenia. His company imported medicines for an amount of GBP 1.4 million 
while they had a retail value of GBP 4.7 million and, hence, the profit earned by all the partners came to GBP 3 
million (USD 4.9 million). 
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The counterfeit medicines were shipped from China by sea via Hong Kong, Singapore and Belgium, then 
packaged as French medicines to be sold in Great Britain under the ‘parallel distribution’143 system. 
According to the MHRA144, this was the first major case where counterfeiters used this distribution technique. In 
this enormous fraud, 25,000 packets of counterfeit medicines were sold to pharmacies or hospitals and were 
therefore available to patients.145 A contributing factor: according to the MHRA these ‘medicines’ only contained 
50 to 80% of active ingredients plus impurities of an unknown nature. 
Gillespie put forward146 that he thought he had imported French medicines from Brussels and that he was 
therefore legally practising ‘parallel trade’ and taking advantage of the price differences between the countries. 
But the medicines in question did not have the social security price tags for reimbursement specific to France 
and were in boxes labelled in Chinese. The MHRA gave even less credence to these arguments since 
Gillespie's claims were rapidly refuted by the fact that the Englishman had also bought machines to make the 
French social security tags and to make it appear that they were from France. 
Peter Gillespie was sentenced to eight years in prison and four other men were also accused of being his 
accomplices (his brother Ian Gillespie, Richard Kemp, Ian Hardling and James Quinn). According to the 
prosecutor Andrew Marshall, this was the biggest case of failure in medical monitoring to occur within the 
European Union. The investigation cost the MHRA GBP 750,000 over four years.147 
 
 
II.3. Large-scale and transnational criminal organisations 
According to the philosopher Peter Sloterdijk148, with present-day globalisation there is “crime which is based on 
professionalised improved disinhibition, which continues to find new ideas in circumstantial loopholes. This 
sustainable crime is basically about sensing the loophole, a loophole in the market and a loophole in the law”. All 
growth elements for transnational criminal organisations. 
But it should also be made clear that studying transnational crime comes up against three major obstacles149: 
- the lack of any sound data, 
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- the difficulty in defining these transnational activities, 
- ambiguity in trying to identify these transnational criminals and their organisations. 
A considerable amount of work on transnational crime has barely taken these parameters into account and 
resulted in “numerous inaccuracies, simplifications, exaggerations and misconceptions”150 of the issues. 
That said, some criminal cases may reveal more sophistication in the organisation of counterfeit medicines. 
Even if the aforementioned cases of Wuppertal or Peter Gillespie are similar to ‘transnational criminal 
organisations’ with a structured but flexible organisation ‘on a human scale’, other cases may reveal networks of 
an unprecedented scope on a much more complex transnational scale. Two cases in this category are 
significant: the RxNorth case, and above all, the so-called ‘Jordanian-Chinese’ network, which became the 
‘Avastin’ network, all of which have in common that they lasted for a long period (respectively, five years and 
about ten years). 
 
II.3.a. RxNorth case 
On May 22, 2006, the British customs at Heathrow airport seized a large quantity of the counterfeit version of 
medicines manufactured by major pharmaceutical companies. The goods originated in China, then went by truck 
to Hong Kong, by boat to Dubai and finally by plane to the United Kingdom, before being shipped to the 
Bahamas. 
The medicines in question were intended for a company called Personal Touch Pharmacy based in the 
Bahamas. The shipment concerned eight different medicines, seven of which turned out to be counterfeit. These 
were not so-called comfort medicines but treatments for blood pressure, cholesterol and osteoporosis. 
Following the investigations, the telephone number of the goods' recipient in the Bahamas, entered on the air 
transport document, and enabled Andrew Strempler, director of RxNorth, to be identified. 
 
 Andrew Strempler 
Source: http://updatednews.ca/2012/06/20/canadian-online-pharmacy-pioneer-
denied-bail-in-u-s 
 
 
This company was founded by Strempler in Canada in 1999 and took advantage of flaws in the health system in 
the United States to specialise in online distribution of medicines intended for a niche in the American population 
with little or no insurance. In fact, the medicines ordered on the RxNorth site (now closed) did not originate in 
Canada but… China and took a complex commercial route. 
On June 9, 2006, the Bahamian police investigated the company Personal Touch Pharmacy which turned out to 
be an RxNorth distribution centre. After the warehouses were raided, the Bahamas authorities found USD 3.7 
million worth of goods concerning 13 pharmaceutical companies and more than 3 million dose units. 151 
According to the authorities, the annual revenues of Personal Touch Pharmacy (and therefore RxNorth) can be 
estimated at about USD 8 million.152 
This Bahamian company sent parcels of the goods, which originated in China, ordered by customers on its 
website. These orders were in fact accepted by two other companies in England which sent the goods directly 
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by letter to customers living in Canada and, above all, in the United States. This simple rerouting operation 
enabled the English companies involved in this trafficking to earn a commission of USD 1 per packet. For its 
part, RxNorth placed orders for counterfeit products in China. The trafficking of counterfeit medicines was 
complex and transited through Hong Kong, the United Arab Emirates, Great Britain and Canada. The reason 
why these physical flows of goods were fragmented was to conceal the exact origin of the medicines which were 
then sold on to an illicit online pharmacy which was officially ‘Canadian’, targeting the American market. (see 
figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5: Counterfeit medicine trafficking - RxNorth 
Source: Walt Bogdanich, “Free Trade Zones Ease Passage of Counterfeit Drugs to U.S.” 
The New York Times, December 17, 2007 
 
The investigators' task was a complex one: in this way, the licence number corresponding to the transport of the 
suspect medicines from mainland China to Hong Kong could not be used in an investigation. Another example, 
after the raid in the Bahamas, the counterfeiters moved the stocks of counterfeit medicines held in the Sharjah 
free trade zone within the United Arab Emirates to another free trade zone in Dubai called Jebel Ali. The goods 
were stored in a warehouse belonging to a trading house called Euro Gulf specialised in linen and cleaning.153 
When alerted, the Dubai customs found the suspicious medicines and charged seven people. 
The searches made on the Personal Touch Pharmacy computers proved that their server also hosted a 
Canadian online pharmacy which belonged to RxNorth. 
Faced with the charges against him, Andrew Strempler temporarily took refuge in Panama, but six years later, 
his situation changed: 
- In August and September 2006, the FDA intercepted 5,000 packets from the online pharmacy and warned the 
Americans about buying 10 specific medicines (above all, anti-cholesterol treatments) as tests revealed that they 
were counterfeit. 
- In 2007, the company was sold to a competitor, the CanadaDrugs.com Group of Companies. - In 2010, Andrew 
Strempler lost his pharmacist's licence in Manitoba. 
- In June 2012, Andrew Strempler was arrested in Miami, Florida and runs the risk of a 60-year prison sentence. 
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Even though RxNorth used the Bahamas particularly as a distribution platform, the exact origin of the Chinese 
manufacturer or manufacturers involved in this trafficking is still unknown today. 
But an even more complex case stemming from the Middle East deserves to be explained. 
 
II.3.b. The ‘Jordanian-Chinese’ network 
Two transnational channels embody the complexity of the counterfeiters' networks. The first channel is based in 
the Middle East with relations with China in particular, and the second channel – which partially stems from the 
first one – concerns counterfeit medicines exported from the Middle East to markets in western Europe and 
North America. Turkey played the role of intermediary between the two channels in question. 
The first channel was originally developed at the time of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Two families, one 
Syrian and the other Jordanian, shared smuggling activities on both sides of the border, in Daraa and Ramsa. 
The chaos of the civil war in Iraq encouraged the two families to specialise in medicine counterfeiting activities 
(particularly treatments for leukaemia, breast cancer, etc.) to meet the Iraqi demand and in particular to supply to 
the country's main distribution structure for medicines: the company Kimadia154. In fact, this company has proven 
to be a distribution structure subject to regular corruption. 
A Jordanian, Wajee Abu Odeh, claims to be a central operator in the counterfeiting networks in the Middle 
East and went as far as setting up his own company, Sky Park Co. Ltd, in Shenzen in China in July 2003, to be 
closer to the manufacturing sources of counterfeit medicines (officially his Shenzen company is a subsidiary of 
his Hong Kong holding company, which operates in textiles, electronics and economic consulting). Married to 
two Jordanians, Abu Odeh had a third wife, Wu Xia, also born in Shenzen, China, who helped him to set up his 
commercial structure locally. The fake Sky Park Co. Ltd medicines were sent by boat and above all by air from 
China to various hubs in the organisation: Dubai, Amman, Damascus then Cairo.155 
Amman was the most important hub, particularly for counterfeit medicines for aggressive treatments but Dubai 
was more involved in counterfeit comfort medicines. The majority of the medicines were sent by Emirates 
airlines which, once informed of this illicit trafficking, assisted the investigators in their inquiries. Fake official 
documents concerning the counterfeit medicines were given to customs, who were not particularly fussy about 
the exact origin of the products so that they could be imported. The medicines were then distributed according to 
a system similar to that for traditional drugs156 by using hiding places in vehicles (tanks or false compartments) 
where the counterfeit medicines were concealed. These medicines were then redistributed in smaller quantities 
by ‘human mules’ towards the various Middle East borders. If the ‘mules’ were questioned by the customs 
authorities, they declared that these fake medicines were for their own use and, in the case where they were 
intercepted by local customs, one may wonder about their destination as no counterfeit medicine has ever been 
returned to its original laboratory. 
In certain cases, the distribution techniques were particularly creative since counterfeit medicines were found in 
table tennis balls, hidden in washing machines or wrapped in T-shirts sent by sea. Between 2003 and 2006, the 
trafficking prospered in seven Arab countries: Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and 
the Palestinian territories. 
In 2007-2009, the network developed substantially and distributed these counterfeit medicines in a large number 
of countries in the region. 
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- Jordan 
The network is changing: initially it was dismantled in Jordan in 2007 with a first raid in Amman when the 
Jordanian security forces discovered four thousand packets of counterfeit medicines to treat blood pressure 
supplied by the Chinese company Sky Park.157 At least 15 persons were arrested at that time but there were 
difficulties in proving their guilt. The individuals in question were released after two months and were sentenced 
to pay fines of between a few thousand dollars and USD 100,000, which was the case for Abu Afifeh, one of the 
network's key participants. 
The network then extended into the Palestinian territories and afterwards into Egypt. 
 
- Palestinian territories 
In the Palestinian territories, the case took on particularly worrying aspects. In March 2008, a large number of 
counterfeit medicines (treating leukaemia for instance) were discovered at the main Palestinian medicines 
distributor, Al Thulathia. The tests carried out by Al-Najah University in Nablus created confusion as they 
confirmed the quality and the authenticity of the products identified. The personnel of the university in question 
were seriously suspected of corruption (also linked financially to Al Thulathia) as the tests by the other official or 
private laboratories proved the medicines were counterfeit.158 Even more serious: the local police saw possible 
collusion in this illicit trafficking by the Al Arabi Center for Cancer and Blood Diseases, a subsidiary of Al 
Thulathia. 
The manager of the main Palestinian medicines distributor, Abu Hijleh, a former pharmacist who, up to recently, 
had a permanent Canadian residence permit, was very skilful in selling counterfeit medicines. He particularly 
talked about access to low-cost treatment in a "humanitarian" spirit (sic) compared with the Israelo-western 
oppressors. 
This demagogic rhetoric encouraged local pharmacists to unknowingly buy counterfeit medicines at preferential 
prices compared with existing competitors. The cynicism of Abu Hijleh seems to be limitless since he developed 
a Machiavellian technique for disposing of counterfeit medicines when he was advisor at the Al Arabi Center for 
Cancer and Blood Diseases. In fact, Hijleh ensured that the patients were initially treated with legal medicines, 
waiting for the temporary improvement brought about by the medicine, then when the risk of relapse appeared, 
he then proposed counterfeit medicines whose harmfulness was somewhat ‘diluted’ by the foreseeable 
weakness of the patient in question. Questioned by the local security authorities, he acknowledged his links with 
the Jordanian network for counterfeit medicines. 
According to the British researcher Roger Bate, the case is currently blocked by political protection on the 
Palestinian side and it is unlikely that the Palestinian hospitals will make their files available to the courts, 
thereby proving how real this local counterfeiters' network is. 
We should lastly explain that the Chinese authorities, once warned of the links between their country and the 
trafficking in Jordan (2007) and in the Palestinian territories (2008), carried out raids on 11 production sites in 
four provinces: Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Henan. Links between Al Thulathia and the company Sky 
Park International were also revealed and the Palestinian authorities informed the Chinese authorities who 
afterwards prevented members of Al Thulathia from entering their territory. Arrests were also made in six 
criminal organisations including Sky Park International belonging to Wajee Abu Odeh, currently on the run. 
 
- Egypt 
A member of the Jordanian-Chinese network, Sherif Abdul Kareem Abu Kasheh then directed his activities 
towards Egypt where he established a new distribution centre more independent from the rest of the network 
and targeting specifically the Egyptian market, while Iraq was the priority target for counterfeiters based in 
Jordan and Syria. 
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Figure 6: Summary of the distribution in the Middle East in 2007.159 
 
The Abu Kasheh network was infiltrated by the security forces through Mohammed Markieh who was the 
originator of the Jordanian network but who, once arrested, turned informer. Thanks to Mohamed Markieh's 
infiltration, Abu Kasheh, after taking six months to build up confidence, accepted to meet a potential buyer under 
the code name "Monaco" supposedly a buyer from the Colombian FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia). Thanks to this stratagem, on April 14, 2009 the Egyptian authorities arrested Abu Kasheh in his 
apartment in Cairo. At the time of his arrest, the authorities seized over 5,000 boxes of counterfeit medicines for 
Alzheimer's disease and more than 1,700 boxes of counterfeit medicines for breast cancer. Sentenced to two 
years in prison, he was released in the spring of 2012 and is currently thought to be in Jordan where he has 
resumed his activities. In Cairo, investigations proved that the Abu Kasheh network was responsible for several 
deaths160. The volume of counterfeited legal medicines was assessed at half the legal volume of equivalent 
medicines for the whole of Egypt.161 
 
- Syria 
After this initial ‘Jordanian-Chinese’, Palestinian and Egyptian stage, the criminal network then turned towards 
Syria to run its illegal activities more efficiently. In Damascus, activities in counterfeit medicines for the Middle 
East were developed with Abu Afifeh as leader, originally based in Jordan. The manufacturing equipment was 
imported from China and Austria. But the Syrian authorities identified distribution hubs in Aleppo, Idlib, Hims and 
Hamas and about a dozen people were arrested. In May 2009, numerous raids were carried out in Syria to 
dismantle these networks and resulted in 73 arrests. Four tonnes of stolen medicines, either not authorised for 
sale or counterfeit, were seized at this time, of which 60 types of counterfeit medicines from western Europe and 
also half a dozen counterfeit versions of medicines from local companies: Nile Pharmaceuticals and Chemical 
Industries Company (Egypt), Aleppo Pharmaceutical Industries (Syria) and Hikma Pharmaceuticals (Jordan). 
The majority of packages had fake Iraqi Ministry of Health stamps, indicating that these products were intended 
for sale in Iraq. 
This operation proved to be a success for the Syrian regime and, according to Roger Bate, the biggest case of 
dismantling a counterfeit medicines network to date. But the network is still partially in existence.162 
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Figure 7: Distribution network in the Middle East, 2009.163 
 
 
It should be noted that for many years Syria has been a hub for counterfeit medicine trafficking and Syrian 
companies manufacture, import and export illicit medicines to Europe and the Middle East. According to the 
European Commission, 37% of the counterfeit medicines seized at the European Union borders in 2008 came 
from Syria.164 More generally, since 2008, the Middle East has become a strategic area for counterfeit medicine 
trafficking with, according to certain observers, the involvement of terrorist organisations such as the Hezbollah. 
The Middle East's strategic position between Asia and Africa makes it a particularly sensitive area for such 
trafficking.165 
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II.3.c. The ‘Avastin’ network 
The second channel is somewhat an extension of ‘Jordanian-Chinese-Syrian’ network since the counterfeiters' 
networks then tried to export certain counterfeit medicines, particularly Avastin, to western countries probably 
through Turkey. 
 
 
 
The ‘Avastin’166 case concerns a cancer drug which appeared at the Syrian border in 2009, that is three years 
before copies of the same medicine appeared on the American market. It is uncertain whether the Middle 
Eastern channel previously described was used as a ‘corridor’ or if the medicines in question were manufactured 
locally or both. In fact, it is difficult to trace with any certainty the ‘overall path’ taken by the counterfeit medicines 
as the counterfeit Avastin then went back and forth between Turkey and Egypt, before the products were sold to 
a Swiss wholesaler (Hadicon AG) then a Danish one (CareMed ApS). 
The problem showed up more clearly when a British wholesaler, Richard’s Pharma Ltd, bought 120 packs of 
counterfeit Avastin from a Turkish wholesaler and exported 38 of them to the United States. The remaining 82 
packs were sold by Richard’s Pharma Ltd to the British wholesaler, River East Supplies Ltd. This British 
company then sent the counterfeit medicines to the United States to a distributor in Tennessee. 167  The 
medicines were then bought by American doctors through a company belonging to Thomas Haughton called 
Montana Healthcare Solutions. Finally, it should be explained that Haughton's brother-in-law, Kris Thorkelson, a 
pharmacist based in Winnipeg in Canada, distributed medicines by Internet to American consumers on the 
website Canadrugs.com and was investigated even though it did not sell Avastin. The investigators however 
accepted Thomas Haughton's good faith when he stated that he did not know the nature of the counterfeit 
medicines he had obtained. The two British wholesalers, Richard’s Pharma Ltd and River East Supplies Ltd, 
also proclaimed their good faith and insisted that they did not know that the medicines were counterfeit. 
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Figure 8: Diagram summarising the distribution network between  
the United Kingdom and North America.168 
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Figure 9: Diagram169 summing up the overall transit route of the fake medicines 
in question between the Middle East, Turkey, Switzerland, the UK and the US. 
 
This diagram starts in Switzerland: “one of the intermediaries involved in the trade, Hadicon AG in Zug, lodged 
an official complaint to the Public Prosecutor of the canton. Hadicon is alleged to have ordered the drug in 
Egypt, from a company called ‘SAWA for importing and exporting’. The merchandise is then said to have been 
stored in a warehouse in the free port of Zurich before being sent on to Denmark, from where the firm CareMed 
sent it to the UK, the last stop before the US”.170 
Equipment (and also bags) made in China found during the Syrian raids in 2009 suggest that there is also a 
Chinese network: in 2010 fake Avastin was given to 116 patients in Shanghai, some of whom suffered 
complications after injections in the eyes (as well as being a cancer treatment, Avastin can also be prescribed 
for certain eye disorders, which has been known to cause blindness).171 
As we see from the Jordanian-Chinese network case or with ‘fake Avastin’, examining such transnational 
networks with any methodology is tricky to say the least, as they are by definition fragmented and polymorphous 
and are located in a sensitive geopolitical region. The fact that the various ‘criminal’ groups work in isolation 
makes it even more complicated to collect information. Finally the investigators need to assess whether or not 
the wholesalers or distributors involved in these affairs are acting in good faith. It is still not certain exactly where 
the counterfeit medicines could have been sold in Europe and the US by local distributors. 
It appears however that Egypt and especially Turkey were used as relays for counterfeit medicine trafficking 
towards Western Europe or even the United States via the UK. The Middle East may also be a production area. 
So in the case of the ‘Jordanian-Chinese network’, when the Chinese production line was broken off in 2008, 
large-scale production shops in Damascus took over. 
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The network probably comprises about 150 people and is said to be still under the surveillance of the targeted 
pharmaceutical companies172 particularly for high added value medicines: cancer drugs, cardiovascular disease 
treatments, etc.  
At this stage in our study it is important to note that from Mimi Trieu to the ‘Avastin’ network, and including the 
Peter Gillespie case, the organised crime cases that we have described highlight the central role of China in this 
trafficking and a great variety of counterfeit medicines. 
 
 
II.4. Crime in China 
The Chinese authorities are concerned about the role of national organized crime in drug counterfeiting and are 
increasingly striving to counter organized crime. We must remember that China has the most severe sanctions 
in this area (the death penalty). 
In this country, it is important to distinguish between crime based on exports of counterfeit drugs and crime 
focusing on mainland China.  
 
II.4.a. Crime and exports from China 
- The Kevin Xu case 
The Kevin Xu affair is typical of the Chinese business leaders involved in counterfeiting medicines intended for 
clients in the West.  
In July 2007 Kevin Xu, a Beijing businessman, offered potential buyers counterfeits of medicines in high 
demand, such as treatments for cancer, cardiac disorders or Alzheimer’s disease. Xu, owner of the Orient 
Pacific International chemicals company, explained to his supposed clients that these medicines could be made 
in his factory in China and that he would have the consignments sent via different ports to conceal the origin of 
the products. But he had been followed since March 2007 173 and the clients in question whom he met at 
Suvarnabhumi airport in Bangkok and who bought USD 167,000 worth of merchandise to gain his trust, were 
actually special agents of ICE (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement) in the Department of Homeland 
Security.  
At another ‘business meeting’ in Houston, Xu was taken for questioning by agents from ICE and the FDA.174  He 
admitted that his production capacity could reach 200,000 boxes of medicines or over a million pills in one single 
consignment175. At first his counterfeiting activity was more for ‘lifestyle’ type medicines, particularly for sexual 
problems, but Xu gradually expanded his range of counterfeit medicines to those with higher added value 
concerning treatment for heart disorders, prostate cancer or a treatment for swine flu. After the European 
market, Xu later targeted the US market and admitted that he was able to distribute 29 kinds of counterfeit 
medicines in the US.176 But paradoxically Xu was also involved in legal business activities as he supplied generic 
medicines to Chinese hospitals. When he was arrested the Chinese authorities were of little help in identifying 
the business leader’s counterfeit medicines. 
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At his trial in Houston in August 2008, observers realised the full extent of the affair, especially with counterfeit 
medicines of well-known brands intended for American consumers. Xu was sentenced to 78 months in a US 
Federal prison and a fine of USD 1.4 million. His arrest may have prevented the dealer from spreading 
counterfeit medicines within the US supply chain, but some of the counterfeit medicines destined for the UK 
market were distributed, as the unprecedented ‘Class 1’ drug alert by the MHRA was unable to prevent the 
partial distribution of this version in UK pharmacies and hospitals. Laboratory analyses of a medicine to treat 
schizophrenia showed that the counterfeit version was under-dosed as it only contained 55% to 80% of active 
ingredients. There are suspected links between Kevin Xu and Peter Gillespie but so far nothing has proved this 
hunch. 
This affair shows the growing importance of the Chinese organized crime in the production of counterfeit 
medicines and of some initiatives by unscrupulous businessmen. Older cases in Haiti and Panama caused the 
deaths of dozens of children, and those mainly responsible proved to be Chinese manufacturers who were not 
licensed to produce medicines.177 In June 1996, syrups made in China were alleged to have caused the deaths 
of 88 Haitian children, and in April 2007, 78 deaths were reported in Panama (219 victims in June 2011)178 after 
taking an illicit medicine containing counterfeit glycerine179. Unravelling the counterfeit networks was even trickier 
as in the cases of Haiti and Panama the illegal medicines passed through six and five intermediaries 
respectively. For Haiti, the American FDA was unable to determine the exact origin of the counterfeits in spite of 
the numerous investigations in China. A manufacturer named Tianhong Fine Chemicals Factory was tracked 
down in Dalian in northeast China but in late 1997 the factory closed down without the investigators being 
informed of the exact address.180 
In the Panama case, the perpetrators were found in the Yangtze delta thanks to the cooperation of the Chinese 
authorities, but there again, no manufacturers were formally charged. The manufacturer Taixing Glycerine 
Factory was apparently closed following investigations by the Chinese authorities at the request of the US FDA. 
The Chinese brokerage company involved, CNSC Fortune Way, belonging to the Chinese government, was 
never penalised and continues to do business today.181 
So although there is a whole history of export of Chinese counterfeit medicines, the Kevin Xu affair shows that 
the distribution of this sort of product is becoming more opportunistic and cleverly marketed. 
 
- The Sengyang Zhou case 
A similar, though less widespread, affair has recently been brought to light182 concerning Sengyang Zhou, 31, 
from the Kunming Yunnan region. This young Chinese national specialised in the export of fake diet medicines 
sold on websites in 2008-2009. The products Zhou put on the market contained undisclosed active 
pharmaceutical ingredients like sibutramine, which can cause extreme hypertension or tachycardia. Zhou also 
produced counterfeits of an anti-obesity drug in China and marketed it successfully in the US. These counterfeits 
circulated on the Internet and particularly on online auction websites like eBay. A site specialising in the 
distribution of counterfeit medicines known as www.2daydietshopping.com was even based in Texas for better 
promotion locally. This particular site was managed by a Chinese person with US citizenship called Qingming 
Hu, who was followed by the American authorities. 
Zhou was arrested in March 2010 in Honolulu, Hawaii during a ‘business meeting’ set up by FDA agents in 
which he confirmed that he could make large quantities of a counterfeit version of the anti-obesity medicine. In 
June 2011 he was sentenced to 87 months in a US federal prison for trafficking and attempted trafficking of 
counterfeit medicines and ordered to repay more than USD 500,000 to the victims of his crimes. 
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This affair proves that criminal strategy in counterfeiting medicines also tends to rely on a diaspora settled in a 
targeted developed country. It shows that in spite of the complexity of the criminal system in place, various US 
authorities (FDA Office of Criminal Investigations, ICE Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Postal Inspection 
Service) managed to work together to arrest the criminal.  
But cases of Chinese counterfeiting do not target foreign markets exclusively, and mainland China is also a 
victim of the problem. 
II.4.b. The case of mainland China  
In China there is one affair183 that reveals this ambitious criminal tendency. It began when a man named Li was 
questioned in July 2011 in Jinhua City, Zhejiang, during a regular taxi rank inspection. Li had in his possession 
700 empty medicine bottles with their packaging and the anti-forgery tags. The police then discovered that he 
had been obtaining used bottles from a number of hospitals in Zhejiang for years thanks to the help of at least 
one person in each hospital cleaning service. This particular criminal network bought used bottles and packaging 
from hospital cleaning services all over China. Li’s family supervised the network and supplied the bottles to 
medicine producers based in Beijing and Shanghai. The enquiry later revealed that Li was part of a larger 
network which included 300 people from all over China targeting mainly medicines for serious conditions such as 
cancer treatments (lymph node cancer, breast cancer and lung cancer). The counterfeit medicines were sold for 
CNY 10,000 per pack (USD 1,600) and even more on the Internet or in unregistered private hospitals or 
pharmacies. 
The criminal network actually comprised four main groups184: hospital cleaners who sold the packaging, the 
hospital agents who bought them, the wholesalers and finally the counterfeit medicine manufacturers. According 
to Jiang Yiqun, of the public security economic crimes investigation team in Jinhua, a cleaning agent could 
pocket CNY 1,500 (USD 240) for a full package of medicine to treat breast cancer (with the bottle, the 
instructions and the authentication labels) and CNY 1,200 (USD 190) for a medicine used to treat lymph node 
cancer. A drug inspection officer in the same city said that most of the medicines contained starch and wheat 
powder and could cause serious diseases and even death.  
In November 2011, 16,000 police officers were called in, leading to the arrest of 1,770 suspects in this 
trafficking. Counterfeit medicines worth CNY 2 billion (USD 315 million) were seized by the Chinese authorities. 
The search also unearthed 1,400 counterfeit medicine production or marketing facilities. 
Like the previous examples in English-speaking countries, we can also observe here – on a grander scale – the 
involvement of corrupt players directly linked to the health sector. 
For most experts, the Chinese organized crime is unquestionably the leader in counterfeit medicines, but other 
countries too can be involved in this kind of trafficking, particularly India. The researcher Roger Bate reports the 
case of a famous Indian counterfeiter named Rajesh Sharma, also known by the name Rajesh Dua, who allows 
the purchasers themselves to decide on the type and content of the product to be used in the medicine. This 
semi-industrial counterfeiter employs some forty people for a production worth tens of millions of dollars.185 What 
is special about China is the huge number of counterfeiters who do both legal and illegal business and who can 
produce large quantities of counterfeit medicines partly destined for export, so the Chinese authorities are 
undoubtedly a little less vigilant. As a result, a number of pharmaceutical companies are unsure of the exact 
origin of their production because, according to analyses by Philipe Andre, a teacher at the School of 
Pharmaceutical Science and Technology in Tianjin University “39% of European and US pharmaceutical 
companies are ill informed of the origin of the Chinese producers with whom they work”.186 
Certain pharmaceutical companies therefore share some responsibility for this situation. 
Finally there is the difficulty in describing these Chinese counterfeiters, as situations vary enormously and 
information sources are limited: manufacturers who, like Kevin Xu, have both legal and illegal activities; Chinese 
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counterfeiter networks who, as in the case of Sengyang Zhou, have foreign intermediaries; and counterfeiting 
cases concerning mainland China which can involve hospital networks. And there is one last case that is even 
more difficult to understand: what role do ‘conventional’ criminal organisations, like triads, play in these 
dealings? 
 
II.4.c. Evolution of criminal organisations in China  
In China relations between the state and crime are largely ambiguous. The Chinese criminal economy is 
summed up in a paradox: “On the one hand, corruption should be preserved as an element of stabilisation for 
the Party-State apparatus through rent seeking, but on the other hand, it should be opposed as a destabilising 
factor of its political legitimacy, which threatens the survival of the regime. In other words, in spite of the current 
political rhetoric, the fight against corruption can only be limited and used only as an example, or they risk 
collective suicide.”187  
The Chinese population may be largely in favour of these criminal organisations being subjected to the authority 
of the Chinese government, seeing it as bringing more stability in the face of the unpredictable effects that these 
illegal organisations can generate within society.188 But the most frequent mistake in describing these Chinese 
organisations is to think that they are still somehow hierarchical, whereas “under pressure from the Chinese 
government and market dynamics (including the black market), criminal networks are above all flexible”.189 On 
the other hand, although such organisations continue to recruit on the margins of Chinese society, they also 
seek possible members among politicians or well-known individuals with a strong social status.190 In general, 
relationships between Chinese politicians and criminals are particularly widespread, especially at intermediate or 
lower levels and based on corruption which protects the criminals from illegal activities, 191  particularly 
counterfeiting. 
It was in the 1980s that contraband and counterfeiting businesses (cigarettes, weapons, currencies, medicines, 
etc.) really took off in China.192 According to counterfeiting expert Li Guorong, in general “counterfeiting has 
become so significant that taking radical action would have a disastrous effect on the economy and could 
destabilise the government, some of whose factories and warehouses connected to counterfeiting belong to the 
local army or to political leaders”.193 In the more specific case of counterfeit medicines, the Chinese government 
has long been somewhat tolerant towards the counterfeiters involved.194 
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In China, criminal organisations have also adapted to anti-crime campaigns and have redirected part of their 
assets to legal activities. In the city of Chengdu (capital of Sichuan province), a criminal organisation specialising 
in illicit activities in the medicine sector (theft in particular) became partly involved in legal activities by buying 
shares in legal pharmaceutical structures, particularly by investing in a medicine production unit and donating to 
medical institutions195. Members of this organisation included doctors, hospital managers and primary school 
teachers. These criminal organisations are in fact similar to informal relationship networks. Such networks can 
then resume a more hierarchical structure by continuing to recruit in marginal groups and regularly approaching 
politicians and people with a high social status. The real leaders give their instructions ‘behind the scenes’ and 
then break with the original strategy aiming to favour legal business activities. 196 In this case we find ourselves 
facing particularly resilient networks that are able to play on ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’ activities in a pragmatic and 
opportunistic manner to avoid arousing too much suspicion in their environment. 
This example shows the importance of corruption and illicit economic dealings that need to be identified locally. 
In the past few years Chinese regions have gained more independence and developed an increasingly 
autonomous local economy197. The counterfeit medicine industry can benefit a whole series of economic sectors 
thanks to the organisation of the trafficking in question (restaurants, hotels, transport companies). 198  This 
regional dimension of the counterfeit medicine trade in China is even more strategic in that local court rulings 
find it difficult to question the ‘favourable’ economic context around counterfeiting.199 Furthermore, investigations 
are made more difficult in the Chinese system of decentralised factories as in general, finding the counterfeiting 
factories is tantamount to finding your way through a complicated labyrinth with a multitude of intermediaries and 
suppliers.200 
There is also the question of these organisations’ relations with Hong Kong. Contrary to what some experts 
believed, Hong Kong’s return to China did not lead to an exodus of triads, and a new type of alliance was set up 
between mainland China and the former British colony.201 Production units of the multi-product counterfeiters in 
Guangdong and Fujian provinces are often financed by criminal organisations based in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan,202 which are themselves often involved in drug trafficking, prostitution and pornography.203 In Hong Kong 
they have the benefit of different legislation from mainland China, which can complicate matters in logistics and 
in legal terms when trying to track down the originators in the counterfeiting business. The situation in Taiwan is 
even more favourable to criminal organisations based on the island but with illegal business activities, 
particularly counterfeiting, in mainland China. There is virtually no cooperation between China and Taiwan on 
these issues.204 
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These networks also involve the Chinese diasporas (in the US or Canada) comprising import-export companies 
but also community leaders, restaurant owners, and various types of employees who can help suppliers meet 
potential buyers.  
These parasitic, opportunistic criminals seek to develop alternative strategies and invent non-conformist, flexible 
and undetectable organisations. Conversely, they can also implement a camouflage strategy or mimic 
hegemonic organisations thereby concealing their activities. 205 
 
To sum up the profiles of these Chinese criminal organisations involved in counterfeit medicines we propose the 
following classification: 
- Large-scale organisations working nationally, which may be an aggregate of different types of network. We 
observed that in a landmark case brought to light in Jihua City “the criminal organisation” in question included 
different types of actor: members connected to the hospital environment, wholesalers and manufacturers of fake 
medicines. 
- Chinese businessmen involved in legal activities who expand into illicit counterfeiting of medicines intended for 
export, particularly to high added value markets like North America or Western Europe. The example of Kevin 
Xu (p. 59) is symptomatic of local businessmen who become involved in large-scale illegal trafficking intended 
for international markets.  
- Smaller structures which develop an Internet strategy with an intermediary abroad (Sengyang Zhou affair, p. 
67). 
- Small foreign structures which arrive in Chinese industrial areas and establish local companies intended to 
form transnational networks. The previous example of Sky Park and their relays in the Middle East is a telling 
example of this kind of strategy which seems to be catching on. 
- And finally cross-border crime is also developing in China with foreign mafia groups who can be involved in 
counterfeiting medicines206. Chinese people living abroad seem to have an important role in these dealings with 
foreign countries.207 Access to these information sources remains tricky and tracking them down will probably 
require extra research work with the help of specialists in Chinese matters. 
 
 
II.5. Mafia groups, terrorism and financing 
What about mafia groups in the counterfeit medicine trade? 
 
II.5.a. Mafia organisations  
The Italian Mafia has a long tradition in counterfeiting, as their involvement in criminal counterfeiting 
organisations dates back to at least 1860 with one Giuseppe Morello, a famous counterfeiter who later 
emigrated to the US where he continued his activity by counterfeiting dollars (1867-1930)208.  
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In the more specific case of contemporary Italian mafia groups, there is hardly any doubt about the involvement 
of the Mafiosi in counterfeiting. Take for example the involvement of the Camorra in the luxury product industry 
as shown by Saviano209 or in the worldwide distribution of fake Bosch electric drills described by the researcher 
Francesco Forgione210. These counterfeiting activities are at local level in Italy but also on a worldwide scale via 
specific distribution networks. Links between the Camorra and the counterfeiting business were in fact confirmed 
in a recent Europol report which does not reveal too much about the nature of the relations in question.211 
According to certain reliable studies212, the Italian mafia is allegedly also directing its activities to the health 
sector: “the benefits for the Mafia of breaking into the medical sector is twofold: the gangs, who have now 
become part of the middle classes, have understood that this sector is both a guaranteed income and a means 
of social control.” In Calabria, forty or so private hospitals, over three hundred medical laboratory centres and 
doctors belong to Mafia families.213 In short, the health sector plays the same strategic role for these criminal 
organisations as the construction sector played during the booming post-war years. 
In the more specific case of counterfeit medicines, the Camorra’s involvement has been confirmed by the PSI,214 
particularly for medicines to treat infections and cardiovascular disease. Roberto Saviano215 also mentions the 
case of the Camorra copying real bar codes on medicines imported into Italy via networks set up between China 
and the port of Naples. These counterfeit medicines are then allegedly transferred to anonymous buildings near 
the port to be later ‘integrated’ into the official medicine distribution network.216  
That said, in the medicine sector, links with mafia organisations are very often tricky to establish and in general it 
should be specified that the pattern of “integrated criminal counterfeiting remains rare and is ‘reserved’ for 
organisations which have full control over their socio-economic environment”. 217 
But these port cities, historically mafia capitals, which no doubt guarantees them a ‘geographic income’,218 are 
presumably strategic zones for direct or indirect mafia involvement in trafficking medicines. For access by sea, 
the western part of the Balkans is also mentioned219 as a hub for counterfeit products from China arriving in the 
European Union via the Black Sea through ports on the Adriatic or Ionian Seas.  
Mafia involvement in counterfeit medicines is all the more plausible, at least theoretically, because the Italian 
Mafia and particularly the Ndrangheta have become “entrepreneurial mafia”220 and have gone from “traditional 
homicides, kidnappings and large-scale drug trafficking to controlling whole sectors of the economy (such as 
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earth moving, construction, financing awarded to people in difficulty)”. 221 The very real difficulty in analysing 
these mafia groups lies in the fact that “their levels and methods are much trickier to discover. It is indeed 
difficult to determine whether these structures are involved during production, circulation or final distribution of 
the counterfeit products, and whether these groups organise, do the production themselves or merely provide 
various services for the counterfeiters, for example ensuring the mobility of the production units. There is also a 
varying degree of opportunistic criminality, so the members and aims are likely to change as opportunities 
arise.”222 
Another probability factor is the relative proximity of the narcotics and medicine markets. Some researchers 
believe that the fight against drugs may have encouraged some organised criminal groups to move into the 
counterfeit medicine market where there is less risk of penalties and where profits remain high.223 The case of 
the Columbian drug cartels is mentioned as having certain connections with illicit medicine trafficking. In the 
1990s, Cali covered their illicit dealings in cocaine, which involved purchasing raw materials, with a network of 
pharmacies. 224  But this close link between narcotics and medicines became particularly relevant from the 
production angle, and as the historian Jacques de Saint Victor said in a recent work225, “Refining tons of cocaine 
required millions of litres of chemical precursors, made in Europe or the US. Some were widely – and freely - 
distributed, like potassium permanganate, but others needed permits. By investing in these pharmaceutical 
companies, the cartel could import all the products it wanted quite legally”. 
In China the involvement of triads in the synthetic drug market and particularly amphetamines is a significant and 
confirmed phenomenon.226 This kind of diversification could in theory lead certain organisations to move into 
counterfeit medicines. There are a certain number of accounts which point to this: “The corruption of government 
officials by local mafia groups, backed by triads, does not make things any easier. And the economic 
significance of the counterfeit business in some regions (between 8 and 10% of the Chinese GDP) explains the 
lack of enthusiasm of certain local institutions”. 227 But these conclusions should be treated with caution as 
reliable criminology studies seem rare in China or are less easily accessible than in the West. 
But Europe should certainly not be excluded from these studies and some comments from specialists suggest 
that there may be links within the European Union between drug traffickers and counterfeit medicine traffickers 
or that a certain form of imitation may exist between the two networks. At an international meeting of experts in 
Romania, Karolyi Szep, a Hungarian customs officer declared,228 “The Balkans are a significant route for the 
trafficking of fake medicines, and it is the same for heroin and other drugs.” One case of seizure by the Turkish 
police which included 6,000 fake Viagra pills and 750,000 ecstasy tablets and the wherewithal to produce 150 
kilos of heroin is a good illustration of this connection. 
In short, the strong presence of mafia groups in our field of study cannot be confirmed with any certainty, but we 
must maintain an active watch as we have discovered potential factors for the possible involvement of this kind 
of organisation in counterfeit medicines. 
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II.5.b. Terrorism  
The IRA 229  is the most widely cited example of a terrorist organisation involved in counterfeit medicines, 
particularly veterinary medicines230 to finance their activities. In the 1990s, two IRA members, Brian Ruddy and 
his cousin Paeder Hamill,231 set up a counterfeit veterinary medicine laboratory in Hialeah Gardens, 30 miles 
from Miami with USD 60,000 of financial aid. The mastermind of this operation was another IRA member called 
Edward Davidson who was involved in the large-scale theft of British stock in May 2010. Medicine bottles were 
supplied by a legal company based in Atlanta on the understanding that they would be used as medical supplies 
during operation Desert Storm. One James ‘Seamus’ Costello was in charge of these purchases for the IRA232. 
The fake labels were made on a farm in Northern Ireland belonging to Patrick Brady, Hamill’s uncle233. The 
counterfeit medicines, which looked genuine to the untrained eye, contained only water, with no active 
ingredients, with the small difference that they were packaged in 500ml bottles, whereas the originals were sold 
in 100ml bottles. The counterfeit medicines were distributed by Life Services Inc., a subsidiary of a large 
distributor, Lextron, based in Ocala, Florida. The money obtained from these sales was then transferred to bank 
accounts in Northern Ireland. In March 1991 a raid on the property uncovered 30,000 labels for veterinary 
treatments and growth hormones.  
About 700,000 animals may have received injections of the counterfeit medicine234. The affair was discovered by 
Merck who sued Lextron and its subsidiaries, and also Davidson and the other members of the operation in a 
Florida court in February 1992. Davidson was banned from selling, producing or in any way representing the 
counterfeit veterinary medicine and Brian Ruddy was ordered to pay USD 6 million to the company. 
More recently, Hezbollah is a terrorist organisation frequently mentioned as being involved in counterfeit 
medicines. In March 2006, the US Terrorism Joint Force, an inter-agency initiative led by the FBI, charged 19 
individuals involved in a network of counterfeit medicines to treat sexual disorders with activities in Lebanon, 
Canada, China, Brazil, Paraguay and the US235. Five members of this network were Canadian and according to 
the Vancouver Sun,236 which allegedly had access to the US indictment documents, a portion of the USD 
500,000 per month linked to the trafficking was paid to Hezbollah.  
A recent Israeli study 237  confirmed that Hezbollah is focusing more and more on developing illicit activity 
connected with counterfeiting medicines, particularly for energy stimulants. The move to this sector may be due 
to the fact that drug dealing has become something of a problem for this terrorist group: the Islamic community 
had reservations about this kind of activity. But the fact that one of the authors of this Israeli study, Dr Boaz 
Ganor, is also a member of the Israeli National Committee for Homeland Security Technologies makes one 
wonder just how independent this sort of research is in the context of the Middle East crisis and the post-9/11 
crisis. 
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In general, although a number of reports238 tend to confirm the links between terrorism and the production of 
medicines, particularly for ETA, the Chechens or the guerrilla groups in North Africa, there are no precise, 
confirmed elements to prove it. Some elements seem to argue for a close link between terrorism and 
counterfeiting, but as Peter Lowe239 explains, it is important to distinguish between direct links and indirect links 
where sympathisers provide money through a third party. Although Lowe believes the latter case is more 
frequent, it must be admitted that as a general rule the factual elements proving these links between terrorism 
and counterfeit medicines are all too often based on unsupported anecdotal elements, as a recent US report 
confirms. 240  The IRA affair therefore stands alone in the detail of its modus operandi and independent 
researchers should make more effort to authenticate Hezbollah’s level of involvement in the phenomenon and 
the possible participation of other terrorist groups in medicine counterfeiting. 
But in addition to the ‘mafia’ and ‘terrorism’ issues, there is also the financial issue, and particularly money 
laundering in connection with counterfeit medicines. 
 
II.5.c. Money laundering 
Although, in the Middle East, counterfeiters tend to use cash to avoid being noticed in the bank systems241, 
money laundering is often the focus of numerous transnational counterfeiting strategies. It was the case in the 
Goldfinch affair, handled by the MHRA in the UK. This affair began in 2005242 with a person known by the police 
services for armed assault who went over into selling counterfeit medicines on the Internet and who acquired 
over the years a great many properties and assets. The fraud squad found it difficult to follow these laundering 
activities, which made light of borders and which also included the opening of an online casino with a partner in 
Malta. 
Operation Goldfinch enabled the MHRA to find a number of bank accounts in various countries: 
- Spain: three bank accounts with GBP 7 million. 
- Netherlands: three bank accounts with GBP 4 million. 
- Cayman Islands: one bank account with GBP 1.2 million. 
- Malta: thirty bank accounts with GBP 10 million. 
- Curacao: two bank accounts. 
- Isle of Man: two bank accounts with GBP 3 million. 
- UK: one bank account with GBP 3 million. 
making a total of over GBP 28 million (USD 44 million). 
 
And in assets: 
- Two properties in London worth GBP 3 million. 
- Two villas in Spain worth GBP 2.5 million. 
- Two Bentleys worth GBP 250,000. 
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- A boat in Spain worth GBP 1 million, etc. 
making a total of over GBP 8 million (USD 12.5 million). 
 
Legally, the counterfeiters have been ordered to pay damages of up to GBP 1 million. 
 
One stratagem for stopping the counterfeiters is to prove that often they do not pay any taxes, which is a definite 
discrepancy, given the size of their assets and their lifestyle. In general, therefore, MHRA aims to focus on the 
traceability of money flows when arresting counterfeiters. This strategy may appear somewhat strange, but it is 
relatively effective because, of the 2,143 suspected and 179 confirmed cases of pharmaceutical crimes in 2011, 
six have so far led to prosecution.243 In France, in the latest report by Tracfin244, an organisation specialised in 
money laundering issues, it was shown that only two cases are linked to counterfeiting, although the report did 
not specify in which sectors it occurred. Finance remains a widely underestimated sector in the fight against 
counterfeiting, but this tool cannot become effective unless more efforts are made, not only from the law 
enforcement authorities, but also those who create government policies. 
 
 
II.6. Cybercrime and counterfeit medicines 
This section aims to describe the environment in which cybercrime is expanding in relation to the question of 
counterfeit medicines. 
 
II.6.a. Cyberspace and criminality 
Cyberspace is also a specific area which, to some extent, favours deviant behaviour. 
Cyberspace seems to bring about a series of transformations in criminal behaviour.245 
- Globalisation: globalisation of criminal opportunities modifies relationships between global and local as it 
transcends conventional borders. This globalisation also modifies these ‘global – local’ relations from a legal 
point of view. 
- Distribution networks and technologies: these networks create new forms of commercial and emotional 
relationships between individuals and generate new forms of victimisation. But these information flows also 
make it difficult to have a coherent view of the deviant behaviour and to identify these new forms of risk. 
- The simultaneous synoptic and panoptic qualities of Internet technologies: the assailants can observe their 
victims and attack them from a distance. It is also possible to identify the types of attack and the aggressors 
concerned. 
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- Asymmetrical rather than symmetrical relationships: the relationships between the aggressors and the victims 
also have implications for the law. For example, if there are a number of victims from different legal systems, it is 
difficult to finance customised legal investigations even if the criminal act is a well-known fact. 
- Long trains: Internet enables traffic to be traced, particularly at the time of each electronic transaction by an 
Internet user. To some extent this is a good thing, as a copy of this data serves as a backup and supports the 
law, but the copies of this data are also a sensitive issue in human rights and respect for privacy. 
- Changes in the organisation of criminal activities: for example, an isolated Internet user can carry out extremely 
complex criminal acts without any restrictions of time or space. These people can commit crimes which were 
once beyond their organisational or financial means. 
These six points show that the Internet alters the way in which criminal acts are committed and the conventional 
interactions between aggressor and victim. Even if the nature of the offences and crimes does not change 
fundamentally (fraud, counterfeiting, swindling, etc.), the behaviour on this new type of network has changed 
considerably.  
In fact from the criminal point of view, “the most significant transformation in the physical world towards 
cyberspace is the fact that the territory is much wider for both organisations and individuals. The criminals can 
operate on the Internet with less control and on a transnational scale.” 246 
 
II.6.b. Cybercrime techniques  
Four cybercrime techniques play a strategic role in the distribution of counterfeit medicines on the Internet: 
cybersquatting, forums, spam and search engine manipulation. 
 
- An increase in cybersquatting  
The cybercriminal technique called cybersquatting is developed to illegally obtain a domain name to mislead 
cyber-consumers when making purchases on the internet. 
According to the internet software company MarkMonitor,247 cyber-squatting rocketed by over 33% in 2007 with 
382,000 offences identified in the last quarter, making it the most common form of fraud. 
Jérôme Sicard, Southern Europe manager of MarkMonitor explains: “In the past, cyber-squatters registered 
domain names to harm the brands and then sought to sell them back to them; today this is a business in itself, 
aimed at generating huge profits. What could be simpler to generate traffic on search engines than to use brand 
names in a domain name? Because most of the words in the dictionary are already used in domain names, the 
fraudsters and criminals are increasingly turning to brand names and trademarks”. The World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO) has confirmed this growth in cybersquatting: since the launch of the UDRP 
(Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy) in December 1999, over 17,000 disputes have been 
submitted to WIPO’s Arbitration and Mediation Centre.  
The medicine brands most often cited in these disputes248   include: Bayer, Eli Lilly, F. Hoffman-La Roche, Pfizer 
and Sanofi-Aventis. 
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Figure 10: Sectors most affected by cybersquatting 
Source: Philippe Collier, “En 2009, L’OMPI a traité 2107 plaintes de cybersquatting”,  
Contrefaçon Riposte, March 23, 2010. 
 
 
- Forums: strategic discussion areas 
Forums are strategic in spreading information about the trafficking of counterfeit products. 
Two main types of forum can be distinguished: 
- Consumer forums where information is shared on products, prices and low-cost web sites. Cybercriminals 
target these forums by spam and fake comments to attract potential purchasers to their websites.   
- More “underground” forums249 for amateur or more experienced cybercriminals sharing the latest innovations or 
proposing collaborations for illicit operations. There is a hierarchy between the members of these forums and it 
is easy to distinguish between the administrators, moderators, sellers, recognised members and guests who 
might arouse suspicion about possible undercover operations. Interestingly, these types of forum are used as 
meeting places between ‘virtual’ and ‘real-world’ criminal activities.  These forums reduce the time factor by 
allocating a precise task to each cybercriminal to diminish the extent of each offence but also the risk factor by 
allocating cybercriminal actions to different geographic areas and protecting themselves against any possible 
legal proceedings. 
- Spam: a vector for cybercrime 
                                                        
 
 
249 Example cited by CEIS, Study under the direction of Guillaume Tissier, Les marchés noirs de la cybercriminalité, June 2011, 
p.14. 
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Spams250 are an essential vector that use e-mail to advertise websites distributing counterfeit products. The 
complexity of the digital and financial flows is summed up in figure 11.251 The pharmaceutical sector is prioritized 
as a target. One can see how a potential purchaser clicking on an e-mail spam will obtain - via servers based in 
China or Brazil -counterfeit Viagra traced back to Russia for a product manufactured in India and with a final 
payment to a bank in Azerbaijan. 
Studies have proved that 95% of the payments for this spam were made through three banks located in 
Azerbaijan, Denmark and Nevis in the Caribbean. Most of the time, these bank transactions were not 
necessarily fraudulent in that the consumers received their orders, however both the patients and the 
pharmaceutical companies were taken advantage of in that these products were illegal. 
 
Figure 11: Digital and financial flows connected to the spreading of spam for counterfeit Viagra. 
Source: Neha Chevra et al., “Click Trajectories: End-to-End Analysis of the Spam Value Chain”, 
In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium and Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, May 2011,  
pages 431–446.  
 
 
Cybercriminals use several effective and opportunistic techniques to flood in-boxes through dedicated servers 
offering services for sending spam, particularly with a view to inviting the recipient to log on to attractive sites 
from a visual and a financial point of view. The list of recipients can also be ‘targeted’ thanks to the use of 
marketing databases. 
According to Stefan Savage,252 an IT expert at the University of California in San Diego who took part in this test 
study, there are a great many techniques for sending spam to people thanks to the internet setup without being 
blocked, and the real weak point is the banks. “The question is whether this problem is sufficiently strategic for 
politicians to become deeply enough involved.” According to this study, only 0.0001% of spams are thought to 
result in the sale of counterfeit medicines but with a substantial gain. It has to be pointed out that spams are also 
used to disseminate malware such as a ‘Trojan horse’, which surreptitiously runs a programme in the user’s 
                                                        
 
 
250 Spamming can be defined as the excessive use of an email system intended to expose, deliberately and usually repeatedly, all 
or some of its users to messages or content that they neither need nor have asked for, often by making sure they can be confused 
with the messages or content usually exchanged or looked for by these users. 
Source: http://www.futura-sciences.com/fr/definition/t/internet-2/d/spam_1650/ 
251 Neha Chevra et al.,  “Click Trajectories: End-to-End Analysis of the Spam Value Chain”, In Proceedings of the IEEE 
Symposium and Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, May 2011, p. 431-446. Graphic: Courtesy of Stefan Savage. 
252 David Talbot, “Anatomy of a Spam Viagra Purchase”, Technology Review, May 20, 2011. 
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computer to obtain confidential information that the hackers will sell to third parties.253.   These spams account 
for 5% of all mailing activities.254  
A recent study255 revealed that most of this spam is based on an advertising approach consisting in encouraging 
potential clients to buy the products. Only 38% of the medicines in question are products for sexual problems, 
and the variety of medicines on offer is therefore much wider, with 289 different products listed, including 
treatments for cancer, leukaemia or diabetes.256 Western countries, the US in particular, are the main buyers 
through spam and monthly orders257 for the seven leading illicit medicine distributors have been estimated at 
more than 80,000 units. 
Spam is also spread by clever cybercriminals. One of the most significant examples is the case of Oleg Y. 
Nikolaenko, 24, nicknamed the King of Spam, who was arrested in Las Vegas by the US authorities in 
November 2010. Under the name of ‘Docent’ he earned hundreds of thousands of dollars using his ‘Mega D’ 
botnet258 capable of sending 10 billion unsolicited emails a day259. The US Department of Justice accused 
Nikolaenko of spamming on behalf of Lance Atkinson and other members of the Affking group, an affiliation 
programme of illegal online pharmacies. 260 According to the journalist Brian Krebs, ‘Docent’ also sent spam for 
other illegal online pharmacy networks and recordings made of SpamIt without their knowledge revealed that 
‘Docent’ earned commissions of USD 320,000 between 2007 and 2010 to use spam to promote illegal 
pharmacies affiliated with SpamIt distributing counterfeit medicines. The young Russian fiercely negotiated his 
commissions at 45-50% because of his extremely powerful botnet, whereas normally they are 30% for a 
spammer. 
However the importance of spam should be put into perspective, as for some researchers in cybersafety, the 
search engines also play a major role in the access to counterfeit medicines on the Internet.  
 
- Manipulating search engines  
According to a study directed by Nicolas Christin261, associate director of the Information Networking Institute in 
Carnegie Mellon University, a quarter of the ten most frequent requests on search engines are directed to illicit 
pharmacies. This investigation262 led by some of the foremost researchers (Carnegie Mellon, Harvard) suggests 
that illegal pharmacies seek to manipulate the search engines to promote their activities, especially as it is very 
efficient in encouraging people to buy. The researchers pointed out that the rate of conversion into a medicine 
purchase could be estimated at between 0.3% and 3% when search engines were manipulated, which is a much 
higher percentage than the previous example for spams targeting medicines (0.0001%). To aggravate matters, 
                                                        
 
 
253 John Richard Castronova, “Operation Cyber Chase and Other Agency Efforts to Control Internet Drug Trafficking, “The ‘Virtual’ 
Enforcement Initiative is Virtually Useless”, Journal of Legal Medicine, vol. 27, No. 2, 2006. 
254 Economist.com, “Long life spam. The changing landscape of online fraud”, The Economist, November 20, 2010. 
255 Chris Kanich, Tristan Halvorson et al., “Show me the Money, Characterizing Spam-advertised Revenue”, USENIX Security 
Symposium, 2011, San Francisco, USA. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Ibid. 
258 A botnet is a set of Internet connected or semi-automatic programs which interact with computer servers. Nowadays, the term 
is often used to designate a network of zombie computers, i.e. malicious computers. Source: Wikipedia September 2012. 
259 Brian Krebs, “Chat With Accused ‘Mega-D’ Botnet Owner?”, KrebsOnSecurity, December 5, 2011.  
260 Ibid. 
261 Medical Daily Reporter, “Illegal Online Pharmacies Exploiting the Web”, August 17, 2011. 
http://www.medicaldaily.com/news/20110817/7040/illegal-online-pharmacy-illegal-drugs-online-drug-perscriptions-online-order-of-
perscriptions-il.htm 
262 Study source: Nicolas Christin, Nektarios Leontiadis, Tyler Moore, “Measuring and Analyzing Search-Redirection Attacks in the 
Illicit Online Prescription Drug Trade”, 20th USENIX Security Symposium San Francisco, August 8-12, 2011. 
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the legal online pharmacies have little visibility because of this aggressive strategy of the counterfeiters on the 
Internet who boost their visibility on search engines by latching on to websites with.edu suffixes to make their 
strategy even more effective. Online advertisements can also be very efficient for directing to illicit pharmacy 
websites. As we can see from this study, search engine manipulation is a major problem and is no doubt vastly 
underestimated. 
One well-known case showing the role of search engines in promoting illicit websites concerns Google and its 
system of keywords managed by its advertising sales division. This system, called Adwords, uses keywords to 
bring up an advertisement in the margin of the results page in an Internet search, if these words correspond to 
the words used in the request. These advertisements comprise the URL of the advertiser’s website. The 
advertiser can reserve a keyword of a registered brand that he does not own, and this is what causes problems, 
particularly as in the past few years, Google has been facing lawsuits for counterfeiting from brand owners. The 
ambiguity of this issue comes from the fact that search engines earn most of their revenue from advertising. The 
online pharmacy market represents USD 1 billion a year according to market survey company eMarketer263. 
According to the company LegitScript LLC   more than 80% of online pharmacies advertising on these search 
engines are illegal.  
To try to counteract this visibility for websites distributing counterfeit products, some big companies have started 
legal proceedings against the US search engine. 
These court rulings increasingly encourage the two parties (manufacturers and Google) to cooperate. They 
show the limits of the fight against counterfeiting, which should above all contribute to controlling the information 
networks. 
But Google is not the only strategic search engine; there is also Bing created by Microsoft which has been the 
subject of a report by Legitscript and Knujon, 264  which suggests that 89.7% of advertisements for online 
pharmacies sponsored by Microsoft are illicit and although Microsoft’s promotional policy implies that these 
websites are based in the US or Canada, some websites were obviously based in a foreign country, particularly 
India. Finally, most advertisements for pharmacy websites presented by Bing are for medicines not requiring 
prescriptions. The keyword auctioning system on which Microsoft’s online advertising is based is thought to be 
more beneficial financially to the illicit pharmacies than the legal ones. 
Among the examples mentioned and deciphered by Legitscript as pharmacies sponsored by Microsoft links is 
the network Choice-Rx.com which says it is based in the Seychelles, but is actually part of a network known as 
medstore.biz, which works through an affiliation system. This system allegedly belongs to a Russian criminal 
organisation called Regtime, which plays an important part in the illegal pharmacy network. Legitscript believes 
that criminal organisations are widespread, as the criminal organisation 33 Drugs is said to own the 
dailymedrx.com network which advertises on Bing and is said to have a network of about a hundred affiliated 
pharmacy websites which sell counterfeit medicines without prescriptions. Canada has also been a major point 
of contention and Google was sued by the US Department of Justice for having allowed Canadian pharmacies to 
buy advertisements on Google Adwords that illegally targeted US consumers. That said, in August 2011 the US 
Department of Justice published a statement announcing an agreement with Google for the payment of a fine of 
USD 500 million by the company for having allowed Canadian cyberpharmacies to publish advertisements 
targeting US consumers and then export prescription medicines to the US in violation of the nation’s laws. This 
fine represents the total sum of gross advertising revenue received by the company and the estimated gross 
income collected by Canadian cyberpharmacies from sales made in the US. 
The size of the fine is evidently meant to encourage Google to exert more control over the use of its Adwords 
platform. 
 
                                                        
 
 
263 Thomas Catan, Amir Efrati, “Google Was Warned On Rogue Pharmacy Ads”, The Wall Street Journal, May 20, 2011. 
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Why not use filtering to counter the promotion of illicit websites connected with counterfeit medicines? 
According to the European Alliance for Access to Safe Medicines (EAASM)265 one solution would be for the most 
frequently used search engines to ignore web pages giving information on counterfeit medicines. Such an 
initiative was conducted in 2009 by Google, Yahoo and Bing, which banned fake online pharmacies from using 
registered brands for medicine prescriptions. But these cybercriminals then switched to other methods. They 
now try to reach consumers by using spamming techniques on forums which appear in search engine searches 
(see figure 12 below: a Google search for the psychostimulant Adderall)266 
 
 
Figure 12: Search for the psychostimulant Adderall, Google page. 
Source: OpSec Security, Risk Assessment: Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals on the  
Online Marketplace, Study, November 15, 2010. 
 
 
Therefore, the filtering technique has its limits and it also raises civil liberty issues, as some associations have 
pointed out (for example La Quadrature du Net,267 which is very active in European institutions).  
On the other hand, these problems are arising on an international level. Counterfeiting activities involve many 
operators and many countries. According to International Law the States are still the ultimate reference – thanks 
to the Treaty of Westphalia! In such a context, how can governments adopt national laws that are 
comprehensive, modern and compatible with those in other countries? Not to mention develop international 
judicial cooperation?   
There is also the question of filtering and ‘criminal organisations’. 
                                                        
 
 
265 Philippe Collier, “62% des médicaments vendus sur Internet sont des  faux”, Contrefaçon Riposte, July 22, 2008. 
266 OpSec Security, Risk Assessment: Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals on the Online Marketplace, Study, November 15, 2010. 
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Faced with these “increasingly industrialised and hyper-reactive networks” 268, the effectiveness of the current 
measures should be put into perspective. According to David Fernyhough269, an expert in counterfeiting with 
Hills & Associates (a risk management company based in Hong Kong), “The problem has simply become so 
huge that no measures can possibly stop it.” In the ‘real’ world but also on the Internet. 
 
- Cybercriminal techniques with two strategic targets 
 Finally it is important to note that the targets of these various cybercrime techniques are either the end clients or 
the distribution channels. 270 
In the case of end clients, they may be attracted by an affordable price that comes from a continual flow of spam 
in their inboxes. A potential buyer will then start to surf the web, especially on websites that look legal. For 
websites selling medicines, there will generally be a statement that the online pharmacy is authorised and 
registered in compliance with the legislation. All these factors aim to reassure potential buyers even if they do 
not have a doctor’s prescription. There are a number of online pharmacies that do not require a prescription to 
conclude the transaction.  
In the second case, the counterfeiters tend to break into the distribution channel by using Internet as a marketing 
vehicle, exploiting the fact that some distributors look for low-cost products to maximise their profits without 
thinking to check the integrity of the supply source. Once the products have been bought by the distributors, the 
medicines are for example marketed as legitimate products and it will then be difficult to trace their origin.  
According to the UK’s MHRA271 criminals have for some years now preferred to distribute counterfeit medicines 
to pharmacy wholesalers, particularly those supplying to hospitals or medical support organisations rather than 
directly to consumers. By targeting these organisations, the counterfeiters can capture a bigger, more lucrative 
market. For example, in the UK, the wholesale value of a pack of twenty-eight pills of medicines to treat prostate 
cancer is USD 260, which can give the traffickers a comfortable profitable.272 
But with all these various cybercrime techniques, we should not lose sight of the fact that the principal 
distribution vector of counterfeit medicines for end consumers remains the illicit online pharmacies. 
 
II.6.c. Online pharmacies 
What types of pharmacies can be found on line? 
In the eyes of the law, there are three types of online pharmacy273: 
- Some countries authorise online pharmacies to deliver medicines to patients after obtaining an electronic 
prescription delivered by a doctor.  
- Online pharmacies circumvent the law by employing doctors who prescribe medicines on the basis of 
information supplied by the patients in an online questionnaire. Once the medicines have been prescribed, 
they are sent to the patients.  
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- The most illegal pharmacies deliver all kinds of medicine anywhere in the world, including those that require a 
prescription, with no controls at all, provided the patient can pay for them. 
 
In Europe the situation can be summed up as follows: 
- Online sale authorised in primary care for medicines for which a medical prescription is optional: Ireland, 
Spain, Belgium, Italy, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Finland. 
- Online sale authorised for all medicines if the site is connected to an actual pharmacy: Germany, Denmark, 
Portugal, Sweden. 
- Online sale authorised for all medicines: UK, Netherlands. 
- Medicine only sold on prescription: Switzerland. 
- These Internet sales were recently authorised in France on certain conditions.274 Firstly, the website must be 
owned by a chemist with a dispensary: to put it plainly, sales of the medicine remain the domain of the 
professionals in the sector and should be an additional activity. No ‘pure-player’ from the web can break into 
this market. Next, the website must be approved by the Regional Health Authority. The owner of the site must 
also register it with the Order of Pharmacists. Finally, online sales are currently limited to OTC (over-the-
counter) medicines, i.e. those that can be bought freely and that customers can pick up off the shelves 
themselves. 
 
In general, the free circulation of merchandise between member States is one of the principles of the European 
Union. In virtue of this principle and since the voting of a jurisprudence in the European Court of Justice in 2003 
(known as ‘DocMorris’), Europe considers that a State cannot ban pharmacies from selling over-the-counter 
medicines online.275 The situation is therefore likely to change again in the short or medium term in France. 
In the US online selling is allowed for all medicines but as we will see, the online standardisation systems are not 
sufficiently well established. 
A recent study conducted by MarkMonitor276 revealed a strong interest from consumers for websites offering 
pirated content and counterfeit products. Over 53 billion visits have been registered in one year. Of these, 
counterfeit medicines attract over 92 million visitors annually. Three-quarters of the sites suspected of hosting 
content listed as ‘counterfeit’ are located in North America or in Western Europe according to a MarkMonitor 
study conducted for the US Chamber of Commerce. 
The problem is increasing: an enquiry277 led jointly by Interpol and the WHO four years ago, with the help of 24 
countries, referenced 800 illegal sites, 125 of which are thought to be located in France.   
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A number of elements provided by MarkMonitor show that this trend is worsening278: 
- The VIPPS279 programme led by the NABP (National Association of Boards of Pharmacy) has certified only 
four online pharmacies out of the nearly 3,000 listed in this study. This trend was confirmed in a more recent 
study in July 2012 with 96.71% of online pharmacies practising illegally. 
- These websites receive tens of thousands of visitors a day, to the extent that their activities are sufficient to 
earn them a listing in Alexa, the reference site for internet statistics. 
- China heads the list (49%), followed by India (17%) for those countries of origin of the products according to 
the advertisements. 
- The discounts (up to 90%) are significant of the fraudulent origin of these medicines. 
In 2008, the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University280 which researches the 
phenomenon in the US, identified 365 websites offering medicines on line that in principle required a 
prescription: 85% of these sites did not ask for the prescription and only two of them were officially registered as 
online pharmacies. More recently, the company OpSec Security281, published a study which estimated the 
number of non-accredited pharmacies not requiring a medical prescription as 89% versus 51% in 2007.  
 
This study provides other significant results: 
- Discounts on medicines reach 40% or more on 86% of non-accredited online pharmacies. 
- The illicit activities of these non-accredited pharmacies are in full growth.  
- Three-quarters of these pharmacies describe certain products still protected under a US patent as generic 
medicines. These medicines are often made in India and are still not authorised for sale in the US. 
- Marketing techniques282 to target consumers are increasingly sophisticated and can cleverly divert any risk of 
interception by the authorities. The counterfeiters target message forums with spams to avoid the new 
improved filters used by search engines to detect illicit pharmaceutical sites. 
- consumers are at an increasing risk of reaching non-accredited sites that pass themselves off as legitimate 
sites, according to OpSec Security. 
Other studies have made it possible to gather a certain number of analyses to get a better grasp of distribution. 
Many e-pharmacies with illicit activities are taking on an increasingly sophisticated legitimate appearance in 
targeting consumers and using advanced marketing techniques.283. One technique consists in the site passing 
itself off as being in a ‘secure’ country. One in five online pharmacy sites claims to be Canadian but is registered 
in Russia, Panama or Bulgaria, which are high-risk countries for counterfeiting problems. Another strategy that 
counterfeiters privilege is the ‘merchandising’ of ‘star’ medicines on the internet before their official launch. For 
example, the European Commission reported that one counterfeit obesity medicine and smoking cessation 
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product was “on sale on several websites” before its approval. Sanofi, which developed this future blockbuster, 
has filed a number of suits against counterfeiters since 2004 with the WIPO’s Arbitration and Mediation 
Centre284. 
The latest Brandjacking Index report of 2009 from MarkMonitor highlights an alarming increase in the 
counterfeiting of well-known pharmaceutical brands. Asian manufacturers are offering counterfeits of brand 
medicines on B2B trading platforms that are normally delivered on prescription. These online pharmacies have 
increased their presence on the market. Their turnover was estimated at USD 11 billion in 2009 (USD 4 bn in 
2007). 
 
- Difficult traceability  
In spite of the difficulty in tracing the origin of certain medicines, there is some geographic information about illicit 
pharmacies and on the origin of the spams used to sell counterfeit medicines (see figure 13 below).285 The 
United States are the champions in hosting illicit online pharmacies, with 36% of the total in 2009 versus 49% in 
2008.   
 
Figure 13: Origin of spam aimed at selling counterfeit medicines.286 
 
Chinese organized crime has specialized somewhat in selling counterfeit medicines. Most of the spam attracting 
people to these rogue sites comes from China (31% in 2009, see figure 14)287. In addition, it can be noted that 
the pharmaceutical sector accounts for 64% of all 288 (the second industrial sector is watchmakers, with 6.5%), 
which shows just how strategic this sector is for counterfeiters. 
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287 This 2009 statistic should be taken in perspective, as in 2010, the results of the company Sophos placed China in fifteenth 
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Figure 14: Origin of spam leading to rogue websites.289 
 
 
II.6.d. Concrete cases to illustrate the ‘cybercrime – counterfeit medicine’ combination 
We focus particularly on health scares which can be opportunities for cybercrime strategies, and also a large-
scale Russian example that brought to light counterfeit medicine networks organised on the Internet. 
 
- Health scares 
Europol290 is concerned about the considerable role played by the internet in aiding criminal organizations to 
distribute counterfeit medicines. According to this international organization, these criminal groups are well 
structured and able to instrument health scare situations. That was the case with the swine flu virus during which 
there was an increase in the trafficking of counterfeit medicines supposed to treat the virus. In circumstances like 
this, opportunistic cybercriminals291 send messages (see some examples of Russian cybercriminal messages 
below) to boost sales of counterfeit medicines like Tamiflu and manipulate the search engines during epidemics 
that require emergency treatment. 
According to the company Sophos, Russian cybercriminals targeted UK citizens during the swine flu crisis as 
there were limited stocks available locally.292 In July 2009 when there were concerns about whether the UK 
pharmaceutical industry could supply enough Tamiflu, searches on the Internet for this medicine in the UK 
increased by 1,400%293 and Internet users were often directed to websites managed by cybercriminals (see 
figure 15). 
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Figure 15: Messages from Russian cybercriminals said to have targeted UK citizens during the swine flu crisis.  
Source: Graham Cluley, “Swine flu fears making millionaires out of Russian hackers,  
Naked Security Blog”, Sophos, November 16, 2009. 
 
The case of Fukushima is also significant and following the nuclear accident in March 2011, two Japanese 
traffickers sold “Premium Zeolite” on line, stating that this counterfeit medicine would protect against radiation.294 
According to the researcher Roger Bate it is important to use the Internet’s potential as it can prove particularly 
useful for quick, safe purchases in a pandemic when buying medicines in a crowded pharmacy can present 
health risks. The solution would be to standardise the legal websites and start educating consumers and other 
stakeholders. A European medicine logo to mark legal Internet sales websites is planned for 2014295 and some 
                                                        
 
 
294 Sarah Imber, “Online Snake Oil Salesmen Exploit Japanese Radiation Fears”, SafeMedicines.org, April 14, 2011. 
http://www.safemedicines.org/2011/04/online-snake-oil-salesmen-exploit-japanese-radiation-fears-215.html (access May 2, 2012). 
295 ATS, “L’UE renforce sa législation contre les médicaments contrefaits”, Agence Télégraphique Suisse, February 16, 2011. 
- All rights reserved -  
 
70 
experts believe that it will take up to ten years to set up a traceability system in Europe. The Internet network of 
the future296 must be seen as a ‘global interconnecting network’ that is extremely efficient in times of emergency 
or disaster. An ‘emergency Internet’ must therefore be used in addition to conventional communication means. 
But beyond these emergency situations, there are also cybercrime cases in which the cybercriminals have a 
longer-term strategic vision. Glavmed is a significant example of this. 
 
- Glavmed 
The sale of medicines on the Internet generally works on the principle of an affiliation platform297 and these illicit 
networks can include from 3 or 4 affiliated sites up to several thousand. Glavmed, as we will see, is one of the 
most significant cases of cybercrime in the pharmaceutical sector, but there are between 100 and 200 other 
smaller networks, according to Legitscript.298  
 
These illicit online networks have several methods in common299: 
- The illegal online pharmacy networks claim to supply low-cost legal medicines. 
- A lot of these networks sell mainly ‘comfort’ medicines but others offer a wider range of products. 
- Some websites focus on branded medicines while others offer only generics. 
- Some websites offer both branded and generic medicines but complaints from consumers indicate that even 
for purchases of branded medicines, a generic is always sent. 
- Some networks never deliver the counterfeit medicines. 
 
One important affair in the illicit trafficking of counterfeit medicines recently opposed two Russian businessmen 
involved in cybercrime: Pavel Vrublesky and Igor Gusev300. Pavel Vrublesky is the former CEO of Chronopay, a 
leading Internet payment system in Russia. He is currently in prison, charged with conducting illegal activities in 
online pharmacy affiliation programmes called RX-Promotion. Igor Gusev co-founded Chronopay with Vrublesky 
in 2003, but following a conflict brought to light in 2005, Gusev left the company and founded his own illegal 
pharmacy affiliation programmes: GlavMed and SpamIt. These two affiliation programmes have dominated the 
fake online pharmacy market worldwide, but SpamIt was closed down in September 2010. Gusev has since 
been accused of practising illegal activities and is said to be on the run. In 2009, the two Russian businessmen 
brutally confronted each other publicly and commercially, each trying to bring down the other’s programmes. 
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How Glavmed worked 
Glavmed in fact had two affiliation programmes301:  
- one with purchases by consumers from sites promoted through affiliates of SpamIt,  
- the other with orders from sites promoted by regular members of Glavmed using search engines and hacking 
techniques. 
In general, SpamIt managed the ‘suspect’ activities (spamming campaigns, etc.) for sites selling medicines on 
line, including the huge Canadian Pharmacy network, while GlavMed provided ‘honourable’ showcasing for 
affiliation sites of online pharmacies (…). ‘Honourable’ in appearance only, as a study of the messages 
exchanged on Glavforum302 led to the discovery of discussions between affiliates proving that they knew that 
their PharmacyChecker303 or other certificates were fake. 
 
 
Figure 16: Glavmed - SpamIt affiliation model 
Source: Brian Krebs, “SpamIt, Glavmed Pharmacy Networks Exposed”,  
KrebsOnSecurity, February 24, 2011. 
 
The affiliates of Glavmed / SpamIt had ‘prefabricated’ online pharmacies. They picked up about 40% of 
commissions on sales made on their website. Eight out of the ten largest affiliates of Spamit.com earned over 
USD 1 million in commission on their website. The motivation of these e-pharmacy affiliates was to generate 
cash as quickly as possible.304 The largest affiliates of SpamIt could hope to earn between USD 5,000 and USD 
50,000 a month in commission. 
                                                        
 
 
301 Ibid. 
302 Glavforum is the Glavmed online forum, www.glavforum.com. 
303 PharmacyChecker is a company that until 2010 supplied certification services for online pharmacies aimed at the most popular 
search engine. 
Source: http://www.safemedicines.org/2009/12/checking-the-facts-on-pharmacycheckercom.html 
304 Donald E. deKieffer, “The Internet and the Globalization of Counterfeit Drugs”, Journal of Pharmacy Practice, vol. 19, No. 3, 
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The websites promoted under the name ‘Canadian Pharmacy’ by affiliates of Glavmed / SpamIt were by far the 
most promoted by spam in June 2010. 
 
 
Figure 17: Affiliate brands promoted by spam.  
Source: M86 Security Labs, June 2010. 
 
 
SpamIt 305 is said to have been the biggest distributor of counterfeit medicines on the Internet with over 1.5 
million orders from 800,000 cyber buyers between May 2007 and June 2010. For three years, over 2,500 
affiliates were able to earn significant commission by promoting the Glavmed pharmacy websites. 306 
According to sources obtained by hackers in 2010307, the second biggest member of the SpamIt network, called 
GeRa, is said to have enabled SpamIt to generate 80,000 sales of counterfeit medicines and USD 6 million in 
revenue over three years. GeRa was also linked to a large spambot that could send 18 billion emails a day. 
Most of the SpamIt affiliates were paid in Webmoney, a virtual currency similar to PayPal. The payment system 
ePassporte was used for these payments. Following the closure of SpamIt by the Russian authorities in October 
2010, the volume of spams fell drastically (around 40% at the beginning of October 2010308) particularly because 
the SpamIt affiliates were in a transition period during which they were looking for other partners. But GlavMed 
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remained active after the closure of SpamIt. In 2011 cybersecurity researchers valued the monthly income of 
GlavMed at over USD 1 million.309 
GlavMed has no hesitation in advertising on the search engine Bing by pirating advertisements of legal 
Canadian sites (canadrugs.com, prescriptionpoint.com) to redirect them to an illegal Russian site canadian-
healthcare-shop.com.310  
Note that WebMoney has gradually withdrawn from financing cybercriminal activities311 especially after signing 
contracts with conventional companies such as Steam, a US company specialising in online video games. And 
ePassporte was closed down in September 2010 due to fraud. It is important to remember that online payment 
method setups are very closely linked to the development of these online pharmacy affiliation networks. 
Chronopay was at the centre of the payment system for the RX-Promotion network. 
 
- Russia 
Links have also appeared between the cybercriminals in the GlavMed/SpamIt network and the Russian 
Business Network312. According to a confidential report 313 “The RBN offers a full infrastructure for illicit activities 
on the Internet in child pornography, games, phishing, spamming, virus spreading and more. Some experts use 
the term cybercrime provider. The RBN guarantees that the servers will not be closed down, even if a complaint 
is made; this is what we call bulletproof servers. (…) The RBN should be understood as a service designed and 
intended for criminals and mafia groups of all kinds which manages technology platforms to protect their illegal 
cyberactivity.” 
Russia plays a major role in cybercrime linked to counterfeit medicines even if other regions probably also have 
a strategic role in this field (Eastern Europe, Brazil, China, etc.). 
According to a recent study314, Russia represents a total of USD 2.3 billion on the world cybercrime market, 
valued at USD 12.5 billion. The Russian-speaking world accounts for USD 4.5 billion, or more than a quarter of 
the world cybercrime market. The study also estimates spam emanating from Russia at a total of USD 830 
million and the proportion of spam connected to the distribution of counterfeit medicines at 6.2% of the total 
Russian cybercrime market, or USD 142 million. A particularly worrying fact is that Russian cybercriminals 
apparently have increasingly organised, large-scale structures which are close to the organisations linked to the 
more traditional sectors of organised crime (prostitution, drugs, arms dealing, etc.). 
 
In terms of activity, figure 18 below315 shows the links between ‘economic profit’ and ‘number of incidents’. 
Spams and online banking fraud are shown to be the most profitable activities. Cybercrime concerning 
counterfeit medicines are somewhere in the middle. 
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Figure 18: Relation between profit and number of incidents.  
Source: http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/4686/cyber-crime/russian-cybercrime-not-only-a-localized-threat.html 
 
 
 
II.7. A summary of the criminal organisations involved in counterfeiting 
medicines: organisational challenges 
At the end of our study, how can we distinguish the criminal organisations involved in counterfeiting medicines in 
the ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ worlds? 
 
II.7.a. ‘Real’ criminal networks and medicine counterfeiting  
It is important to underline the importance of the network concept and observe the transnational criminal 
networks very closely in our study.  
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- The importance of the network concept  
The network concept is particularly suited to today’s economy: “The specialisation era has become the network 
as such and its ability to supply, transport and deliver illicit goods to various countries. The actual type of goods 
in question is now of secondary importance.” 316  
Generally speaking, the ‘criminal network’ concept seems more appropriate than ‘criminal organisation’. The 
network-style organisation dominates, with for example “central figures who initiate the projects, settle conflicts 
and give guidelines to all the players. In this structure, activity moves from the centre towards the players on the 
outer edges, and these have no contact with each other”.317 This organisation is particularly common in China318 
where a unit (often a trading unit) dominates a spider web structure (called zhizhuwang in Chinese) with 
authorised interactions between the outer units. This organisation does not exclude a leader or group leader but 
it is predominantly the “network of networks” pattern at the top of a pyramid structure. One variant is a network 
structure with no interaction between the outer units but with an entrepreneur-coordinator in the centre who 
isolates all the contacts. This pattern is often found in drug trafficking in China319. Another advantage of the 
network is that it weakens the legal instruments that are often held up by bureaucracy or slow decision-making 
processes. But conversely, over-compartmentalising structures can hamper the steady flow of information and 
can also lead to excessive risk-taking by the units on the edge who can then challenge the central leaders and 
create instability within the organisations.320  
Often in counterfeiting, “the criminal networks become traders, middlemen between supply and demand, 
facilitators of illegal international trade”.321 This ‘trader’ approach has been confirmed in the pharmaceutical 
sector by Nie An322, CEO of the company Honor International Pharmtech, which was investigated by customs 
officials. According to Nie An, “We do not really have factories. Honor International is just a trading company. 
(…) As a trading company, stating that you can take charge of production attracts business. It is false 
advertising.” 
This statement could also have applied to Kevin Xu who was more of a middleman than a manufacturer. 
Generally speaking, one feature of these networks is that they adapt easily to market conditions. The Chinese 
‘traders’ involved in counterfeiting are able to segment the market according to buyers’ demands and prices of 
counterfeit medicines can vary according to the quantity and quality of the active pharmaceutical ingredients 
contained in the products. This technique enables traders to sell off their counterfeits cheaply and in large 
quantities without lowering their profit margins or conversely to sell more sophisticated medicines in more closely 
regulated markets.323 Our numerous examples have shown us that criminal organisations use networks in a 
more pragmatic way than the law enforcers324, which gives these organisations a definite advantage in terms of 
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speed and efficacy. “It is very difficult to track counterfeiters’ production sites and their distribution networks and 
therefore to arrest them.”325 
As we have seen, two types of criminal organisations seem to dominate in the most significant cases of 
counterfeit medicines: 
- Either actors with some sort of connection with the pharmaceutical sector (see the Peter Gillespie and Kevin 
Xu cases, pages 44 and 59). These horizontal organisations are often of medium size (from three or four 
people to ten or so in the centre of the network). 
- Or criminal organisations that are closer to a “conglomerate” with “very large operators which have taken 
over a small-scale diaspora activity which controlled the trafficking throughout the 20th century.”326 In this 
case the organisations can be highly complex with industrial facilities and others more geared towards 
marketing and finance. This kind of network tends to be polymorphic with a structure that regenerates or 
adapts to opportunities and can therefore direct its actions towards a variety of fields (particularly by 
targeting Europe and the US). It seems difficult to anticipate or even to follow such a complex network 
closely enough without being able to infiltrate the heart of the strategic decision-making core as we saw in 
the case of the huge Middle East network. 
There is also the question of the transnational dimension of these networks. 
 
- Transnational criminal networks 
As we have seen, the case of mafia groups (or triads, cartels, etc.) would benefit from greater clarification as 
there is very little “analysis of the flows of international economic exchange”327 connected with these criminal 
structures which have diversification strategies that might involve them in counterfeiting medicines which in turn, 
as we have observed, has certain links with the narcotics market. Yet there has been little study of this 
diversification strategy at global level, particularly when it combines legal and illegal activities.328 Examination by 
specialists of this type of organisation (researchers, magistrates) would confirm whether or not this type of 
structure exists and would keep a watchful eye over any future involvement.  
It would be an analytical error to attribute to these transnational criminal networks (and particularly mafia groups 
or their equivalents) “a transnational scapegoat function, symbolising the dangers and damage related to 
economic and institutional globalisation and privatisation processes”. 329  These illegal networks often take 
advantage of local corruption, but also work closely with legal structures (free zones, transport companies, etc.) 
that should also be associated as much as possible with these shifts resulting from the globalisation of trade. We 
have also observed that legal actors (importers or manufacturers) could sometimes become illegal actors and 
that criminologists should concentrate more on this ‘transnational white-collar crime’ in their studies. 
Generally speaking the most internationalised criminal structures have acquired the ability to analyse the 
opportunities of certain markets, especially by testing certain strategies likely to expand their field of action330. 
“There are no ordinary, constant networks but rather a multitude of transit countries, most often selected for their 
lack of thorough verifications. But some places are hubs.”331 That said, it is also truly difficult to analyse these 
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networks and anticipate their form and nature, as in some cases, “there is no way of knowing in advance how 
the groups or statutes are made up, or how the various relationships are combined”.332 A frequent feature of 
these networks is their “hybridisation”333 especially in counterfeit medicines where we have seen the variety of 
groups involved: Chinese manufacturers, smugglers, pharmaceutical sector wholesalers, corrupt customs 
officials, Chinese or Russian soldiers, Russian cybercriminals, white-collar crime, presumed mafia involvement, 
etc. The difficulty lies in finding out where and when sub-networks can incorporate into each other or even 
mutate in different directions. With these constant changes “the media and government radars have an inherent 
difficulty in detecting the clandestine and changing criminal phenomena far enough in advance”334 and the 
investigation services in the pharmaceutical sector seemed more involved in real current issues. “One thing is 
sure, these operations are wide reaching”335 and international orders can come from a variety of regions often 
involving Chinese operators with hubs in India, East Africa, the Middle East and Southern Europe.  
Finally, however important the transnational commercial exchange has become and however complex it is to 
guarantee accurate traceability, in the most opaque criminality, particularly industrial, often “it is at local level that 
organised crime shows itself as a tangible activity”.336 The challenge for the law enforcers is to gain access to 
these sources domiciled in areas difficult to access. The case of major new industrialised countries like China 
addresses the issue of this local dimension with acuity. And the Internet, that “network of networks” poses 
specific challenges in criminality for our field of study. 
 
II.7.b. ‘Virtual’ criminal networks and counterfeit medicines 
We will begin by describing the organisational features of these ‘virtual’ criminal networks, and then we will 
examine their connections with the ‘real’ criminal networks. 
 
- Organisation 
For criminals “the most significant transformation from the streets to cyberspace is the enlarged playing field of 
individuals and organised groups. Enabled by the Internet, criminals can operate in cyberspace with less 
governance, and on a transnational scale”. 337 In general, the “cybercriminal” organisations differ from traditional 
criminal organisations by their greater fluidity. Cybercrimes are committed by multitasking and virtual criminal 
networks also hold online meetings. 338  These networks are based on independent individual units as the 
members rarely meet in real life and sometimes do not even have any virtual contact with other colleagues. The 
virtual criminal networks are often managed by a small number of criminals who do not actually commit any 
crimes themselves but act more as ‘entrepreneurs’ as we saw with Igor Gusev, founder of the Glavmed network 
(p. 94). 339  Cybercriminal actions (spamming, data processing, etc.) are compartmentalised into different 
segments of responsibility. 
It is important to specify that since the mid-2000s the Internet has led to the fragmentation of crime and 
trafficking of counterfeit products supplied by thousands of ‘transporter ants’. Internet has perhaps led to an even 
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more individualised form of criminal organisation.340 Information technology tools are now widely available, to 
such an extent that any Internet user could turn into a potential “cybercriminal”. This development has been 
aided by the fact that cybercriminals’ identity is not only anonymous but also universal and that their pharming 
techniques are common and relatively easy to implement on the Internet (the so-called bulletproof341 servers 
preserve anonymity). Another feature that has helped this development is the automation of so many processes 
which makes it more difficult to adhere to a rigid hierarchical organisation on the Internet compared to the real 
world where individual effort is the best strategy in criminal organisations. 342 On the Internet the concept of 
power or violence has nothing to do with an accumulation of the “physical strength” of the various computer 
hackers or pirates. 343  The more strategic skills now lie in automated processes. Automation is becoming 
increasingly accessible to Internet users, particularly if they want to become involved in counterfeit medicine 
networks. 
That said, this individualisation should be qualified, as from a global viewpoint a particularly effective cybercrime 
setup cannot function if the organisation is too small. As we saw with the Glavmed case and illicit online 
pharmacies, using huge networks of affiliates combines an individualised and compartmentalised organisation 
with a complex overall structure. Cybercrime structures such as these also have high level experts who can be 
easily solicited by the central actors in these organisations to optimise their “criminal network” 344  with for 
example financial advice (money laundering) and technical advice (hosting on servers protected from law 
enforcers). 
When examining criminal organisations on the Internet involved in counterfeit medicines, our previous studies 
have brought to light two types of structure. 
The first are opportunistic online networks which can be set up ad hoc, coinciding with ‘real’ flows, during 
distribution to the end consumer. The RxNorth and Wuppertal affairs come under this category where members 
act on the Internet for a limited time and on specific tasks.345 
A second category of organisation is exclusively devoted to online distribution and promotion with globalised 
affiliation techniques and aggressive promotion on search engines or via spam. The Glavmed case is a 
revealing example of such organisations, generally domiciled in emerging countries. Paradoxically, these 
Internet networks seem better organised and more coherent that the organisations involved in counterfeiting 
medicines in the real world. The affiliation and promotion techniques for counterfeit medicines correspond to 
relatively clear management strategies and a careful watch can help us to understand the networked 
organisation set up.  
 
- Relations between ‘virtual’ criminal network and ‘real’ criminal network 
If cybercrime was initially distinct from more conventional criminal organisations, it appears that the two networks 
are somewhat similar, particularly in the case of medicines where cybercriminals have to find supplies from illicit 
production sources. It is worth noting however that it is not easy to analyse and therefore confirm any actual 
links between real criminal networks and others that are more ‘virtual’. Although the online pharmacies 
necessarily obtain supplies from industrial structures, the nature of these links remains vague and many 
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observers seem to ignore them. But in general, the two networks are more or less distinct and it seems that in 
most of the cases observed and indexed, and contrary to what some researchers like Julie Lynn Olson think,346 
to our knowledge, there is no real fusion between the two types of network, particularly in medicines where the 
optimal distribution methods on the Internet and logistics in the real world have not created transnational 
organisations that can manage both types of illegal trafficking for any length of time.  
Criminal approaches differ in the two environments and we can currently distinguish between three different 
examples: 
- Criminal organisations involved in the ‘real’ world but without any real impact on the ‘virtual’ (for example, 
the Kevin Xu affair). 
- Criminal organisations originally involved in the ‘real’ world but which use Internet to distribute their 
counterfeit products (for example the RxNorth affair). 
- Criminal organisations which focus their skills on the ‘virtual’ world (for example Glavmed). 
 
It can be supposed that a structure combining large-scale trafficking of counterfeit medicines on line and in the 
physical world would have little chance of surviving for any length of time as an organisation like that would be 
more visible where the ‘real’ connects with the ‘virtual’ and paradoxically would gain less benefit from the 
systemic flaws because of a defect in the organisation. That said, it is true that both types of organisation tend to 
be modelled on similar organisations and, as Olson 347  notes, “the characteristics traditionally attributed to 
conventional organisations can also be attributed to cybercriminals”. One wonders if it is not the traditional 
organisations that take their inspiration voluntarily or de facto from the specific qualities of cybercriminal 
organisations: best possible use of the network, fairly horizontal structure with only a very small nucleus of 
decision makers, sense of ubiquity, fast execution, flexibility, a knack of finding loopholes, etc. A hacker’s 
manifesto348 is very revealing of how the “TAZ: Temporary Autonomy Zones” work; for the cleverest traffickers, 
these can overlap into the ‘real’ world: “(...) appearing - disappearing to better escape from the government 
surveyors, it temporarily occupies an area (of land, of time, of imagination) and then breaks up as soon as it is 
named. The TAZ avoids the named TAZs, the areas "conceded" to freedom: it takes by storm, and goes back to 
being invisible. (...) A TAZ can only exist if it maintains a certain level of anonymity.” 
But in the case of cybercrime organisations, such Temporary Autonomy Zone characteristics can be pushed to 
the extreme because challenging the concept of borders and the general immediateness of actions are specific 
to the ‘virtual’ world. Another trend349 specific to cyberspace: “the proliferation of counterfeiting on the Internet 
can also be explained by an interconnection between minor trafficking and serious crime. A small-time home-
based dealer can contact mafia networks for example. Breaking up the chain dilutes criminal liability”. This 
analysis is particularly relevant in the case of illegal online pharmacies which operate by mixing a highly criminal 
core network with partners who are Internet users seeking illegal surplus income. 
To sum up, it is especially important not to consider such ‘real’ or ‘virtual’ organisations as tentacle-like 
structures with fixed strategies. “The widest and most incorrect theory is that there is a unified conspiracy in 
counterfeiting and criminal organisations. (...) It is more likely that the counterfeiting economy operates in parallel 
with the legal economy with a kind of assembly of different submarkets”.350 Although most cases are white-collar 
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crime-related, we have also seen a great variety of situations, particularly with organised crime-type structures 
able to seize criminal opportunities in pharmaceuticals (Wuppertal case) but also hybrid transnational networks 
that are particularly tough to track and dismantle. 
Generally speaking, “the last globalization wave was both an opportunity and a challenge for these traditional 
criminal organisations. This has led a number of authorities to argue the fact that they are gradually being 
“replaced by smaller, more flexible groups”, or even by “networks”. (...) Without an autonomous institutional 
identity, they are no more than business connections between individuals of varying durations”.351 A point of view 
particularly suited to the different patterns observed in medicine counterfeiting dominated by flexible autonomous 
groups and even large businesses, such as the ‘Jordanian-Chinese’ network should be understood according to 
a system of fluctuating opportunistic networks and subnetworks. It is also important not to presume that, in these 
most significant ‘real’ or ‘virtual’ criminal networks, each operator is in contact with all other operators in the 
network but instead that each member operates within nodes, connections and intermediate structures. Only the 
most strategic members liaise while the other members tend to operate relatively independently or in isolation.352 
As for the particular case of traditional criminal structures that can be characterised by the use of violence, more 
or less secret initiation rites and a long history, their involvement seems likely in certain regions (triads in China, 
cartels in Latin America, for example) but there is only scattered evidence, which is insufficient to accurately 
confirm such involvement. Whatever the case, it would appear that such organisations operate more on the 
edge of counterfeit medicine trafficking, particular when transnational. That said, the question, one that is 
outstanding with our open source information, arises of possible cooperation between white-collar crime 
organisations and more traditional ones involved in trafficking habitually linked to organised crime. For some 
researchers ‘partnerships’ (rather than mere ‘transactions’) between these two networks are obvious353, but as 
we have seen, they have yet to be specified and confirmed in the case of medicine counterfeiting.  
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III. Criminological issues and recommendations 
 
The purpose of this third part is to show to what extent counterfeit medicines shake up traditional criminological 
concepts. We will then suggest ideas to counter this phenomenon. 
 
III.1. Shaking up criminological concepts  
Our discussion will be in two parts: first we will show that criminological concepts remain partially valid for 
deciphering criminal issues surrounding counterfeit medicines. Then we will highlight certain new academic 
aspects. 
 
III.1.a. A partially suited theoretical view 
In light of the ‘networks’ involved in medicine counterfeiting are criminological theories appropriate? 
To a certain extent we can answer in the affirmative. Indeed, the concept of mimicry according to Gabriel 
Tarde354, a criminology reference of the 19th century, appears to be valid in the case of ‘counterfeiting criminals’, 
which is inherently based on counterfeiters’ desire to imitate original medicines as best they can, as far as their 
appearance is concerned anyhow. Certain drug copies can therefore appear to be flawless.355 Also, to infiltrate 
certain markets, counterfeiters must ‘mimic’ the system in place based on the pharmaceutical industry’s models. 
The only difference is that the production, packaging, distribution, marketing and financial structures launder the 
income from these illegal sales.356 We can also assume that the fragmentation of the pharmaceutical supply 
chain inspires these networks’ counterfeit medicine flow management techniques, helping them to evade law 
enforcement authorities. In such a context, the criminological concept of “situational prevention” 357 appears to 
be strategic and still topical. Indeed, mastering the manufacture of medicines and protecting transport flows or 
flows on the Internet involves prevention techniques that are essential for operators who may be targeted by 
counterfeiters. 
White-collar crime is also an important area of discussion.  
According to the American Edwin H. Sutherland358 who founded this concept, white-collar crime is characterised 
by the fact that it attempts to “exploit a legitimate business by non-violent means, whereas organised crime (…) 
uses physical intimidation and violence to enforce discipline, secure its markets and punish informants”.359 
Sutherland’s analyses remain partly relevant to our field of study. Indeed, his “theory of differential association 
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argues that criminal behaviour is learned through the channel of interpersonal interactions by acquiring 
techniques to achieve crimes, attitudes, rationalizations and motives”.360 All of which are stimulating elements in 
deciphering criminal networks where, as we have seen for the most sophisticated networks, it can be assumed 
that there are many interpersonal interactions between groups of diverse backgrounds involved in medicine 
counterfeiting activities. 
Sutherland also stresses the concept of “anomie and normative conflicts” that can be expected to create an 
environment conducive to criminal behaviour. In such a context, criminals can be perceived “as the only 
guarantor and interpreter of the legal system”361, particularly in cases where there is no “immediate perception of 
physical injury”362, which can be applied to medicine counterfeiting, where the diluted chain of liability and impact 
of the drug's counterfeiting are rarely established accurately. This failure to accurately assess the health impact 
of counterfeit medicines fosters a form of self-justification among these white-collar criminals: “Illegal? Yes, but 
not criminal. I presume that a criminal action involves harm to a person, and we've never done that”.363 
Paradoxically this idea of white-collar crime being less dangerous than crime that is perceived as “more 
organised, violent and traditional” remains very present in public opinion 364 and it is up to law enforcement 
authorities to clarify and stress further the predatory nature of such criminal behaviour dominant in medicine 
counterfeiting. It is also important to continue to obliterate the often mythological multiple roles attributed to 
criminals. 365  
This is all the more necessary as the profile of some leaders in medicine counterfeiting (Andrew Strempler) 
corresponds roughly to these conceptions of white-collar crime where “the crime is committed by a respectable 
person of high social status in the course of his occupation”366. While it is necessary to qualify this “high social 
status”, for many business owners involved in counterfeiting activities (Peter Gillespie, Kevin Xu) the size of their 
company and the quantities of counterfeit drugs imported or manufactured meant that they had obvious 
responsibilities. We can also deem this ‘aura’ all the more unacceptable in counterfeit medicines as there is a 
real health impact resulting in death in some cases. However, we should avoid oversimplifying classifications as 
the profiles of criminals can vary due to the large number of ‘criminogenic interstices’ created by globalisation. 
Can Sutherland’s concept of “a white-collar crime of high social status” be applied in emerging countries, 
especially China? Are there not a variety of criminal situations that should be uncovered, with networks involved 
in medicine counterfeiting in various ways (hospitals, small manufacturers, drugstores, etc.)? How much are 
traditional criminal organisations (Chinese triads, South American cartels or even the Italian mafia) involved in 
this trafficking?  
Our area of study in fact raises many questions. 
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III.1.b. The novel nature of criminological concepts linked to medicine counterfeiting  
Between formalisation issues, cross-disciplinarity challenges and mapping problems, our criminological scope is 
clearly novel.  
 
- Specific crime insufficiently formalised 
As we have seen, white-collar crime dominates many significant ‘criminal networks’ involved in medicine 
counterfeiting. 
Having said that, the organisational dimension of these networks is still not analysed sufficiently. According to 
Sutherland367, it is essential to better understand the ‘organisational’ dimension of this kind of crime, which can 
be ‘formalised’, particularly as “network structures” as previously discussed.  
In this type of analysis there is the question of ‘boundaries’ and it is also important to bear in mind that there may 
be many factors binding governments with the economic environment368, and thus white-collar crime. The ‘white-
collar criminals’ in question may therefore be shielded by personal or cultural ties. According to Sutherland it is 
essential to draw the strongest possible boundary between the government and the private sector for crime 
prevention to be consistent and effective.369 
It would therefore be appropriate to formally classify white-collar crimes involved in medicine counterfeiting 
according to geographical area and the most significant cases. We have noticed that, paradoxically, white-collar 
crime is more visible than more traditional violent criminal organisations that may be involved in medicine 
counterfeiting. More precise research focusing on crime directly or indirectly linked to the pharmaceutical 
industry should therefore be encouraged, in particular to better assess risk areas and operators. It would also be 
appropriate to facilitate studies of how traditional criminal organisations become involved in medicine 
counterfeiting. Some regions (China and Latin America, for example) seem more appropriate for such research. 
But in general, we cannot help noticing that despite abundant literature on the subject, studies of traditional 
criminal organisations are too scarce, vary in quality, to say the least, or are too ideological. This situation is also 
applicable in the United States, where, in the early 80s, researcher Peter Reuter observed the scarcity of 
research studies.370 
In criminological terms, our area of study challenges certain traditional views that generally emphasise a 
connection between marginality and criminal risk.371 But contemporary crime and particularly cybercrime, if 
considered one of the most innovative forms of crime, puts such a relationship into perspective because today 
potentially anyone on the Internet can have access to criminal activity. New technologies (Internet, but also 
satellites, mobile communications, so-called virtual worlds, etc.) require the “rigid boundaries of police 
criminology” to be reconsidered, to focus on “criminogenic interstices” 372  to better understand modern-day 
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crimes 373  and the organisational forms involved. “Criminogenic interstices” refer to the gaps left by public 
institutions both in services and regulations, which criminal organisations exploit”. 374  ‘Real’ and ‘virtual’ 
‘interstices’ or ‘loopholes’ that we previously analysed with various examples revealing the presence of criminal 
networks. In the ‘real’ world we noticed how much the emergence of new Chinese and Indian manufacturers, the 
size of free trade zones, the growth of trade and the complexity of the supply chain disrupt the traditional 
patterns of ‘criminal organisations’ connected to organised crime or organisations that generally have a strong 
structure and hierarchy. As for policing and investigation methods in the broadest sense (customs included), 
they come up against hurdles given the complexity and volatility of international trade not to mention the legal 
obstacles in certain investigations. 
In light of such challenges in the representation of what is ‘real’ and ‘virtual’, there is an acute mapping issue. 
 
- The mapping issue 
Crime mapping, particularly inspired by statistics that allow the use of more or less scientific techniques, seem to 
have a limited application in the case of counterfeit medicines. Indeed, urban mapping techniques applied to 
crime present much more complex challenges on a global scale, primarily due to the difficulty of compiling 
statistics on certain areas where access to illegal trafficking data is difficult. That said, it is essential to map 
counterfeit medicine trafficking networks more effectively by an experimental approach and not to limit the 
mapping to mere seizure statistics. 
For example, it would be encouraging to compile a list of areas most at risk with a specific set of parameters (tax 
benefits, local protection, corruption, unreachable digital servers, etc.). Such a list of vulnerabilities related to 
these targeted areas, compiled regularly in a visual form, would clarify the ongoing challenges and help to guide 
law enforcement tools and lobbying.  
The mapped risks may for example distinguish regionalised risks, wide-reaching risks and network-related risks 
(real and/or virtual).375 Another strategic risk, one that is too often overlooked, concerns meeting points376. It is 
indeed difficult to know in which areas relations between ‘real’ counterfeit medicine trafficking and ‘virtual’ 
distribution is formed. Transition areas between the sale of counterfeit medicines and their ‘financial laundering’ 
are also particularly vague. It is therefore necessary to better reference and decipher these potentially 
criminogenic meeting points.  
The overall objective is to achieve mapping that reflects the spatial dynamics of the most relevant risks. With this 
approach, it is easier to understand the types of criminal networks involved in this trafficking, as the concept of a 
network can “vary in size, form, membership, cohesion and purpose. Networks can be large or small, local or 
global, national or transnational, cohesive or diffuse, centralised or very decentralised...”377.  
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The analysis of networks would distinguish “strong ties and weak ties” within a network.378 But paradoxically, 
weak links are potentially significant because they extend a personal network and most importantly make it 
possible to go beyond this small circle to join other circles. It is therefore important to always try to analyse or 
map the nature of these links and the ability of certain operators to transform weak ties into strong ties even 
temporarily.  
In other words, above all the idea is to have a better understanding of how the network works (“net-work” or 
rather “work-net” in the words of researcher Bruno Latour379). This dynamic view of the risks (associated with 
counterfeit drugs) should therefore favour a navigational approach380 to existing networks and their operation 
methods. These navigational practices may include new features such as foresight or feedback.381 
In addition, a dynamic analysis of the criminal organisations involved in counterfeiting is essential because 
criminal organisations can play on the multiple effects of spatial movements (changes in production sites, 
changes in transportation flows, etc.) and they master the different aspects of the “liquid society” referred to by 
Zygmunt Bauman 382 . With such a conceptual approach (criminogenic interstices, meeting points, network 
navigation) it could be appropriate to attempt to gather statistics on specific areas. Specific areas could be 
assessed quantitatively according to local constraints like the hot spots 383  in New York’s high-risk 
neighbourhoods. It is essential to encourage law enforcement agencies to “think outside the box, to gather 
information at the right time to analyse it quickly” because analyses can no longer be performed solely on the 
basis of field experience384 or frozen statistics. While compiling statistics on high-risk areas will be difficult to 
implement on an international scale, more dynamic and sophisticated mapping, in addition to its analytical 
advantages, would also help to rally the most motivated authorities and would help to influence and guide public 
actions385. 
Without mapping techniques combined with a vulnerability model, it is difficult for an outside observer to perceive 
any strategy behind the flow of counterfeit medicines that appear to be predominantly opportunistic and thrive in 
areas where effective state presence is a problem (either lacking or is ambiguous, such as in Russia or China). 
Dynamic mapping, with updates of the most strategic risk areas, would make it easier to monitor these networks, 
decipher the logic behind criminal trends and propose scenarios to be able to foresee these trends. 
That said, it is also important for these mapping methods to make use of a wider variety of social sciences. 
 
  
                                                        
 
 
378 Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited”, Sociological Theory, vol. 1, 1983, p. 201-233. 
379 Bruno Latour, Changer la société, refaire de la sociologie, La Découverte Poche, 2007, p. 208. 
380 Valerie November, Bruno Latour, Eduardo-Hübner “Entering a risky territory: space in the age of digital navigation”, 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, vol. 28, No. 4, 2010, p. 594. 
381 Valerie November, “Being close to risk. From proximity to connexity”, International Journal of Sustainable Development, vol. 7, 
No. 3, 2004. 
382 Also see Zygmunt Bauman, La vie liquide, Editions du Rouergue, 2006. 
383 Hot spots refer to criminogenic neighbourhoods. Updated statistics on these areas are used to map risks and help police 
regularly assess the situation and steer their actions. The technique was popularised in New York City. 
384 Laurent Borredon, “Entretien avec Victor Goldsmith, professeur à la Pace University de New York”, Le Monde, September 13, 
2012. 
385 Bernard Debarbieux, Martin Vanier, Ces territorialités qui se dessinent, La Tour d’Aigues, Editions de l’Aube/Datar. 
- All rights reserved -  
 
88 
- The importance of greater support from social sciences  
Traditional criminology remains related to social sciences such as law, psychology and sociology386 but in our 
area of study these theoretical approaches are rapidly limited, especially when criminal analysis is purely 
transgressive or marginal. In actual fact, crime should be considered from a benign and ordinary perspective387 
and it is important to make use of other expertise in humanities that is often overlooked in criminological 
methods388: economics, demographics, geography, urban planning, etc.  
With a “dynamic criminal network”, criminology must make use of international relations in particular389. Indeed 
we have seen how much regional conflicts and their links with certain grey zones (free trade zones) or strategic 
industrial zones (Chinese factories) can have an effect on trafficking of counterfeit medicines. It is therefore 
necessary to solicit researchers to decipher the “inconspicuous risks” and “combine territorial geopolitics with 
network geopolitics. Unlike governments, these criminal organisations cannot control large areas (...). In this 
respect, it should be noted that unlike government territoriality, the territoriality of large criminal organisations is 
not global, it is segmented”.390 
It is essential to focus just as much on how the crime is committed in these “segmented territories” and on the 
conditions that may lead to the criminal act as on the actual criminals themselves.391  
 
To better understand the nature of these criminal networks it is no doubt also important to solicit research in 
gender studies392. This academic discipline is not used to its fullest potential in criminology393 and although 
crimes are committed predominantly by men, the role of women has not been studied adequately in this area of 
research. A reminder that in the case of Kevin Xu (p. 59), the investigators were largely able to catch the 
Chinese businessman through his wife, and in the vast Middle East network that we have described, it was 
thanks to the Chinese wife of a Jordanian that a Chinese network was created and able to play a strategic part in 
the distribution of counterfeit medicines. In Egypt, Suzanne Mubarak394, wife of former President and a breast 
cancer victim, was sensitive to issues related to the criminal aspects of medicine counterfeiting. Through her 
influence, the Egyptian government incited General Mostafa Amr, former head of the Narcotics Bureau, to fight 
against this trafficking. Note also that there is a wide female presence in the medical and pharmaceutical sector 
and we have seen a network of pharmacies in France headed up in part by a Chinese woman that was involved 
in a network of counterfeit medicines. 
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As we can see, it is important to diversify analysis methods to better understand the complexity of criminal 
networks. 
 
- The importance of cross-disciplinarity and a novel perspective 
It is also important that criminologists avoid focusing too much on a historical approach to criminology as 
modern-day crimes are often committed at high speed and therefore require faster and innovative crime analysis 
with a very operational dimension. This operational aspect also implies that criminologists have greater proximity 
with the private sector, while many of them are refractory to more coordination with the police and private 
security operators.395 The case of French-speaking Europe is quite specific when compared with Quebec where 
criminological researchers have diverse backgrounds and are closer to the police community. In France 
“research is based more on a sociological and criminological perspective that is critical of the police, rather than 
in partnership with the police”.396 
A more pragmatic approach less focused on the legal and “idealistic” aspects of criminology would require more 
private sector operators or hybrid operators (NGOs) to be solicited, which makes the theoretical field of 
criminology more complex than before.397 One may also wonder whether the expertise called upon, particularly 
the police or former police officers working for pharmaceutical companies, should not benefit more from outside 
experts in their investigations.  
A partnership with pharmaceutical researchers would be appropriate provided that it were not limited to scientific 
techniques testing the counterfeit nature of the medicines. In this respect, the researchers at Michigan 
University’s criminology centre 398  working in pharmaceuticals and social sciences from a criminological 
perspective provide a fresh and relevant approach and should allow a better understanding of the new specific 
issues in connection with pharmaceutical crimes. 
The novel and, to say the least, imaginative activities of these counterfeiters are quite a challenge for the police 
and its well-established techniques. In this respect, the Internet has revealed novel criminal activities requiring 
transnational investigations and where there is deviant conduct not generally considered by the police as strictly 
criminal. 399 An excessively ‘routine’ perspective can facilitate but also predetermine police work in cases that will 
help it to take a stand that will structure the way the ‘criminal’ cases in question are perceived and considered. 
400 On a more operational level there is the case of the security director at a pharmaceutical company (which 
does not wish to be named) who feels that medicine counterfeiting organisations that can be truly called criminal 
are ones connected with traditional criminal circles (organised crime, drug traffickers, etc.). However, it is 
reasonable to wonder whether such an assumption is not likely to lead to major cases being overlooked in 
investigations when they are harder for this former police officer to identify due to their unconventional nature. 
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Generally, in our globalised world, it is important to move from conventional thinking to counter-intuitive 
thinking401 as: 
- Strategically, the most obvious dangers are not necessarily those that need to be prioritised. 
- Well-intentioned efforts to fight against transnational criminal organisations (such as national or international 
treaties to counter illegal activities) can often have the opposite effect to the one expected and encourage 
criminal networks to simply adapt their strategy. 
- The increasingly widespread values of material success and moral relativism mean that each individual may 
potentially be seduced by large and fast profits and participate directly or implicitly in such transnational criminal 
organisations. 
These three points illustrate the competitive advantages enjoyed by transnational criminal networks in the 
current context. It is crucial to consider the possibility that national organisations and authorities do not have 
sufficient resources to stop such a criminal threat as criminals continuously defy slow, centralised, state-run 
organisations with their asymmetric and flexible methods. To sum up, these criminal organisations also use the 
networks in a much more appropriate and effective way than the law enforcers 402 , which gives them an 
advantage in terms of speed and efficiency. 
 
- A desire for anachronistic secrecy? 
One may wonder, however, if the failure to solicit enough external researchers is the result of a desire for 
secrecy, given the very discrete nature of the pharmaceutical companies’ investigations. This high level of 
discretion is justified in part because “a system of objective power (...) may quite legitimately operate in secret 
through its formal autonomy, without sacrificing its “publicity” for the purpose of defending everyone’s interests. 
There is therefore no logical connection leading one to deduce that publicity has a greater value”.403 
We must also recognise that some counterfeiting areas are particularly difficult to access and that the ‘secrecy’ 
is partly due to the impenetrability of areas harbouring counterfeit medicines. Regarding this, a distinction can be 
made between “grey zones”404, where licit and illicit trafficking are intertwined (free trade zones, digital servers, 
tax havens, etc.) and “white zones” that do not appear on official maps and may concern trafficking of illicit 
medicines, particularly in connection with certain Russian and Chinese military zones. Lastly, there are Chinese 
industrial areas that are difficult to access or hazardous: these include north-east China, in particular Harbin, a 
city of five million inhabitants, where few foreigners travel to and considered a strategic region for medicine 
counterfeiting.405 
It appears that many areas where counterfeit medicines are manufactured or transited are impossible or difficult 
to access406. In many cases access to information is difficult for all those involved and this ‘secrecy’ is not 
entirely deliberate. While it is also evident that ongoing investigations require full discretion, this desire for 
secrecy also seems to have reached its limits. The analysis of cybercrime clearly shows that credible and visible 
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sources exist, especially on the Internet, to decipher the challenges and even the criminals involved in such 
trafficking. Indeed, we have seen to what extent a simple blogger based in the United States, Brian Krebs, was 
able to relay valuable information on (Russian) criminal networks involved in medicine counterfeiting. Lastly, as 
the Wikileaks case showed on a wide scale, even confidential diplomatic information can be widely spread over 
the Internet. A CREDOC study407 confirms this trend, especially for the younger generation. “All this generation 
hears about is a society of information and new communication technologies, a knowledge-based economy 
(…).What it wants, above all else, is the language of truth, honesty”. 
Several factors therefore ‘weaken the secrecy’ especially as, according to Simmel, “secret society is the right 
form for content that is somewhat in its infancy, with the vulnerability specific to the early stages of 
development”408 , which brings us to wonder about this discretion in the medium term, which will lose its 
relevance in the event of a major health scare in the context of counterfeit medicine trafficking. 
 
- The importance of the victims 
Analysing medicine counterfeiting therefore implies taking into account the impact of this crime on victims and 
society, which has long been a blind spot for criminological analysts409 that pharmaceutical crime has acutely 
revealed.  
Since the work of the German criminologist von Hentig410, criminological approaches tend to show that the victim 
and criminal are often in direct contact. However, in our area of study there is actually a strong tendency for 
direct links between criminal and victim to disappear because in both ‘real’ networks and on the Internet the 
counterfeiters’ aim is to remain anonymous, thus artificially diluting the chain of responsibility. Another 
particularity described by the OECD 411 : “medicine counterfeiting has been described as the perfect crime 
because, if the patient's condition improves, there is no investigation, and if the patient’s condition worsens, it will 
be primarily attributed to the patient’s medical condition”. The link between the fact that the medicine is 
counterfeit and its effects on the patient are not always that obvious to observe or analyse. Therefore, it would 
also be appropriate to develop varied expertise to better identify and assess such victimisation. 
In addition, as Edwin S. Sutherland stated in his reference work412, victims are rarely in a position to fight against 
the businesses involved in white-collar crimes. It is therefore essential in medicine counterfeiting for institutional 
and/or private stakeholders to relay accurate information on these medical risks to consumers. At operational 
level it is no doubt easier to conduct ‘victimization’ investigations in the context of international trade rather than 
in China itself.413 
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III.2. Considerations to counter this phenomenon 
In this last part we will analyse different ways to gain better control over this phenomenon. The issues of 
analysis, intelligence, police work and expertise will be broken down in particular. 
 
III.2.a. The issue of assessing the ‘crime – counterfeit medicines’ combination 
This question arises in particular with regard to the reliability of the statistics announced. In terms of danger, the 
record often reported of 192,000 deaths due to the consumption of counterfeit drugs in China in 2001 should 
have been further verified and confirmed when it was simply relayed by most researchers and the media 
(particularly in 2002 by the San Francisco Examiner414), and did not cause health authorities to sound the 
alert.415 This lack of statistical stringency in such a major case of counterfeiting was identified by researchers at 
Oxford University, who noted in 2007 that a rough translation by a Chinese teacher for the Shenzhen Evening 
News created a misunderstanding over the actual extent of the problem. Indeed, the figure of 192,000 deaths 
did not relate directly to the counterfeiting of medicines, but more generally to diseases caused by these 
medicines and their misuse416. It is therefore important to be more stringent when reporting these statistics and 
to better understand the real danger of counterfeit medicines and their impact. It would be useful to regularly 
publish reports and studies on the health effects of counterfeit medicines as this data is too scarce. More 
credible validated statistics are essential417 for the credibility of public debate. 
In terms of crime, it is also important to change existing analysis methods. Generally, law enforcement policies 
on transnational crime assess the success of operations based on the following criteria418: 
- A decrease in violence and corruption. 
- The capture of criminal organisation leaders. 
- A decrease in the size of these transnational criminal organisations. 
- A decrease in their scope of operations. 
However, these parameters are soon limited and can be poor indicators of crime prevention: the violence may 
decrease but the corruption increase, criminal leaders can become martyrs and be quickly replaced and success 
in one geographic area may mean that there is an increase in the same trafficking in another area. 
In the fight against medicine counterfeiting, the situation is assessed primarily based on seizures or arrests but 
again these assessments can be guided by a policy to focus on seizures in certain regions or at certain times. In 
this respect, there has been a significant crackdown on the Internet. 
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For example, the Interpol’s Pangea V operation from September 25th to October 2, 2012419 resulted in: 
- 79 arrests and the seizure of 3.75 million potentially deadly medicines worldwide worth a total of USD 10.5 
million. 
- The closure of 18,000 illegal online pharmaceutical websites. 
- A global operation involving 100 countries. 
 
In France this operation led to420: 
- 427,000 smuggled and counterfeit medicines being seized by customs. 
- 236 illegal sites offering medicines being identified. 
- 14 suspect hearings, searches and seizures of computer equipment to investigate and pursue inquiries. 
 
In comparison, Pangea IV in 2011421 led to the arrest of fifty-five people, the seizure of 2.4 million doses of 
counterfeit medicines sold on the Internet and customs cooperation in 81 countries. We are therefore seeing an 
increase in seizures from one year to the next. However, although these initiatives are beneficial, accurate 
information on the current situation but more importantly on the impact of and follow-up to such operations is 
lacking, especially regarding the type of websites closed down and their ability to re-appear later on.  
The issue of follow-up and the impact of such operations on the Internet was even more vital in the case of the 
“CyberChase Operations” initiative in April 2005422 to crack down on illegal online pharmacies that distributed 
mainly steroids and amphetamines without a prescription. This operation, prepared over one year by the U.S. 
DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) in partnership with agencies in other countries (Australia, India, 
Canada, Costa Rica) resulted in the arrest of 20 individuals in eight cities and the seizure of 41 bank accounts 
with a total value of USD 6 million. The initiative targeted the ‘Bansal Organization’ which had been operating 
since 2003 through 200 websites distributing some 2.5 million doses of medicine per month. Although this 
initiative was able to dismantle a major trafficking network, one wonders how effective such a method is. 
According to the researcher Bryan A. Liang, the main hurdle with this type of approach is the fact that 
conventional methods are used in the hope of reducing supply based on a primarily judicial approach. However, 
such a tactic based on laws targeting unconventional criminals difficult to intercept, due to their mobility and their 
mastery of technology, can be costly in terms of human resources when conducting investigations and 
prosecuting criminals. Are these operations assessed properly, particularly the financial aspects? Are they 
primarily just a show for the media? Are these operations too specific and limited in time? Is a medium-term 
review possible? These are all legitimate questions that are virtually absent from public debate. 
The problem of assessing such crackdowns is also found in the ‘real’ world. For example, the strategies of 
multinationals to close counterfeiting plants can quickly reach their limits and have a boomerang effect as these 
initiatives may paradoxically encourage the most skilful Chinese counterfeiters to produce greater quantities at 
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the start of the production cycle to offset these anticipated losses.423 Therefore, raids might not stop Chinese 
manufacturers from returning to the business, even more motivated, just weeks after the plants have closed.424  
In light of such “creative and unconventional” criminal organisations, particularly in China425, or more generally 
with “criminal markets that operate in a disorganised way and characterised by multiple actors working together 
in complex and unpredictable ways forming loose alliances”426, it is also important to renew law enforcement 
assessment methods. Although it certainly seems necessary to assess the success of crime prevention based 
on management criteria427, these criteria should be specified and not be limited to mere seizures.  
These management criteria include assessments with a regular review of cases handled, senior staff at both 
operational level and in intelligence, analysing international partnerships, training abroad, etc. In other words a 
whole range of measures that are by no means limited to mere seizures and that, as we have seen, must be 
specified and contextualised more. With regard to criminal organisations, it is mainly important to have a 
selective approach to crime prevention by adapting crackdowns on different time scales based on the complexity 
of the case. 
How can intelligence be conceived and organised in such a context? 
 
III.2.b. Improving the analysis of the problem through centralised intelligence 
Too often observers (researchers, seasoned journalists, etc.) only have access to standardised information or 
more credible but scattered information. It is therefore essential to find alternative analysis methods rather than 
prolonging existing methods to achieve the selective hierarchical centralisation of information in ‘pharmaceutical 
counterfeiting crime’. 
What’s more, online cybercrime is no doubt easier to decipher than crime in the ‘real’ world. “Although it does 
not actually foster a sharp increase in counterfeiting, the digital world supports the growth of an economy of 
copying and falsification, paradoxically less ‘underground’ as it is visible across the planet”.428 It is therefore 
important to continually improve the increasingly centralised online watch but moreover to better track criminal 
networks in the ‘real’ world both in terms of interactions between the actors involved and also their local form. 
Intelligence efforts should be made not only to dismantle networks, which is usually complex and time-
consuming, but also to steer the impact of the crimes towards victims and society, something that traditional 
criminology has for too long neglected to do.429 In actual fact, criminal intelligence should make a qualitative 
leap430, given the new forms of organised crime emerging, and not narrow its perspective by simply assisting 
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criminal investigation.431 This emphasis on intelligence can also be found at European level in: The EU Internal 
Security Strategy. Towards a European Security Model
432
, which defines organised crime as one of the main 
threats to the EU alongside terrorism and stresses the importance of anticipation and intelligence. Through a 
recent report by the National Security Council, Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime433,the United 
States also insisted on this aspect of intelligence, distinguishing between “substantially upgraded signals 
intelligence” (SIGINT), “human intelligence” (HUMINT) and “open sources intelligence” (OSINT). The first two 
forms of intelligence are, according to this US report, essential in the fight against transnational criminal 
organisations. That said, open intelligence should not be neglected and it is currently too scattered as far as 
medicine counterfeiting is concerned.  
Generally, the main idea is to have a collaborative approach434, helped by the fact that the Internet is by 
definition an interactive tool. Government agencies cannot fight against this phenomenon alone435 and it is 
essential to involve private actors (companies but also NGOs) in implementing a policy to centralise intelligence. 
It is also important to develop cross-sectoral approaches. For example, pharmaceutical manufacturers could 
draw inspiration from the cosmetics sector. Monitoring should also be organized horizontally in terms of skills, 
with a variety of social science approaches, rather than focusing reductively on criminology. According to 
sociologist Howard S. Becker436, an act becomes deviant primarily depending on interaction with others. This 
concept of crime is very relevant in a world organised in networks where the line between lawful and unlawful is 
increasingly crossed by many actors and opportunistic individuals often unfamiliar with mafia groups or any other 
major criminal organisation.  
As the National Security Council report suggests, effective intelligence could also help develop profiles of 
individuals, companies and institutions connected to these transnational criminal organisations. As for the 
individuals involved in counterfeiting crime, it would be useful to better understand their psycho-sociological 
profile and the conditions that lead such actors to go against social norms. Greed is certainly an obvious 
motivation but it is often an insufficient explanation. Medicine counterfeiting is a major criminal area that warrants 
more centralised intelligence and research on the profile of the criminals involved. The financial sector sets a 
good an example with the Behavorial Analyst Unit (BAU), a section of the FBI that became involved in white-
collar crime after the Madoff affair. One year after the American embezzler was discovered, the FBI opened the 
BAU-2, “a special unit of eight federal officers whose mission is to profile the psyche of this new category of 
serious financial criminals”.437 The profile of financial criminals is even more complex to decipher than serial 
killers and according to Mark Hilts, head of the BAU-2, it will take several years before “being able to achieve 
any accurate criminological characterization of this type of offender”.438 However, greed does not appear to be 
the mainspring of these financial criminals but rather fantasies of omnipotence supported by a psychological 
process of lies and denial. One may wonder whether this rigid logic of denial is found in certain serious criminals 
involved in major cases of medicine counterfeiting. The case of Andrew Strempler is revealing in this respect as 
he often claimed to be a ‘white knight’ fighting against the monopoly of pharmaceutical companies, which no 
doubt helped to nurture his denial regarding his illegal activities. One particularity for a significant portion of 
white-collar criminals involved in medicine counterfeiting seems to be that they do not see themselves as 
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criminals439. Some, on the other hand, like Strempler, are perfectly comfortable with the view of the “white-collar 
criminal” dear to criminologist Donald Cressey and use “verbalization which enables them to commit their crime 
while maintaining an ideal of honesty”440. The importance, according to Cressey, of how white-collar criminals 
are motivated and justify their crimes is food for thought that warrants more specific research in the area of 
medicine counterfeiting. 
The central involvement of pharmaceutical companies in investigations, the complex impact of the effects of 
medicine counterfeiting and the sophistication of the supply chain can support their claims. It would therefore be 
appropriate to thoroughly analyse the profiles of these criminals to be better equipped to counter their often false 
claims. At the very least it would be useful to understand the reasoning and behaviour of the different types of 
criminals involved in medicine counterfeiting to help guide law enforcement. 
It is therefore important to encourage centralised intelligence not limited solely to the criminal underworld but 
also focusing on contextual aspects (e.g. geopolitical), industrial aspects (monitoring supply chain 
organisation441) and even psycho-sociological aspects that can lead to illegal trafficking of medicines. Lastly, it is 
essential to have intelligence activities in foreign markets442 and in this context security officers and embassy 
diplomats could be mobilised to decipher such risks particularly by monitoring border areas.  
But in addition to useful intelligence there is the more general issue of law enforcement in such a context. 
 
III.2.c. The issue of law enforcement 
The law enforcement challenge raises two issues: the first concerns the meaning of ‘policing’ and the second the 
way law enforcement is implemented. 
 
- ‘Policing’ 
Some researchers question ‘policing’ in the global and repressive sense. Indeed, regardless of policing 
innovations, in general the tasks of the police force remain fundamentally limited. As demonstrated by 
sociologist Michael Lipsky almost thirty years ago443, “the number of problems the police has to deal with is so 
great that its resources could be forever increased without its needs ever being met”.444 Indeed, transnational 
illegal activities currently come under a web of global interconnections with low-cost transportation and 
communication and are “unstoppable”. 445  A general viewpoint that could be applied in part to counterfeit 
medicines for law enforcement agencies given that so many cases appear to be uncontrollable on a global 
scale, in particular in developing and emerging countries. 
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How can ‘policing’ be defined in this context? 
Essayist Luc Boltanski stated in a recent original work446 that “as state agents, the police only has as much 
power as it is given by the state, i.e. that of any ordinary police force, within the framework of the law. This power 
is sufficient to capture common criminals (...), but insufficient when it comes to defeating elite criminals. Police 
officers know only the reality of their official determination”. Is this comment pessimistic or realistic? In any case 
it has the merit of showing the boundaries of conventional police methods in such a complex, global and unique 
area as medicine counterfeiting. This police expertise is especially limited when it comes to certain countries. 
While the Chinese and Russian governments may appear dubious to say the least, the case of North Korea, 
which has apparently specialised in counterfeit cigarettes, currency and medicines, including Viagra labelled 
‘Made in USA’447, is an example in the extreme proving that, in certain countries, even the best experts will have 
a limited scope of intervention and limited intelligence. 
In this context, the work of the police (or customs) is more like detective work: “(...) because they have the same 
intelligence and the same perversity as serious criminals, they too are able to dig into the cracks and interstices 
of reality to exploit incoherencies, which may also mean to the extent of revealing inconsistencies.448 
This is detective work where, as we have seen, information is more than ever strategic, especially when found 
as early as possible, to anticipate the risk of counterfeiting.  
 
- Law enforcement 
To counter the networks that are the preferred organisation of these criminals, the strategies and measures 
should be maximised into law enforcement networks. These law enforcement networks involve a variety of 
actors whose contribution should not be too static.449 It is mainly important to have a selective approach to crime 
prevention by adapting law enforcement on different time scales based on the complexity of the case. As we 
saw with the Jordanian-Chinese network and the RxNorth case, crackdowns can take five, ten years, or more. In 
the era of the Internet and the spectacularly publicised staging of organised crime, it is important in law 
enforcement to focus on medium and long-term action, rather than media hype that is no doubt useful but at the 
very least approximate in terms of analysis and follow-up. Therefore rapidly dismantling truly transnational 
organisations must remain the priority when taking action and assessing this action. On this point, a working 
group devoted to medicine counterfeiting could be created based on the Threat Mitigation Working Group450, 
which is a U.S. interagency structure involving the main actors involved in transnational organised crime.  
For major cases with a significant health impact but involving fewer actors, such as the Peter Gillespie case, 
there should be less focus on criminological monitoring and increased surveillance of the many pharmaceutical 
supply chain networks and sub-networks as this is where the greatest risk lies. A “law enforcement network” 
approach is therefore essential as is increased information-sharing between stakeholders. This approach must 
be rapidly available whenever necessary according to the criminal networks investigated. Although 
pharmaceutical company investigative departments have acquired this culture, it is less likely that more visible 
institutional agencies will have such a flexible organisation (with the notable exception of the MHRA). Yet this 
need for network-type organisation in law enforcement is not new. It was already the case in the Revco affair, a 
major pharmaceutical fraud concerning American Medicaid in the spring of 1977, where law enforcement 
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agencies worked as an effective temporary network to pursue the protagonists.451 This approach is widely 
neglected today. 
One might also wonder whether it is the responsibility of multinational drug companies to replace the governing 
powers as far as public health is concerned. Certain investigators (who does not wish to be named) hint at the 
fact that their actions are limited. American researcher Daniel C. K. Chow is harsher on this subject and quotes 
the example of China, with which multinationals are generally overcautious when it comes to negotiations. These 
large companies have too much of a tendency to favour short-term action when it is essential to develop legal, 
political and social expertise to establish truly effective solutions. As for anti-counterfeiting and brand protection 
leaders, according to Chow they generally lack the skills and training to address such issues. 452 
An excessive view that our report does not validate, but which has the merit of highlighting the fact that certain 
enforcement actions could benefit from certain major adjustments. At operational level it is no doubt easier to 
conduct investigations in the context of international trade rather than in China itself.453 
Ideally the crackdown on counterfeit medicines should be led by an international agency similar to Britain’s 
MHRA that has the power to investigate and intervene and real organisational and territorial mobility (contrary to 
Interpol, which primarily coordinates different national law enforcement services). Whatever the qualities of the 
pharmaceutical company investigative departments, it is not their job to undertake global public health missions 
and it is therefore essential for the authorities in the main countries concerned get past certain controversies 
related in particular to intellectual property law or other legal issues to achieve this type of structure. Such an 
agency would also be consistent with the police policy known in eighteenth century Germany as 
Polizeiwissenschaft, aimed generally at “bringing happiness to its subjects” and “maintaining regulations that 
tend to make life comfortable”. 454 Specifically this policing was “designed to mark and improve its place in the 
rivalry and competition between European states and ensure internal order through the “well-being of 
individuals”. 455  In this case the idea would be to apply this European approach to an international police 
specialising in medicines or public health issues.  
This strategic vision of trade control is confirmed by essayist Frédéric Gros according to whom the police must 
go “beyond the criminal or rebellious aspects, it is the life of the people, life as a fluid process that must be 
safeguarded”.456 
 
III.2.d. The issue of prevention 
This prevention can be improved in two ways: firstly through better controlling market forces and secondly 
through increasingly intensive training for those involved in anti-counterfeiting. 
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- Towards better control over market forces 
Although we have seen to what extent the concept of criminal organisation takes on various forms, one wonders 
if “the groups themselves are less important than the markets in which they operate”. 457 Political efforts should 
therefore “first and foremost interrupt market forces hidden behind this illicit trafficking. Breaking up each criminal 
group does not work, because every group arrested is immediately replaced (...). Tougher laws against mafia 
groups will not stop illegal activities if hidden markets remain unscathed”.  458 “The groups themselves are less 
important than the markets in which they operate”. 459 
Control over market forces is particularly important and significant on the Internet. As stated by researcher John 
Richard Castronova460, law enforcement on the Internet no doubt focuses more on reducing demand than on 
“Cyber Chase Operations”-type activities, the effectiveness of which is increasingly limited, particularly as certain 
illegal online pharmacies are domiciled in countries where it is difficult to enforce the law. Prevention should 
therefore essentially involve consumer education and giving legal online pharmacies much greater visibility and 
value. Castronova feels that the prices of medicines in the United States could also be a decisive factor in 
American consumer choice, steering them towards illegal sites rather than supporting product safety. The 
solution therefore also involves information campaigns on the risks of purchasing specific products and giving 
greater value to existing legal pharmacies (which are VIPPS-certified and have low visibility). In developing 
countries the restoration of the rule of law is no doubt the most important strategic element as expert Roger Bate 
of the American Enterprise Institute and the UNODC recently recalled in an international crime report. 461 This 
issue of decreasing demand, today still undervalued on the Internet462, is most likely strategic, but it should not, 
however, exclude crackdowns on major criminal networks.  
 
- The issue of training anti-counterfeiting organisations 
In order to reduce demand, training is essential. The many examples include the training of Nigerian NAFDAC463 
agents by its U.S. counterparts, which is a step in the right direction. The same NAFDAC was then able to send 
agents to China and India to help the local staff to conduct counterfeiting tests on medicines collected by local 
authorities before they were shipped to Nigeria.464 A salutary initiative. 
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One other example: in 2001 Pfizer set up a series of partnerships with the Chinese government465, an idea that 
should be developed. In 2004 the American company signed a partnership with the Shanghai Municipal Food 
and Drug Administration to detect and stop counterfeiting.466 Other agreements have followed and through these 
initiatives China has apparently been able to recover 600,000 packs of Viagra, 440,000 Viagra pills and 260 kilos 
of starting materials to produce counterfeit drugs.467  
Having said that, better prevention and training on the distribution of counterfeit medicines must also be 
accompanied by whistleblowers and experts able to lead public debate in a more rational manner, especially on 
criminal issues. 
 
III.2.e. The importance of whistleblowers and experts 
Whistleblowers and new forms of expertise have a strategic role in the fight related to the “counterfeit medicines 
– crime” combination. 
 
- Whistleblowers 
It is important for approximate evaluations concerning counterfeit medicines to be put into perspective in public 
debate. For example independent journalists and researchers could work in the academic field or the media to 
question certain studies or to guide the debate towards areas that are being neglected. Our analysis appears to 
show that the current definitions of counterfeiting pay little attention to “communication, interaction or comparison 
arousing less interest in the media. These areas can be classified as “discrete areas” or “specialised areas”468: 
Chinese industrial estates specialising in counterfeiting, free trade zones, free ports, tax havens, “digital 
havens”469, companies relaying spam, Internet forums, etc. are surprisingly virtually absent from public debate. 
These areas are particularly strategic as “they can be considered as often the first or even the primary places 
where one finds the definitional processes that give problems, namely risks, their characteristics while 
determining how they exist. Hence questions about the importance and meaning usually given to the publicising 
phase”.470 It is also important to support “local whistleblowers”. In China, most cases of counterfeit drugs are 
reported by the media, and a personality like Gao Jingde471, fighting the counterfeiters in his country, should be 
supported in his efforts. He noted in September 2008 that two-thirds of Chinese pharmacies sold counterfeit 
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medicines…472. Strangely, even in ‘authoritarian’ countries like Syria, Egypt and China, there are visible or more 
discrete lobbyists. In Syria the medical training of Bashar al-Assad (Doctor in ophthalmology) and his 
cardiologist father-in-law in London contributed to raising the awareness of the Syrian government on certain law 
enforcement measures (ironically, in light of the current situation).  
It is also essential to adapt information on networks involved in counterfeit medicines to the public (politicians, 
consumers, young internet users, etc.). Anthropologist Mary Douglas has shown how “the ways dangers are 
apprehended and ranked differ greatly depending on the structure of social groups and networks of special 
commitments which individuals have entered”473. This implies that the information should be adapted to the 
social group. Although this is not the place to debate communication policies vis-à-vis the general public on 
these issues, it may be noted that the most strategic whistleblowers are most likely found among healthcare 
professionals and policymakers. The latter appear too often to have delegated the issue of counterfeiting to 
external (public or private) organisations whose effectiveness should be further questioned as lobbying issues 
are sometimes confused with monopoly protection issues. In light of our previous thoughts on the importance of 
international coordination and the ‘white-collar crime’ aspect related to the pharmaceutical industry, it is 
important to better inform these 2 groups about the risks associated with medicine counterfeiting through well-
dosed, targeted, and pragmatic information. It is important in some cases for these warnings to be fast, 
especially in crisis situations and the Internet offers many real-time mapping opportunities that are hardly used 
by stakeholders. This view, which may have its limits, would especially make it possible to make “the risks 
palpable” and thereby make the warnings of criminal threat “credible”474. 
 
- Experts 
Lastly, it is essential for some of these whistleblowers to also provide expertise, particularly by making visible 
what is not475. However, the current environment does not lend itself to this kind of initiative and pharmaceutical 
industry experts are often especially discrete in this area: even companies that specialise in the traceability of 
medicines do not wish to share information on this subject. This is probably due to a lack of independence as “it 
would appear that the high level of interaction today between these experts’ sectors and the economic sectors 
(...) makes it increasingly problematic to remain ‘outside the circle’. There are so many conflicts of interest that it 
becomes difficult to recruit experts who are both competent and have no ties with the issues they must 
analyse”476. It is particularly important for more economists to become involved in such topics, particularly 
organised crime, to decipher the illegal aspects of these networks, but also and especially their involvement in 
legal activities.477 
In terms of expertise, it is also necessary to develop connections with the research community, particularly at an 
early stage, to anticipate problems. As we have seen in relation to the profile of criminal organisations in our 
area of study, work should not be limited to criminology research centres, which, in addition, are often not in 
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touch with operational issues. What’s more, it can be assumed, as indicated in a National Security report478, that 
the fight against the most complex transnational criminal organisations involves the use of more varied expertise 
from the industry, finances, academia, civil society and NGOs drawing on a greater number of varied 
partnerships. 
Indeed, the use of other academic profiles (geography, economics, management, industrial risk specialists in the 
pharmaceutical industry, scientists) will enable traceability techniques to be developed for use in certain 
investigations to trace the sources. In a case of antimalarial medicine counterfeiting for example, a pollen 
analysis technique helped to identify the source of production of medicines counterfeited in southern China on 
the border with Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar.479 These investigations were coordinated by Interpol, WHO and 
Wellcome Trust, a medical research fund based in London. A certain type of pollen and calcite, a mineral from 
the Guangxi province, was specifically able to identify the suspect area. Armed with this information, the Chinese 
authorities were able to arrest Xu Qiang, a middleman in the Yunnan province. He used to sell legitimate 
pharmaceuticals but also became involved in illicit trafficking when he was approached by Burmese traders who 
wanted counterfeit medicines to sell them at a substantial profit.  
In the emerging digital world it is unlikely that the experts in question will be found in the conventional 
criminological field as “criminology, which seems in an ideal position to apply its theories and methodological 
tools to analyse cybercrime, is struggling to understand the deviances found in the digital world”480. As for 
computer scientists, they tend to restrict their thoughts to the technical aspects and the societal aspects are 
often overlooked.  
The research centre in Michigan481, which combines criminological and pharmaceutical approaches, is a model 
that should undoubtedly be implemented in other countries. In terms of expertise, the creation of hybrid 
forums482, aimed at co-producing knowledge, in particular through discussions between scientists (or engineers, 
researchers), and political action, is essential. It is therefore necessary for these forums to rapidly find fields of 
expression and for credible albeit sometimes patchy information to support their efforts as we have seen just to 
what extent approximate information can lead to problems in public debate. Generally speaking it is important to 
recognise the legitimacy of minority views483, which are particularly interested in strategic and undervalued areas 
of public debate which tend to be avoided by some individuals with professional expertise who seek to “keep 
their considerations pure”.484 
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III.2.f. Internet specificities 
It is important for law enforcers to really consider all the specificities of the Internet and we propose in this 
context four priorities for more effective law enforcement. 
 
- A specific network 
Given our previous thoughts on the Internet, many law enforcers appear to pay little attention to the actual way 
this digital network functions. It would be useful to better understand the particularities of counterfeiting on this 
virtual network before initiating enforcement measures. In fact, most of the challenges of counterfeiting on the 
Internet raise issues that go well beyond the concept of ‘real or fake’ products because “in a networked world the 
question of authenticity is no longer valid”485 and “the economic value is more related to ideas than to the 
physical ownership of goods or services”.486 To summarize, in a largely post-industrial context, the control over 
information has become the central challenge rather than product counterfeiting in the strictest sense. In this 
society of information “it is crucial to know who receives the information, how and by what means, about whom 
and what and for what purpose they are sent”487. In addition, an object’s value “does not stem from its rarity as it 
can easily be duplicated almost infinitely”.488 The infinite nature of information over a network devoid of any 
centre or hierarchical governance introduces complex challenges for those involved in the fight against 
cybercrime. Indeed, conventional information, investigation and infiltration techniques are difficult to apply, to say 
the least, in such an environment and we have seen that the removal of sites specialising in counterfeit drugs is 
probably only a temporary solution.489 On the Internet the asymmetry between law enforcement authorities and 
the criminal is particularly strong and benefits the fraudster even more than in the ‘real’ world: “computer hackers 
have a choice of weapons while defenders have to consider all scenarios. (...) How is it possible to adhere to the 
sacrosanct principles of simultaneous and proportionate response for attacks that last a few milliseconds in an 
unpredictable environment?”. 490 
As for anti-counterfeiting techniques proposed by companies such as MarkMonitor, which consist of 
“understanding both distribution channels and digital promotion vehicles to develop effective neutralization 
strategies”491, they remain limited, to say the least, as online counterfeiting network strategies will always have 
the upper hand over these law enforcement techniques. 
Lastly, radical solutions such as filtering are technically questionable492 and imply questioning the very principle 
of individual freedoms on the Internet. In the medium term it in fact seems implausible to expect an overall 
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decrease in the risk of Internet crimes: a study conducted by the Oxford Internet Institute493 concluded that for 
38% of experts surveyed, the Internet will never provide a minimal risk of crime and a reasonable degree of 
privacy, and only 27% of them think that the situation will improve by 2020. 
In this context: what law enforcement solutions are there to counter criminal strategies on the Internet? 
 
- Four priorities for more effective law enforcement 
Four priorities warrant further consideration to improve the fight against online crime linked to medicine 
counterfeiting. 
The first priority area involves targeted lobbying. This lobbying would especially concern middlemen helping to 
promote online counterfeiting sites and in particular search engines. 
Indeed, adequate legal lobbying can be effective: as a result of measures taken by the FDA, in 2010 Yahoo494 
and Google had to adapt their search engine to retain only accredited online pharmacies (VIPPS - Verified 
Internet Pharmacy Practice Sites). In September 2010, Google sued several pharmaceutical advertisers who 
circumvented its new policy and in January 2011 the Californian company tightened its selection criteria once 
again. On a European or even international scale, pressure on the middlemen can therefore be useful when well 
argued and relayed effectively by policy. That said, the impact of this legal arsenal against illegal online 
pharmacies should be put into perspective as, on the Internet, “conventional legislation against illegal online 
pharmacies is actually less effective than against illegal physical entities”. 495  
A more original type of lobbying could target consumer protection associations or health sector representatives. 
With “public health” arguments it is possible to convince people of the need to better inform consumers but 
especially pharmaceutical middlemen (wholesalers, importers) about the risks and trends in online counterfeit 
medicine distribution. 
 
The second idea is to identify the strategic hubs of online counterfeit medicine distribution. This strategy involves 
having, on a regular basis, a ‘snapshot’ of the most significant illicit trafficking. 
According to a recent LegitScript report496, while there are 450 accredited companies worldwide for registering 
domain names, half of illegal online pharmacies, which mostly sell medicines without requiring a prescription, 
actually obtain their domain name from two companies: Internet.bs and AB Systems. More specifically, at least 
one-third of illegal online pharmacies use Internet.bs, a relatively small company operating in the Bahamas and 
that advertises aggressively under the title ‘offshore company’. As for the second operator, AB Systems, it exists 
solely for illegal online pharmacies to register domain names and advertise. 
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Figure 19: The Top 10 domain names that control illicit pharmacies. 
Source of chart: Legitscript, March 2012. 
 
 
As LegitScript states, ICANN497 should have the means to challenge the Internet.bs website’s right to register 
domain names.498 Based on this argument, lobbying ICANN would seem highly useful. The idea would be to 
steer law enforcement as early as possible before the risk of counterfeiting, namely by soliciting Internet-related 
organisations that have a strategic role often misjudged by many stakeholders. 
As we discussed earlier499, initiatives relating to the results of the main search engines to block access to the 
most visible counterfeit medicine distribution websites also seems essential. 
Computer experts could be used to negotiate better with the major search engines on issues that are highly 
technical. A growing ‘public-private’ partnership approach is essential here and LegitScript cooperates with the 
Center for Safe Internet Pharmacies (CSIP)500, a non-profit organisation of leading companies to create a portal 
with a database with which Internet service providers can monitor and close down illegal websites. 
 
The third idea is indeed to establish leading partnerships with research centres specialising in digital issues. We 
have been able to identify relevant studies by research centres in California and New York501. The purpose of 
such a partnership would be twofold: 
- To better understand on a global scale how online counterfeit medicine distribution works and analyse the 
major trends scientifically and independently. It is important to note here that data from specialised companies 
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like MarkMonitor and Sophos can sometimes be conflicting: for example, in the ranking of the leading spam-
relaying countries, studies502 by these two companies conducted at similar dates (summer 2009 and January-
March 2010), placed China in first place (MarkMonitor) and fifteenth place (Sophos). It is therefore necessary 
to regularly provide independent information from the private sector using transparent methods to ensure that 
such information can be used to help stakeholders with decision-making as it is difficult to incorporate issues 
that are both industrial and digital on a global scale. The newness of the subject explains this situation in part.   
- Secondly, technical solutions with such advanced laboratories could be tested and even replicated on a larger 
scale. They would no doubt cost less than the work of companies specialised in this field and could facilitate 
innovative solutions that could help all drug manufacturers affected by counterfeiting. Lastly, it would be useful, 
in partnership with these research centres, to fully consider the developments in this information society 
because it is likely that, like Google, new Internet companies will soon disrupt brand and product protection 
strategies in the pharmaceutical sector.                                                                                                                
 
The fourth priority involves an overview of the criminal issues and paradoxically favours “offline” activities to fight 
against illegal online distribution. Medicine counterfeiting is “a multifaceted problem that requires a global holistic 
response”.503  The challenge is to avoid the exhaustion of hunting down every counterfeiter on the Internet but to 
always involve the ‘real world’ in analyses and operational actions. Indeed, the Internet is just one stream in the 
distribution of counterfeit medicines and it is essential to identify, for the most extensive distribution networks, at 
what level there are connections between ‘real distribution’ and ‘online distribution’. On a more theoretical level, 
more generally one can consider that “an increasing number of activities are born in digital spaces and non-
digital spaces”504 and stress the importance of an analytical “border zone”505 between these two worlds and the 
concept of ‘interlocking’ to perceive this challenge as “the real and digital have reciprocal effects but do not 
become hybrid and each world maintains its particularities”.506 As Europol has stated, such flexibility “requires 
investigators to be well aware of both online and offline environments in which criminals operate”.507 The analysis 
of offline trade in relation to online activities is particularly relevant in ‘grey’ zones such as free trade zones or 
free ports: indeed, according to Ilisa Bernstein508, Director of Pharmacy Affairs at the FDA, a number of vendors 
on the Internet are based in these free trade zones. According to the International Chamber of Commerce509, 
these areas include: Paraguay (Cuidad del Este), the United Arab Emirates, China (Hong Kong, Shanghai, 
Guangdong), Panama, Taiwan and Mexico (Zona Frontera Norte). Yet little information is available on these 
strategic “criminogenic interstices” in medicine counterfeiting and the goal would therefore be to better 
understand what lies in the cracks between the ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ worlds. 
                                                        
 
 
502 MarkMonitor sudy, Brandjacking Index, summer 2009. 
Sophos study conducted January to March 2010. Source: Presswire.com, “Dirty dozen spam-relaying countries revealed by 
Sophos; China dramatically disappears from list of worse spam-relaying nations for the first time”, M2 Presswire, April 28, 2010. 
503Albert I. Wertheimer, Perry G. Wang, Counterfeit Medicines Volume I: Policy, economics and Countermeasures, ILM 
Publications, 2012, p. 106. 
504 Saskia Sassen, La globalisation. Une sociologie, Gallimard, 2009, p. 244. 
505 On the concept of boundaries see Franck Guarnieri, Eric Przyswa, “Cybercriminalité et contrefaçon : pour une nouvelle analyse 
des risques et des frontières”, Murs et frontières, Hermès, No. 63, 2012. 
506 Ibidem.  
507 Europol, Threat Assessment, Internet Facilitated Organised Crime, iOCTA, 2011. 
508 Walt Bogdanich, “Traffic in fake drugs prospers in network of free trade zones”, The New York Times, December 18, 2007. 
509 International Chamber of Commerce, The international anti-counterfeiting directory, Protecting the world against the plague of 
counterfeiting, 2008, p. 7. 
- All rights reserved -  
 
107 
As we suggested earlier we can also assume that the ‘real’ trade should be prioritised by law enforcers. Issues 
related to cybercrime organisations or Google are certainly strategic but perhaps improperly, and often 
fruitlessly, attract public debate, leaving in the shadows the bigger challenges we have mentioned. Therefore our 
findings are similar to those of anthropologist Bruno Latour510 according to whom “the expansion of digital 
technology has greatly increased the physical aspect of the networks: the more the digital environment becomes 
digital, the more the physical dimension overrides the virtual in a given activity”. This view therefore confirms the 
dominance of the ‘real’ world in deciphering the ‘(cyber)crime-counterfeit medicines’ combination, which is also 
expected to have implications for the priorities in the crackdown on identified ‘loopholes’. However, we have also 
seen that all of these reflections should not bring into question the necessary albeit late adjustments to the 
development of legitimate online pharmacies and strong awareness campaigns for internet users. 
At the end of our analysis of law enforcement aspects we observed that the most relevant initiatives, both in 
analytical and operational terms, are often the result of individual initiatives (blogger Brian Krebs), semi-private 
initiatives (Legitscript), academic initiatives (Michigan university, US university centres concerning the Internet) 
or a few rare institutions with a recent or novel approach (MHRA in Britain). Yet these whistleblowers and 
innovative structures do not appear to be sufficiently considered as ‘models’ by many policymakers, who are 
often solicited by highly visible and better ‘positioned’ institutional and private organisations. Analytically, it is 
therefore essential, like the company Legitscript, to have more reports and studies, especially on a European 
scale, to stringently and independently demonstrate the major risks in the area of (cyber)crime to enhance public 
debate on these complex issues. However, there is a surprising lack of regular European and Asian research on 
this subject, most studies being British or American and of good quality. It would therefore be useful in particular 
to have Chinese, Indian, African, North European and Eastern European feedback as these are strategic areas 
as far as this problem is concerned. 
On an operational level, the creation of a mobile international agency with powers to investigate and arrest, 
focusing on counterfeit medicines (or health-related products) is a serious option that would be relevant if given 
the appropriate resources. Regarding the Internet, such an agency could rely on specialised partnerships with 
academia, which is too offered neglected on digital issues or on the European cybercrime agency ENISA511, 
which is surprisingly not involved in issues of online counterfeiting. 
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Conclusion 
 
Through this analysis, we have demonstrated that there are obvious ties between ‘criminal organisations’ and 
‘medicine counterfeiting’. However, although white-collar crime controls most of the trafficking in developed 
countries, crime in developing countries such as China appears to be much tougher to define. The most 
common analytical error is to focus on conventional criminal organisations that appear to be more on the fringes 
of this problem. 
There are obviously grey areas both concerning reality but also the extent of the phenomenon, especially its 
health impacts. The global environment - and thus the counterfeiting and criminal environment-, has clearly 
gained in complexity and speed under the influence of globalisation, emerging markets, the Chinese industry 
and the Internet. In this hypercomplexity, we have seen that in many cases, the ‘real and fake’, licit and illicit “are 
interlocked in an attempt to divert their distinctive signs. They are interconnected, based on new mechanical 
switching rituals”.512 
It is therefore important to decipher these ‘new rituals’ further, particularly those related to ‘criminal networks’. 
Overpassiveness, especially from institutions supposed to fight against counterfeiting, has benefited criminal 
organisations that cleverly use loopholes in the international system. Crime involved in medicine counterfeiting 
leads somewhat to “revenge for the purpose that forces us to consider it”513 and should make us question further 
the available studies. 
With such a boomerang effect, is it not appropriate to review our analytical system to “conceive extreme 
phenomena”?514 Does deciphering the issues of medicine counterfeiting as effectively as possible in the ‘real’ 
and ‘virtual’ worlds not imply “being more hyper-real than what is real, more virtual than virtual reality”?515 Is it not 
true that the fragmentation of law enforcement intelligence and the fragmentation of international trade doubly 
benefit counterfeiters, who appear to have increasingly professional agility and speed? In short, like the 
counterfeiters, surely it is important to dramatically anticipate with a sharp flair for loopholes and what is 
marginal? Yet, as writer Jean Baudrillard quite rightly stated in his book The perfect crime in 1995, “we are now 
lagging behind events. Although they can sometimes appear to fall behind, they in fact have long since 
overtaken us. Hence a delayed interpretation, which is merely the retrospective presentation of the 
unforeseeable event”.516  
This extreme vision of the ‘perfect crime’ should be put into perspective as medicine counterfeiting tends to rely 
more on loopholes than the mastery of counterfeiting networks that operate as we have described. 
Law enforcers (including French customs and certain pharmaceutical company investigative departments) often 
seem to be working professionally and with determination in a difficult and increasingly complex context. 
Certainly the issues are also addressed in the medium and long-term term through international negotiations or 
based on geopolitical parameters that partly escape health professionals.  
But as we have detailed, operational flexibilities also exist in the short term and some expertise is clearly 
underused. Therefore for the industry it is important not only to better understand the illegal trade of counterfeit 
drugs by acquiring a more powerful and imaginative centralised intelligence approach but also to question law 
enforcers on the meaning of their tasks and to guide politician’s budgetary policies based on pragmatic and 
flexible choices, calling upon independent and credible whistleblowers if necessary.  
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As for cybercrime, one may figuratively wonder whether it is not embodied by “intelligent machines” that sense 
(...) the dark paths of accidents and disasters?”517 In this context law enforcement on the Internet seems to be 
currently surpassed by illegal trade and these automated “intelligent machines” and unless the very logic of the 
network is challenged, the situation, like the real world, will never be entirely controllable. Paradoxically, the 
partially new challenges of the Internet are more present in the so-called ‘real’ world or in a ‘real-virtual’ 
interaction still emerging, than strictly speaking on this “network of networks”. 
Although the professionals in the sector still appear somehow to control the overall situation, an unexpected 
major health scare or a major counterfeiting case in a “high media profile” area (China, Europe, North America, 
etc.) could shake this balance, particularly through communication channels on the Internet where the 
overzealous ‘tell-all’ policy may damage certain actors’ sometimes excessive taste for secrecy.  
Taking rapid new initiatives that are both strategic and operational is therefore not an empty project. Without 
such initiatives counterfeit medicines would increasingly be “a hidden object that becomes elusive, paradoxical, 
ambiguous that infects the subject itself with this ambiguity and its analysis protocol”.518  
And it would therefore benefit criminals of all kinds. 
   
                                                        
 
 
517 Jean Baudrillard, Le crime parfait, Galilée, 1995, p. 65. 
518 Jean Baudrillard, Le crime parfait, Galilée, 1995, p. 84. 
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Glossary of acronyms 
- AFSSAPS: The AFSSAPS became the ANSM on May 1, 2012. 
- ANSM: French National Agency for the Safety of Medicinal and Health Products 
- CEIS: European Strategic Intelligence Company. 
- CJEU: Court of Justice of the European Union. 
- CNAC: French National Anti-Counterfeiting Committee. 
- CREDOC: Research centre for the study and observation of living conditions. 
- DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration. 
- EAASM: European Alliance for Access to Safe Medicines. 
- ENISA: European Network and Information Security Agency. 
- FARC: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia.  
- FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
- FDA: US Food and Drug Administration. 
- ICANN: Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. 
- ICE: US Immigration and Customs Enforcement. 
- IFPMA: International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturer & Associations. 
- IMPACT: International Medicines Products Anti-counterfeiting Task force. 
- INTERPOL: International Criminal Police Organization. 
- IRA: Irish Republican Army. 
- IRACM: Institute of Research Against Counterfeit Medicines. 
- LEEM: French association of pharmaceutical companies. 
- MA: Marketing Authorisation. 
- MHRA: Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency. 
- NABP: National Association of Boards of Pharmacy. 
- NAFDAC: The National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control. 
- OCLAESP: French central office for the fight against damage to the environment and public health.   
- OECD: Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development. 
- OOS: Out Of Specification. 
- PSI: Pharmaceutical Security Institute.  
- RBN: Russian Business Network. 
- SNDJ: French National Judicial Customs Service. 
- TAZ: Temporary Autonomy Zone.  
- UDRP: Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy. 
- UN: United Nations. 
- UNICRI: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. 
- UNIFAB: French Association of Manufacturers. 
- VIPPS: Verified Internet Pharmacy Practice Sites. 
- WAITO: World Anti Illicit Traffic Organization. 
- WCO: World Customs Organisation. 
- WHO: World Health Organization. 
- WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization. 
- WTO: World Trade Organization. 
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List of interviews (in alphabetical order) 
 
1. Roger Bate, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C., USA. 
2. Stéphane Berlot, Regional Manager France, MarkMonitor, Paris, France. 
3. Thierry Bourret, Director General of the National Gendarmerie, OCLAEPS, Arcueil, France. 
4. Daniel C. K. Chow, Professor, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University, Columbus, USA. 
5. Philippe Collier, Chief Editor, Contrefaçon Riposte, Paris, France. 
6. Silvain Coué, FSP Mekong, International Technical Expert, Advisor to the Commissioner General of the Cambodian 
National Police, Cambodia. 
7. Gregory Crabb, Inspector In Charge, Revenue, Product and Global Security at U.S. Postal Inspection Service, 
Washington D.C., USA. 
8. Michele Forzley, Global Public Health Lawyer & Professor Widener School of Law, Silver Spring, USA. 
9. Thomas Gayet, Director Cert-Lexsi, Bagnolet, France. 
10. Patrick Haeyaert, Head of Information Management Department, Corporate Economic Security, Sanofi, Paris, 
France. 
11. Mike Jones, F.I. Adviser, MHRA, London, UK. 
12. Tom Kubic, President and CEO, PSI, Washington D.C., USA. 
13. Jean-Luc Moreau, Global Head Product Security, Novartis, Basel, Switzerland. 
14. Doug Moyer, Adjunct Instructor, Program in Public Health, College of Human Medicine, Michigan State University, 
USA. 
15. Jérôme Pierrat, Journalist, Paris, France. 
16. Philippe Van Eeckhout, Chairman, Contratak, Paris, France. 
17. Chris Vansteenkiste, Project Manager IPR Crime Unit, Europol, The Hague, Netherlands. 
18. Simeon Wilson, Director Global Security, Astra Zeneca, London, UK. 
 
Certain interviewees preferred not to be named. 
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